FROM NATURE TO ECONOMICS

What we have already arrived at in chapters 2 and 3—six levels of reflection (proximity, totality, mediation, exteriority, alienation, and liberation) in four metaphysical situations (politics, sexuality, pedagogics, and antifetishism)—must now be implanted within the confines of nature, semiotics, poetics, and economics. This discourse multiplies by four the degree of complexity arrived at in chapter 3.

4.1 NATURE

4.1.1 Status Questionis

4.1.1.1 The practical relationship with the other (see chap. 3) always includes a person-to-nature relationship of proxemics or poiesis. It is of this nature that we must speak here. Nature is not the cosmos (2.3.3.1) or culture (4.2-4). Nature is not yet the matter of human labor, which has a significance, a history, dialectically opposed to culture. Nature, the part of the cosmos that is included in the world, is formed by natural beings (4.1.2.2). It is the phenomenal totality structured by a physical, astronomical, or inorganic and organic, vegetable, and animal order. We must describe the potential matter (C in diagram 4) of human labor (the matter of semiotics, poiesis, and economics), its destruction and ecological regeneration.
4.1.2 Nature and Politics

4.1.2.1 Naive realism and materialism (such as that of Engels) assert that the cosmos ($A$ in diagram 4) is what is first; and they eliminate the notion of nature as it is understood here. Idealism (such as that of Sartre) affirms the world and consciousness as first and confuses the real cosmos with worldly nature ($B$). For its part, philosophy of liberation, beyond critical realism or Heideggerian thinking (an ontological idealism), surpasses the false contradiction of realism-idealism by affirming the real anteriority of the cosmos ($ordo realitatis$), the existential $a$ $priori$ of the world ($ordo cognoscendi$), and the economic interpretation of nature ($ordo operandi$).

4.1.2.2 Nature is the totality of noncultural beings ($B$ in diagram 4) included in the world (2.2.7) that, without ceasing to be part of the cosmos as real things (2.3.8.1), nevertheless have as foundation of their sense the historical $proyecto$ of the world (2.2.3.2). Nature is the intramundane reality: besides essence (3.4.7.3), it has sense (2.3.8.3)—that is, it is a natural being. A natural being is a sense-thing in potency (4.2-4) or, better and more exactly stated, a natural thing with sense (differentiating it from the cultural thing or artifact, which is, properly speaking,
the sense-thing). Nature is the phenomenon (2.2.3) of the cosmos; it is the appearance of the cosmos in the world as totality. Nature as phenomenal totality is constituted by natural beings or phenomena, by natural (5.1.3), noncultural, data.

4.1.2.3 It is from the world—from a historical, political, sexual, or symbolically determined world—that we comprehend nature and interpret natural beings. If there is a history of the world, there is likewise a history of nature. That is, the Greeks understood physis as eternal, divine, nascent; the medievals understood natura as created (natura naturata), finite, without a principle of corruption; modern Europeans have understood nature or Natur as matter that is mathematically observable (since Galileo) or economically exploitable (since the Industrial Revolution). Nature, along with work and capital, is the origin of the myth of civilizing progress. It will now be understood what is meant when it is said that nature is, interpreted politically: it is hermeneutically visualized from the center or from the periphery (4.1.8), from diverse social classes, from political systems, principally, as the matter of a mode of production in a determined social structure.

4.1.3 Physical Substantivity

4.1.3.1 Nature, the noncultured part of the cosmos in the world (hence a negative notion with regard to human labor), is the phenomenal appearance of that which is real, of itself, anterior to the world in the order of manifestation, which is to be distinguished from the order of revelation (2.4.5.2-3) and of real constitution (3.4.7.1). Kant referred to nature as the unknowable noumenon (object of the archetypal creative intellectus), and to that which we call nature as the order of physical objects constituted by the a priori category of understanding. We must affirm that the cosmos is really known in its real constitution (derived comprehension is real discovery; 2.2.4.7) but never interpreted in its entirety (due to the exteriority of the cosmos; hence there will always be a possibility of a future history of nature). The cosmos, hence, is known as a worldly phenomenon—that is, it is constituted in its historical meaning (2.3.5.6) as nature.

4.1.3.2 Real constitution is known concomitantly in all
true interpretation of sense. Thus we know the cosmos as nature. From nature we formulate models that allow us to understand what the cosmos is. I shall call universe the model of the cosmos insofar as it is nature, but on its macrophysical, astrophysical level.

4.1.3.3 Today the most acceptable model of the universe (very different from that thought of by Aristotle in his *Physics*, Holbach in his *Système de la nature*, Schelling or Hegel in their *Naturphilosophie*) unites cosmology or astronomy with cosmogony; the universe is neither eternal (as it was for Aristotle and Maimonides), nor incorruptible or changeless (as it was for Aquinas), nor infinite in space. On the contrary, it underwent a zero time \( t^0 \); it is in a finite expanding space. The universe is young; it still has abundant hydrogen. The earth is more than four thousand million years old. We can calculate exactly, according to Ambartsoumian, the age of the sun, of the stars, and of the galaxies. We can even know that the galaxies move away with a velocity \( V \) proportional to their distance \( d \), as Slipher tells us.

4.1.3.4 Microphysics, with its corpuscular or undulatory model, tells us of a nucleus and electrons, atoms and molecules, and macromolecules, which begin by being microscopic and end by becoming more and more complex.

4.1.3.5 All the physical cosmos, even before being included as nature or modeled as universe, is in reality a macrosystem with its own unity, coherence, and substantivity. I want to emphasize that it is *one*, unique. A pile of rocks has only additive unity. The cosmos as real totality has constitutional unity. It can include many substances (hydrogen, iron, lead: *substantia* or *ousia*), but they are subsumed within a real physical system. The constitutional unity of the interdependent notes that make it a system is substantivity, as Zubiri says (which is not the traditional substantivity). In this case it is the substantivity or unity of the system of the cosmos as real physical totality. Unity does not come from a mere process of combination or complexification, but from an effective physical coherence, which is not that of an organic or a mechanical artifact. It is a composed substantivity *sui generis*: the physical cosmic system. Philosophy of nature should explore these themes.
4.1.4 Living Substantivity

4.1.4.1 The totality of the cosmos, hence, functions as only one thing: a single reality essentially constituted, of itself, from within itself (*ex se*, not *a se*), a real system, which is included in the world as nature. In such nature, we ought now to differentiate the merely physical (from astrophysics to the microphysical intra-atomic level) or inorganic and the living (which begins in organic being).

4.1.4.2 Among inorganic beings, it seems that the heavier nuclei are more recent. There is, then, a transformation in the physical cosmos, according to certain patterns. In all events, the astrophysical cosmos, although immense, possesses a relatively simple and homogeneous structure; its greater complexity is only a totality of macromolecules in process of entropy, transforming formidable quantities of energy into mass, or hydrogen into substances atomically heavier than it. The physical cosmos tends toward an immobile stabilization.

4.1.4.3 But within that cosmos an antientropic phenomenon takes place—life—where a much greater complexity can be seen in a single living cell. In terms of the heterogeneous functionality of the structural parts of the substantive living system, a single cell has more complexity than the whole inorganic cosmos.

4.1.4.4 Life appears in the cosmos. It has been on earth between three and four thousand million years. It originates and goes through a process of evolution. This poses three themes: living substantivity, the phylogenetic multiplication of the individual within a species, and evolution through a process of metaspeciation.

4.1.4.5 The substantivity of the whole inorganic cosmos is unique. It is only one thing. Atoms, molecules, and conglomerates such as rocks, planets, and galaxies, are singular parts of only one system. By contrast, each living being, from the unicellular to the vegetable or animal, has a relatively individual substantivity—not as much as in the case of the human person, a unique individual in the proper metaphysical sense because of its autonomy. The quasi-individual substantivity of each living being has unity in its constitutive notes, with greater coherence and functional heterogeneity than does the whole inanimate physical system.
4.1.4.6 The greatest living unity and individuality can be seen in the reproductive capacity of phylogenetic self-multiplication into stable species through the reproduction of new individuals with genetic identity or with similar specific, hereditary characteristics. Individuals become a species (it is not the species that becomes individualized). A species is the totality of constitutive notes by reason of which a constitutive essence belongs to a determinate phylum.

4.1.4.7 Species evolve. That is, in the generation of the new individual they can transmit a system or a constitutive genetic scheme with possibilities for a new speciation. The origination of specific essences by metaspeciation is what is called evolution. Evolution becomes complete only when a new individual is produced that possesses in its system or genetic scheme constitutive notes different from those of the progenitor and that can, on its own, multiply as a new species; then it is the head of a new phylum. The living substantivity or essence is hence evolutive. Life would, then, seem to be what Bergson called the élán vital or biological finality that surpasses entropy and is directed to ever greater degrees of complexity and consciousness. Philosophical biology must reflect on this thematic.

4.1.5 Human Substantivity

4.1.5.1 Real things, individual and specific essences, evolve—from the unicellular to the pluricellular, from the vegetable to the animal, from the insects to the vertebrates, from the fish to the amphibians, birds, and mammals, and seventy million years ago—the primates. More than three million years ago, finally, homo appears, in the beginning perhaps as homo habilis; two hundred thousand years ago as homo sapiens with distinct racial differentiations.

4.1.5.2 Only the human being has sufficient substantivity to be considered something individual, autonomous, separate, and independent. The systemic coherence of essential human notes is of a maximum closure: it is the only thing really totalized constitutively. This is so not only because of possessing the constitutive note of intelligence, but more because of possessing the note of real alterity: it is a being for the other. Arms and legs, sexual organs, cranial configuration, speech apparatus—a per-
son's entire bodiliness is orientated not only to its intelligence, but also—to say it once more—to its metaphysical reference to the other. It is the openness to the other, to other-directedness, that enables a person to be a person, to be substantivity properly so called.

4.1.5.3 Physical substantivity is unresponsive, unique, and closed. Living substantivity ranges from the plant, which shows certain inside-outside reactions (in photosynthesis), to the animals, which can originate a response to stimulus thanks to a nervous system, progressively more complicated in "higher" animals. Nevertheless, mere sensibility and the first degree of sensory-motor intelligence do not enable the individual to separate itself distinctively and autonomously from the species. Only in the human being, because of its nervous system, which has an incalculable relational coherence due to the fourteen thousand million neurons in the cerebral cortex, is the experience of the proximity of total exteriority and the handling of multiple mediations in the totality of the world possible.

4.1.5.4 Humankind did not first appear as a species knowing how to comprehend, interpret, and question as it does today. Within the same human species there was a maturation of essence. From *homo habilis*, the Pithecanthropus or Neanderthal, to *homo sapiens* there was a maturation of constitutive notes. Earlier human beings could have been intelligent but not rational or free (as a child is intelligent from its birth but reaches the age of reason at the end of infancy, and freedom during adolescence). In the same manner persons must have first expressed themselves as a totalized species, minimally individualized as separate, distinct exteriority, as other. In *homo sapiens* the dominion of rationality must have affirmed itself clearly as a free, independent exteriority, thus enabling it to be the subject of pulsion toward alterity and of very complex communicative, relational semiotics (for example, human language).

4.1.5.5 On the fact of human independence, of the free and exterior closure of human substantivity, depends the fact that each individual is distinct and not merely different (3.3.3.3). The human species is not constituted univocally by individuals differentiated from a single identity. The human species is formed by distinct individuals who shape history (a human being is a *res eventualis* and not merely a natural being). The content of the
species is analogous, similar, but with individual distinction (and not mere difference). It is a species that has a history, world history; human beings are individuals who have a biography. The metaphysics of exteriority and liberation depends on the real *sui generis* constitution of human substantivity, absolute closure, freedom, responsibility, separate and independent totality with a semiotic function vis-à-vis the totality of the physical or living cosmos and even vis-à-vis all the rest of the individuals of the human species. The only free being that has a world is the other. Philosophical anthropology studies these issues.

4.1.6 *Nature and Eros*

4.1.6.1 It is the human being that turns toward the other as exteriority but with a specific analogous unity, and because of this it turns toward systematic social structures (classes, nations, etc.) toward social formations (with modes of production). The human person, thanks to freedom and separation, is the only being that can turn itself toward and reflect on things in order to comprehend them in its world. To unfold a world (2.2) is a real constitutive note of a human being. To include in that world inanimate and animate cosmic things is what has happened ever since humankind has been on earth, from the moment of its appearance. Hence nature is as old as human nature. The first human circumspection (2.2.5.5) of the cosmos established nature as the comprehended part of the cosmos (*B* in diagram 4).

4.1.6.2 That first nature could not have been other than inhospitable, a cause of terror (because of terrifying natural phenomena, the ferocity of wild animals, incomprehensibility of their actions): cold, hunger, solitude, confusion. Attacking humankind on every front, nature advanced threateningly to the horizon of *eros*.

4.1.6.3 Nature as landscape, as a place in which to reside, dress, eat, as a horizon still without frontiers—an aggressive, savage, chaotic nature—is the erotic nature where humankind will make its house; it is ecologic (both "ecology" and "economy" come from the Greek stem "house": *oikia*). In this manner there originates the person-cosmos dialectic, the emergence of nature as habitat.

4.1.6.4 From nature persons take, for example, wood,
which—after the domestication of fire—is warmth, security, and light (3.2.8.1). In that nature they discover the cavern as house, the stone as door, the fruits of the earth as nourishment, and the animals that one day they will shepherd in order to replenish their supply of protein. Nature is nourishing, sheltering, protective, and maternal. It is the beautiful nature of the splendor of dawn and of twilight, of the rivulets of the mountains, of the song of the nightingale, of the fierceness of the oceans, of the perfume of the rose.

4.1.7 Nature and Imperialism

4.1.7.1 Gardenlike nature has now been transformed by the human species into an immense dunghill. Humankind, which once lived in respect for the terra mater and even rendered worship to it, now transforms it into pure matter of labor—though there are romantics who plead for a “return to nature” as did the hippies. The divine nature of the Greeks, the "sister earth" of Francis of Assisi, is now interpreted in terms of sheer exploitability: homo naturae lupus. Wolf? Infinitely worse than the wolf, which has in no way destroyed nature.

4.1.7.2 In effect, nature as exploitable matter, destructible without limit, a cache of profits, a source of capital gains, a time-projected extension of the dominative attitude of the slave driver (who made the slave work that nature), is obviously the interpretation adhered to by the center (Europe first, but now equally the United States). This change of person-to-nature attitude started in the Industrial Revolution, and it reaches a hallucinating peak in the present state of monopolistic imperialist capitalism, the society of superconsumption and aggressive destruction of nature as a mere mediation (a "logical corollary" of the previous destruction of oppressed peoples of the periphery). The goddess nature is now industrial raw material: ironore, petroleum, coffee, wheat, livestock, wood.

4.1.7.3 The industrial conglomerates transform the garden into a dunghill. Factory effluents kill the fish and the vegetation of the seas; they rarefy the atmosphere with asphyxiating gasses; they destroy the natural sources of oxygen (the United States robs the periphery of its oxygen because it consumes more than it pro-
duces). The Club of Rome has pointed out that there are natural resources that are nonrenewable, that pollution is on the increase, that the human species is multiplying itself irresponsibly, that food supplies are on the decline, and that we are approaching a gigantic ecological collapse. Nature could exterminate this species that has turned irrational because of its economic system. Nature, which seemingly would remain patiently passive, responds with a threat that brooks no opposition: they who destroy me destroy themselves!

4.1.7.4 But the technologico-economic system of the capitalist social formation seems unwilling to change. Launched by its own logic to the maximization of profits, and hence of consumption-production and vice versa, imperialism continues its devastating course. Until when? To what limit?

4.1.8 Ecology and Liberation of the Periphery

4.1.8.1 Nature, earth, its biosphere and its atmosphere, have been mortally wounded. The second report of the Club of Rome says that growth is not linear but organic (that is, the regions of the center will resist crises better; those of the periphery will die sooner). But crises are global now and will affect all residents of all regions. Those responsible for the destruction of nature are the developed powers of the center: they account for more than 90 percent of the contamination of the earth (even though they count less than 30 percent of the world population). That industrial center will never make the decision to reduce its own growth: its economy is founded on the (irrational) principle of ever accelerated profit. Will some technological miracles regenerate ecological equilibrium? Or will the romantic and moralistic advice of the Club of Rome convert the wolves into lambs? It does not seem likely. A solution, if there is to be one, will come from other sources.

4.1.8.2 The alternative Worldwide Model formulated in the periphery in opposition to the Club of Rome (by the Bariloche Foundation in Argentina) sets out from other premises. But much work remains to be done on it.

4.1.8.3 Can it be that a new person-to-nature attitude is impossible for capitalism, given the phase it is in now? Can it be
that person-to-nature relationships that are less extravagant, less destructive, less consumptive, more economical, more patient, and more respectful of nature, can emerge only in peoples that have not arrived at the contradictory degree of technology within capitalism? Can it be that the destructive system will come to an end only when person-to-person relationships are redefined?

4.1.8.4 It would seem that at the moment when the peoples of the periphery demand a just price for their raw materials (nature worked on by the servant, the oppressed, the dominated), as has been somewhat fictitiously determined in the case of petroleum—at the moment the whole system will explode. Of course, before that moment comes, the powers of the center will have been able to transfer their more pollutive industries to the periphery and assure themselves of control of the less destructive and more complex operations. And before that moment comes their imperialist armies will continue to invade, repress, and assassinate. But, in the end, the hour will come. It is only in the periphery—in Asia, Africa, and Latin America—that a regeneration of the person-to-nature relationship can begin to take place—if it is not already too late.

4.1.8.5 The political liberation of the periphery seems to be the essential condition for the possibility of the restoration of natural ecological equilibrium—if true liberation, affirmation of the cultural exteriority, is undertaken, and not simply imitation of the economic process and destructive technology of the center. It would be the authentic humanization of nature, the development of culture in justice.

4.1.8.6 It is time to search for a metaphysical foundation for the peace movements in Europe and the United States, and for the liberation movements in the Third World. This foundation cannot be anything other than life—the human life, as Being, that is threatened by the arms race in the geopolitical center and by injustice in the periphery. The capitalistic system, unable to distribute overproduction, cannot make use of its mammoth productive capacity. It instead produces unemployment; unemployment reduces buying potential; fewer sales further reduce production. To make up for the profit loss by reason of reduced production and consumption, recourse is had to the arms industry. Armaments (means of death, not of production or con-
sumption) bring with them the threat of the total extinction of life in the center, and they are used to repress and exterminate liberation movements in the periphery. This life—threatened in the center by atomic missiles and in the periphery by hunger and injustice—confronts the logic of profit, and struggles—with pacifism in the center and machine guns in El Salvador.

4.2 SEMIOTICS

4.2.1 Status Questionis

4.2.1.1 A philosophy of beings has two aspects: description of natural being (4.1) and of cultural being (the poietic). I call cultural being the mediation (2.2) that is a fruit of human production. The cosmos appears as nature from within itself, of itself; it is real, anterior to the world. Cultural beings, fruit of the person-to-nature relationship, are situated on a new level, the level of culture. They are signs, products, or artifacts. The totality of these beings I call culture. Those that signify someone or something are called signs; they are studied by philosophical semiotics. Beings, operations, and systems involved with the functional or formal coherence of products are called artifacts or useful beings (4.3).

4.2.1.2 Philosophical semiotics includes many classic disciplines in philosophy (logic, philosophy of language or of communication, etc.). It is a philosophy of sign and communication where "what has been said" emerges from "saying," and imperative revelation arises from proximity and justice.

4.2.2 Wordless Self-Exposition

4.2.2.1 In face-to-face proximity, in the nonspatial timelessness of immediacy, in closeness to the other, with the other, in the child's suckling, in the lover's kiss, in the toast of compatriots celebrating a liberation victory, or in the dance of happiness, there are no words; silence or music reigns. It is the dense silence of plenitude where words originate. In the origin of words there is the other, who "speaks" by presence (not as substance, ousia, but as self-revelation, parousia). Protosemiotics is an ineffable "say-
ing"; it does not say something; it does not say anything! It exposes itself in proximity. It is the epiphany of sincerity. It is not truth but veracity, fidelity, the veritas prima: a stripping, a nakedness before the other, a silent responsibility before the one about whom nothing can be said because one is there entirely, next to the other.

4.2.2.2 So essential for semiotics (semblein in Greek means "sign," "mark," or "testimony") is originative proximity that without it the system of signs that are elaborated and produced as a bridge to cross distances in communication cannot emerge (4.2.5).

4.2.2.3 A person is, as it were, born too soon; prematurity is such that certain nerve centers produce up to 80 percent of their neurons after birth. Enrichment from maternal proximity— warmth, caress, nourishment—allows for a better structuring of the cranium as it grows after birth. Proximity, hence, enters into the physical constitution of the other. It is a proximity that will reactualize, on the sexual, political, or pedagogical level, in orgasm, joy, and enthusiasm, the first (and last) relationship that animates all human life and its semiotic process. What is semiotic poiesis if not the reestablishment of proximity in some manner?

4.2.3 Expression

4.2.3.1 Distance between one person and another demands the production of signs of communication, as when a shepherd on the mountain communicates with companions by whistling. To express ("press out," as when an orange is squeezed) is to impel toward the exterior something that is in the interior. Comprehending or perceiving has about it an aspect of passivity; expressing by exteriorizing semiotically is its correlative activity.

4.2.3.2 There is a certain semiotic in animals; they are capable of emitting sounds that indicate (the merely deictic character of the sign) certain stimuli. The dance of the bee signals the distance and direction of food. Innate or acquired (in the sphere of sensitive-motor animal intelligence) instincts are related to requirements of the species, but they are not signs as such nor are they interpreted in their meaning.

4.2.3.3 Only humankind has a semiotic function, is capa-
table of symbolic poiesis: the sign (the signifying element) refers to
the element signified (interpreted meaning) and, thereby, to a
world (4.2.4). The human being is "the living being that has lan-
guage" (logos), attains to self-expression, possesses apophantic
capacity, says something about something. That which is said is
the ontic fruit of the semiotic function.

4.2.3.4 Human expression follows a categorical code, a
program of expressive principles. The code has an essential,
genetic, constitutive, or hereditary level, a sort of "innate mental
structure," as Chomsky would say, that acts initially as a
"generative grammar," then matures its fruits progressively
(Piaget), until it arrives at the adult level. This code is also cultural
(socio-historical inheritance; Lévi-Strauss). This apriority of the
expressive code has relevance to Aristotle's problem of categories
(linked to the Greek language) or those of Kant (linked to
judgments—that is, certain types of predication).

4.2.3.5 The child, because it is human, very soon discovers
the sense of the sign—that is, the reference of a sign, a signifier, to
a signified. The semantic dimension is the reverse of that of beings
or things. The thing shows, manifests, uncovers itself. The dis-
covery of the thing, of the being, is truth. Truth goes from the
thing to interpretation; semantics goes from interpretation to
sign.

4.2.4 Significative Totalities

4.2.4.1 The world is the quotidian existential totality (2.3).
The world is expressed intentionally as an interpreted totality
(2.2.5) or totality of sense. This is the level of the concept or men-
tal sign (whose content is a real aspect of the thing, its meaning).
For its part, the totality of sense is expressed through significative
or significant totalities. They are of many levels (such as, for ex-
ample, the system of highway signs in a given nation), but the
fundamental one is language. By language I understand a totality
of significant moments formed by elemental units that express
phonetically (or in writing) the totality of sense in a moment of its
history. The interpreted totality represents the world, and lan-
guage expresses the interpretation.

4.2.4.2 Linguistic totality has a functional grammatical
structure, a code constituted by categorical principles, which permits the expressed system (discourse as *continuum*, phrases, sentences) to have a strict internal logic among its elemental units that can be analyzed separately (lexemes, morphemes, phonemes, etc.). The respectivity of cosmic things or the phenomenality of the worldly meaning is reproduced syntactically in language. If a being is a worldly unit (or unit of meaning), the semantic linguistic unit is the word (as adequate semiotic structure).

4.2.4.3 The relationship of the signifier (for example, a word) to the signified (the sense that acts as intentional signifier with respect to the real signification: the thing itself in one of its aspects) is semantics. All signifiers have a denotation or immediate referent (the meaning), and a connotation or final reference to the world. All denotation of something is in the end connotative of the totality of the world. In the same manner, because of the semantic mutability of signification (which progressively changes meaning in a historical world), a signifier no longer totally, but only partially, signifies its signification. The mutability of signification is what constitutes the possibility of the history of languages (4.2.9.1).

4.2.4.4 Language, as expressive totality of the world, has as many modalities as the world itself. There is everyday language; there are languages of oligarchical cultures and languages of mass culture; there is the language of popular culture. There is sexual language (reproduced as language of desire, symbolically, in sleep; its semantics is interpretable), religious language (as Roland Barthes shows), political language (which is understood not by what it says but by what it glosses over, against whom it speaks, when, and why, etc.), and technical language.

4.2.5 Tautology

4.2.5.1 The one-dimensionality of everyday discourse, the impossibility of discovering a sense other than the one that has been imposed, the only sense accepted by all, the "everyone says," is converted into a gigantic tautology. What is said is said because everyone has always said it. The sense of meaning and of nonmeaning has been lost. Theories of communication are frequently founded on such tautology with unspoken presuppositions as accomplices.
4.2.5.2 The factual sciences of communication present such communication as fact without obscurities or mystery, as sketched in diagram 5. The emitter (E) sends a message (M) to the receiver (R) by means of a channel (c), which can have impediments or resistance. The emitter transmits certain information (I) that has as referent a signification (S) that is tuned in by the receiver as information received (IR). The information has been encoded (between I and 1/3) according to a certain code (code); it must be decoded when tuned in by the receiver (between R and IR).

4.2.5.3 The process of encoding is correlative to that of decoding. The information to be transmitted must be encoded semantically, syntactically, and phonetically in order to be decoded phonetically, syntactically, and semantically as information received from the emitter. All this can be projected into mathematical models and be given a high degree of technical sophistication.

4.2.5.4 What is overlooked is that these models presuppose an enormous systematic tautology. That is, it is naively accepted that information can be decoded, that there are no linguistic, social, political, or sexual conflicts. Communications experts, accepting as obvious what is the result of numerous abstractions, confuse abstract structures with real structures of communication. They forget that the system in force, frequently a domina-
tive one, is one in which all are alleged to interpret what is said, although in reality they cannot give an account of the meaning of anything that is said.

4.2.6 Exposition

4.2.6.1 We now approach the antisemiotic moment par excellence or, more exactly, the point of departure, the source of origin, of new historical semiotic totalities. We have said that the proximity of the kiss or that of suckling without words (4.2.2) is replaced by the distance of semiotics (4.2.3-5). But suddenly, in the world of signs, gestures, marks, or words, springs forth the unforeseeable, the unexpected, the ineffable that unsettles the semiotic totality. Someone lets out a howl of pain: "—Ooooh!" No words are spoken. Your hair stands on end; an eerie sensation crawls down your spinal chord; in expectant tension you attend to what it is that is happening to someone. Someone appears in a semiotic vacuum. Expression gives ground to exposition. Someone has been left exposed, as those who face a firing squad expose their flesh, their bare chests, to imminent assault. Others reveal themselves (parousia) apocalyptically; there is on their face, in their naked flesh, in their person, the same message beyond all coding. Exposition anticipates expression.

4.2.6.2 The other—the poor; the oppressed; the Latin American, African, or Asiatic; the violated woman; the alienated child—advances in defiance, pleading, provoking from beyond (symbolon) the world. The other in his or her bodiliness is the first word (dabar in Hebrew, meaning both "word" and "thing"), the significant identically signified, the historical and exterior content, the biographical metaphor, nakedness as self-revelation; the other is veracity more than truth. Truth is the discovery of the meaning of what a thing is in reality; veracity is a sincere revelation of what someone is as alterity (it always runs the risk of being taken for hypocrisy, merely apparent authenticity, falsity, or irony). The expression of the oppressed as exteriority always entails exposition, risk, valor.

4.2.7 Ideology

4.2.7.1 When exposition is repressed, a semiotic totality is imposed as ideological domination, as fratricidal, uxoricidal, fili-
cidal tautology. The European alienated the word of the Amerindian by the conquest of the sixteenth century and the word of African and Asian cultures by the colonization of the nineteenth century. English, French, and Spanish semiotics destroyed the word of the Aztec and Inca, of Ghana, India, China, and Middle East caliphates.

4.2.7.2 Ideology (be it political, erotic-macho, or pedagogical) is a concrete discourse that justifies and conceals domination. The sign (it can be idea, word, form, image, sound, aroma) has as horizon of meaning only the oligarchical neocolonial (3.3.6.4) or imperialist culture (3.3.6.2). Popular culture is silenced (3.3.8); its expression is repressed, its exposition violated. The propaganda and indoctrination of the ideology of the empire and of the national oligarchy by all the means of communication bring about a conditioning of the masses as a market, as inculcated desires of the capitalist economic system of the center.

4.2.7.3 To discover the question of ideology is to open the chapter of conflictive semiotics (of the linguistics of conflict), which comes from the mandatory silence to which the peoples of the periphery, women, and youth have been reduced.

4.2.7.4 Science can be as ideological (5.7) as the conditioned mentality of the masses. The prevalent contemporary ideological mentality (that of the oligarchies of the empire or of dependent nations, as well as that of the masses insofar as they are oppressed, not insofar as they are popular exteriority) is the one that is founded on a dominative semiotic totality. A people, as an alienated mass, can have a naive ideological mentality that passively accepts the domination it undergoes. In this case the sign does not disclose the reality of oppression; it conceals oppression; it is false.

4.2.8 Semiotic Subversion

4.2.8.1 The ineffable, wordless "saying" (4.2.2.1) that springs from the exteriority of the oppressed questions the fetishist absolutization of a semiotic system (4.2.7.1). The wordless "saying," the provocative imperative of protest (4.2.6.1), is the revelation or deictic manifestation (deiknynai in Greek means "to indicate," "to show") of another significative space. The subversive word is dabar in Hebrew (which is not a mere compe-
hensive or expressive *logos*, but is operative, realizable, and subversive). Exposition (4.2.6) is linguistic subversion as revelation of the Absolute (3.4.8.1) in history through the epiphany of the poor.

4.2.8.2 The interjection as exposition of the pain of the oppressed (that is later articulated in the proclamations or manifestoes of liberation), the protest of women's liberation, the rebellion of the young man against his teachers, are messages, words, revelation, or metaphoric apocalypsis, for they take us beyond the spoken word toward the one who speaks as a distinct exteriority. It is impossible to decode that word (in its entirety) because its message remits me to a referent that is not a mere ontic meaning (something), but a metaphysical meaning (someone, the other). (It cannot be decoded entirely, but it can be decoded analogously, by approximation.) It situates this decoding not at the level of rational interpretation but at the level of acceptance of its meaning because the speaker says it (hence it is a historical act and one entailing the risk of faith; 2.4.8.4).

4.2.8.3 The only way to decode the meaning adequately is by carrying out a practical action of service (2.6.7.3) that allows the one who receives the message to approach the ambit of exteriority where the other person is. For those who find themselves in the prevailing semiotic totality, this means they must put themselves in an exterior critical situation without protection. That is why artistic geniuses in their bohemian lifestyle and political heroes in the persecution they endure and even in their death reach out to exteriority, a risk from which the new will come forth.

4.2.8.4 Semiotic, poietec, or poetic beauty finds exposition in the system of the *proyecto* of liberation of the oppressed; the future *proyecto* in the present system, the venture of the oppressed, the dawning today of what will be tomorrow. Artist and art expose to the system, as witnesses of what is to come, apocalyptically (if apocalypsis is the revelation of the word of the oppressed), the visage of the oppressed. That is why its exposition is ugly according to the rules and canons of beauty currently in force; but it is an innovation of the formal coherence of signs and is therefore procreation of the beauty of a new order.

The apparent ugliness of the countenance of the oppressed, the withered face of the farmer, the hardened hand of the laborer, the
rough skin of the impoverished woman (who cannot buy cosmetics), is the point of departure of the esthetics of liberation. It is entreaty that reveals the popular beauty, the nondominating beauty, the liberator of future beauty. Estheticism is the dominating ideological imposition of the beauty admired by the cultures of the center and of the oligarchical classes (imposed by the mass media). It is the ideology of beauty.

4.2.8.5 The most oppressed classes do not always have the most acute critical awareness, but such awareness can be reached by classes that, although objectively not the most oppressed, are the ones upon whom ideological contradictions weigh the heaviest. That is why the philosopher (5.9.5.1-2 and 5.9.5.8), as an organic intellectual, as militant, can express the criticism of a people with the maximum of precision even if, by birth, culture, or work, the philosopher does not, from the beginning, belong to the oppressed classes.

4.2.9 Liberation of the Sign

4.2.9.1 A semiotics of liberation should describe the process of the passage of a given system of signs to a new order that surges forth when the old order is surpassed. Think, for example, of the coming into being of the romance languages from Latin by the invasion of exterior and oppressed Germanic peoples during the time of the Roman empire. In the same manner, the peripheral exteriority of Latin American, Arabic, black African, Indian, Southeast Asian, or Chinese semiotics will promote through their irruption into history (if a process of political liberation takes place; 3.1.7-8) a new global and future semiotics. The history of languages, for example, is the continuous fruit of such irruption and passage to new linguistic systems. The same can be said of the proposed semiotics of the oppressed classes (3.1.4), of liberated feminine culture, and of rebellious youth.

4.2.9.2 The praxis of semiotic liberation creates new words because it renews the sense of the world; it creates new cultural and historical codes. The expressive revelation of the people, which is welcomed only in silence, is the beginning of semiotic liberation. Its dynamism is the mobilization of the people itself, in whose exposition the provocative word is liberated.
4.2.9.3 Popular epic poetry of all peoples and of all historical moments is art par excellence. It is creative; it speaks of the ineffable, of what has never been told; it is the very narrative of popular liberation. The time will come when the poetry of Pablo Neruda or Ernesto Cardenal will become classic, that of a new order. In all events, popular art is the first art, the supreme expression of esthetics. It develops in daily life, in music, in dance, in painting, in the theatre. The murals of Orozco, Siqueiros, and Rivera in Mexico are there as the exposition of the people in a revolutionary stance. A popular esthetic must be formulated as a point of departure for the liberation of the sign and as expression of its real coherence.

4.3 POIETICS

4.3.1 Status Questionis

4.3.1.1 Poietics or philosophy of production really includes semiotics (4.2), but I have separated them for pedagogical reasons. In this section we turn to material production or the person-to-nature relationship (diagram 4), to physical nature, labor, and all its modalities (technology, design, art, etc.). Poietics concerns itself with a being as an artifact, as a product of the transformation of nature in culture (D in diagram 4). It concerns itself with productive labor in its most comprehensive sense, avoiding the not uncommon philosophical reduction that confuses poietics with esthetics or poetics, the "clean" part of human production.

4.3.1.2 I emphasize design because it includes as its integral moments technology and art—in its most genuine sense of operative, projective integration of science (4.3.2.5)—and the extension of art to daily life. The essential theme of design is that of endowing a product with formal coherence. It includes technology—and thus science in its poietic implementation insofar as this signifies functional coherence, use value. It includes esthetics because formal coherence, as such, is the beauty of a product.

4.3.1.3 In this way mechanical engineering, for example, and the inspired art of the artist are integrated into the objects used in the proxemic, in the person-to-artifact nearness of every-
day life. Design is recent (it originated with the Industrial Revolution) but it is integrative because it constitutes the link with labor and culture.

4.3.2 From Techne to Design

4.3.2.1 The operative (practical) is not the same as the factive. The operable (praktikos, agibile) has to do with the realization of proximity with the other; the factible (poietikos, factibile) has to do with producing an artifact. In the same manner there are distinct methods or habits for the theoretical knowledge of science (5.1), for the practical exercise of prudence (5.4), and for poietic productivity (5.5). We must give this some historical clarification.

4.3.2.2 In effect, for Aristotle the methodical habit or knowledge behind the poietic act was techne ("art," "craft"). It was the skill used by the artisan and the artist (from the bricklayer of Athens to Phidias), in accordance with certain norms of production elaborated by reason (orthos logos poietikos). The logos of production is distinct from theory or praxis. The method of the theoretical logos is demonstrative; that of the practical logos is deliberative; that of the poietic logos is projective. The fruit of the theoretical logos is a demonstrated conclusion; of the practical logos a just and prudent decision; of the poietic logos an artifact with formal coherence (esthetic functionality).

4.3.2.3 Between the Renaissance and the seventeenth century, little by little, the classical techne (ars in Latin) began to diversify. On the one side appeared the artist, the man of the fine arts (the one who expressed the totality of the world in a work of art; 4.3.9.7-9); on the other side appeared the technician, the artisan, the one who knew how to manufacture artifacts (from a palace or a cathedral to a carriage, a cloak, or a good meal). The master or apprentice of the Middle Ages became the bohemian artist who lived under the patronage of a prince or a school of fine arts, or by the sale of his works, and the artisan was slowly transformed into the specialized laborer of the industrial world (since the English industrial revolution, approximately 1750).

4.3.2.4 The technician (who is not the nonspecialized laborer who works without method, skill, or craft), the empirical, expert artisan who includes in his work popular or vernacular art
(not the art of the dominant classes performed by the artist of the reigning and dominating beauty of the museums) is displaced little by little by the technologist. That is, with the Industrial Revolution techne is transformed into technology. There appears a new logos. It is no longer, as for Aristotle, the artisan's logos of knowing how to manufacture thanks to long years of apprenticeship under a master. Now there is added to this logos (which is not discarded; the logos of the artisan should be present in the technologist) the scientific, theoretical, and practical logos.

Technology is the redefinition of techne from the scientific point of view. It is not merely applied science; on the contrary, it is the inclusion of science in technical activity, in the discourse of the poietic projectional logos (5.5.2). It is a maturation of technical discourse by means of the participation of science. The sugar in the sugar cane (let it represent science) changes in substantivity when ingested by an animal (let it represent technology). The sugar is not merely "applied to" the animal; it is incorporated into the animal's body. That is, technology is not applied science (concretized theory); it is scientific technique (poietics that includes in its own projectional productive process whatever it needs from science to achieve its own ends). Almost all scientists of the basic formal or theoretical sciences (especially mathematicians and physicists) find it difficult to comprehend that technology could be anything other than theoretical discourse.

4.3.2.5 In the twentieth century technology and art have been reintegrated. “Design” in English comes from the Latin (designare, to "mark out," "designate," "denote"); it means "to devise for a specific function," "to fashion (something malleable) according to plan." The twelve hundred designers who work for General Motors improve the styling of automobiles. The finished product is not only a functional (technological) artifact but one adapted to comfort (by beauty of its form, the feel of plush fabrics, etc.). Just as mechanical engineering (technology) determines the functionality of the transmission of an automobile, the designer decides the place for that transmission (subsystem), in relation to aspects of physical closeness and use (e.g., the position of the driver and the gearshift) within the total system—the field of ergonomics (biotechnology).

The responsibility of designers, inasmuch as they study the
direct person-to-artifact relationship, constitutes them as the technological-human moment par excellence. Technology is guided by the designer, who is not concerned only with the external appearance of a product, but with the formal esthetic-functional coherence of the totality of the artifact from its very beginning. Design is thus the contemporary synthesis of the ancient techne, the skill or methodology of poiesis as such. It is the projectional, integral, unificative synthesis of technology and art.

DIAGRAM 6

- **R’**: referent
- **D/P**: designers, producers
- **M/R**: matter, resource
- **S-o**: subject of need
- **S-c**: subject of consumption
- **A/O**: artifacts, objects
4.3.3 Negativity of Necessity

4.3.3.1 Human beings are finite, living beings. In order to live, they must replenish what their activity uses up. They are subjects with a lack of nourishment (the fruit of the earth, nature, agriculture, shepherding) to satiate their hunger, a lack of external covering to protect themselves from inclement weather, a lack of housing for the privacy of family living. "Lack of" is negativity. This negativity deepens with the appetite or desire for what will fill the lack. Necessity is the tension toward the object that satiates and of whose existence there is awareness. The object, the mediation, arises from the necessity of supplying what is lacking. The state of necessity produces a subject in need (\( S \) in diagram 6), origin of all productive acts and of all work.

4.3.3.2 One is, then, in a "state of necessity," conscious of something desired: the object that can satisfy necessity. In the capitalistic system there thrives a policy of the cultivation of desires. It is founded in the central thrust of the system itself and creates through publicity a collective desire or necessity—a market. The market produced not by a "natural" necessity but by propaganda is the fruit of an absolute criterion built into the economic system itself: to acquire the greatest possible profit from the smallest possible investment.

4.3.3.3 There are no primary (biological) or secondary (cultural) necessities as such: human needs are always biologico-cultural. There is no necessity that is fulfilled in a natural (pre-cultural) manner. There is no cultural necessity that is not at the same time biologico-natural. The distinction between both types of necessity is so ideological as to absolutize the values of exchange and use.

4.3.4 Referent, Work, Matter

4.3.4.1 The productive act begins by conceiving positively what necessity demands negatively. Demands or requirements are formulated projectively as functional systems and subsystems of an artifact that does not yet exist; it is only possible, only imaginary. This I call referent (\( R \) in diagram 6) or eidos, the form to be given to a worked nature.
4.3.4.2 Once persons are schematically imaged in their functions (the "possible, tendential, ideative ground," Marx would say), they become designing or producing subjects (\(D/P\) in diagram 6). An \textit{ego laboro} is immensely more valuable, more common, more unified, and more corporeal than an \textit{ego cogito}. A person as a productive subject confronts nature (the non-cultural or the nonworked; \(B\) in diagram 4) and constitutes it as matter. In poietic materialism the producing subject and work constitute nature as matter. The subject as history is the \textit{a priori} of matter. Historical materialism judges the cosmological materialism of "everything is matter" as antidialectical and naive (3.4.8.2-3). In the producing act, matter ("that-with-which" something is done) is the resource (\(M/R\) in diagram 6).

4.3.4.3 The artifacts or objects (\(A/O\) in diagram 6) that surround us in our everyday world, in physical closeness, are products of human labor—tables, chairs, houses. But even trees in a garden and even natural parks left as a remembrance of pristine nature (4.1) anterior to the appearance of humankind are artistic products, natural museums, cultural moments (\(D\) in diagram 4). If some things are instruments, they were the object of human labor. Work on nature (poiesis, not praxis, as we shall see) is the full and integrated human action that effectuates or fulfills instruments, things-with-meaning, cultural objects, artifacts.

4.3.4.4 The theoretical act (in Greek, \textit{theoria}) is contemplative, passive; it produces truth as discovery of whatever the being is. It is obtained through interpretation or previous demonstration. Its plenitude is ontology and science. The practical act (in Greek, \textit{praxis}) is operative and active; it produces proximity with the other as justice; it is reached by decision, by imperation, by previous deliberation. Its plenitude is politics.

4.3.4.5 The poietic act (in Greek, \textit{poiesis}) is factive, fabricative; it produces the artifact (that which is made by art: art-fact) as transformation of a cosmic thing into a sense-thing, an instrument. That is to say, the poietic act or work (intellectual or manual) changes the form of the matter (that which is worked upon) in order to give a real thing a structure (\textit{morphhe} in Greek) that serves a purpose: it is functional. The laborer has in mind a model (\textit{eidos}) of the form that is to be given to cosmic matter, and by means of work (\textit{ergon}), in a space that is no longer play-space (as
for the child) but ergonomic, molds, with formal coherence (4.3.5), a cultural product.

4.3.4.6 Use value is what labor objectifies in natural matter and makes into an artifact, an instrument. It has value because it serves a purpose. Its functionality elevates the artifact above the mere real thing. The stone (real thing) of the Neolithic period is worth less than the carved flint that serves as the point of an arrow (artifact). The function of being able to pierce the hide of a hunted animal, of penetrating and resisting, is what makes the flint useful; it is the use value of such an artifact. The use value is not intrinsically a matter of economics; it has to do with poiesis, technology, design. Adam Smith clearly saw that work is the source of use value, but he did not see that it is not only part of the economy but also of ergonomics—the designing that includes technology, as we shall see.

4.3.4.7 Insofar as a product satisfies a need (consumption makes someone be a subject of consumption, \( S \) of the diagram 6), it has a functional value, a use value; but, and at the same time, it can be exchanged for something else. This is its exchange value. Exchange value—a thing as merchandise—is not absolute but relative to the sign value of a product, its disclosure of status ("I am different from the hoi polloi; therefore, I buy this!") or of fashion (accelerated obsolescence of a product in order to gain greater profits) in the capitalistic system of consumption and destruction. The sign value of a product refers to a whole semiotic or cultural system, which in reality fixes the sense of merchandise, commodities.

4.3.5 Formal Coherence

4.3.5.1 The formal coherence of an artifact is, in relation to the functional system where it is found, like a denotation with respect to aconnotation (4.2.4.3). I am speaking here of the cohesion or unity of the artifact itself (relationships that are established in the totality of the being between the functional parts of its own structure), and not as it is a part of a larger system in which it is defined.

4.3.5.2 Organs are coherent, complicated, coordinated, supported intrinsically by their own constitution, essential parts
of a living organism. In the human body they are the stomach, heart, brain, and the like. Each functional part is an organ that, although it performs its own function (the stomach digests, the heart propels the blood, etc.), coimplicates the other parts in the coherent structure of the whole. The stomach digests for the heart, which propels the blood to the stomach. The real substantivity of the living coherence, coimplication of its essential notes, is absolutely unique and inimitable (4.1.4-5). The formal coherence of an artifact is always minor; it is only mechanical, not living.

4.3.5.3 It should be understood that formal coherence is not like clothing or the outer form (styling) of a thing. The skin, the organs, and the form of a living organism are not independent. The technological act of design begins analogically at the very origin of a project, just as the form of an organism begins in the unicellular fertilized egg. The skin and the outer form are only the manifestations of functional subsystems.

4.3.5.4 Formal coherence, then, has a twofold aspect. On the one hand it is the adequate resolution of the functional problematics of the artifact, from the major subsystems to the ultimate subsystems or elementary moments (the functional form). On the other hand the final form of the product-visible, tactile—is the one that is appraised as being beautiful (esthetic value, always difficult to determine). The confluence of functional form (use value of the artifact) and esthetic form constitutes the best and adequate formal coherence of the artifact, objective of the poietic act or design. A good technological solution can be an unsatisfactory ergonomic resolution, inasmuch as it can propose an artifact that is excellent from the mechanical point of view but uncomfortable from the ergonomic point of view. And vice versa: a beautiful but useless artifact can be marketed because it has the appearance of usefulness (4.3.8).

4.3.6 Instrumental Totality and Undesigned Exteriority

4.3.6.1 Each artifact forms part of a cultural, functional, symbolico-significative totality. Its intrinsic formal coherence presupposes functional coherence with the cultural totality. Its incoherence, be it intrinsic or intrasystemic, determines its incom-
petence or dysfunctionality. The instrumental totality is what is called the material sphere of culture, but the expression is equivocal. In reality it is the artifactual level or the level of sense-things that are not only material but are signs (because they bear a form implanted by transformative, technologico-design work, esthetic ergonomics); they are things that have a function. which they fulfill within a totality of culture, semiotics, economics.

4.3.6.2 There will be as many functional totalities as there are worlds; more precisely, as many artifactual functionalities as there are practical systems. Just as the artifact is a mediation that is utilized at a distance from the other (2.2), the other is the one who defines the types of artifacts. There are systems of artifacts at the political level (from the highways of a nation to its factories), the sexual or domestic (from the house to the teaspoon), the pedagogical (from schools to hospitals), or the religious (such as a temple or an ornament). Each one of these structured totalities of artifacts predefines in certain ways the formal coherence of each product. The system precedes each subsystem or element.

4.3.6.3 In order to be able to evaluate any product, one has to know how to situate it in the instrumental totality in which it is to perform a determinate function. An automobile should be analyzed within the advanced industrial technological system that plays the role of subsystem within the economic system of imperialist consumption in its present stage. This system, on the other hand, is a subsystem of the political totality presently in force (which includes other subsystems, such as the governmental, military, etc.). Passage from the part to the whole, from the partial whole to the total whole, is proper to dialectics (5.2). Without dialectical discourse there cannot be scientific discourse or real technology.

4.3.6.4 A real thing (a branch on a tree, for example) is defined from its constitutive substantivity (4.1.4), independent of human intervention; an artifact (the branch as part of an arrow) is defined from human substantivity (4.1.5). Instrumental totality is nothing more than an internal unfolding of the world, which is a real moment of human substantivity. Therefore, the essence of the arrow, and not of the wood of the tree, is the worldly or cultural totality within which it fulfills a determinate function (in hunting, for example); the instrument is a moment of human essence.
4.3.6.5 The artifact, because it forms part of a system in which it receives its definition, cannot escape from frontiers that are fixed, for example, by the political sphere. The culture of the center is an instrumental system, as is also oligarchical neocolonial culture. In fact, the design of a peripheral nation or of a macho, authoritarian system functionally organizes artifacts so that they can be manipulated by and in favor of dominators. Design appears as its system of domination.

4.3.6.6 Outside the system presently in force and its dominant design is found a whole ambit that is judged by the oppressive totality as uncivilized, abject, undesigned. In the international order it is, metaphysically, what is considered by imperialist culture as barbarism; in the national order it is what is considered by oligarchical culture as vulgar and popular. The ambit that is undesigned—according to the measurement of the dominant design, according to its technology and criteria of beauty—is, in reality, designed in another manner. Latin American, African, and Asian cultures are, for the United States, at best, folkloric. For national oligarchies the culture and design of indigenous cultures (Amerindian, tribal, traditional) are backward, rude, behind the times.

4.3.6.7 Nevertheless, if there is to be any promising innovation in technology and design in the twenty-first century, it will depend on whether those ambits of exteriority, not designed for the prevailing system but of another design, will manage to articulate themselves in such a way that their traditional technology can be enriched by assimilating (from science) elements deemed necessary without losing its sense of history. If so, a vernacular, native, innovative technology and design will flourish.

4.3.7 Poietic Exteriority

4.3.7.1 What is needed is passage from an abstract exteriority—even if it seems to have a face—to a concrete exteriority by means of labor. The concept of exteriority must be complemented by that of "internal transcendentality" (2.4.8) to the same system as a totality. Exteriority is a transcendentality that cannot be defined entirely from and by totality. One of the forms it takes is that of "surplus work" that the system not only cannot absorb but that it denies, alienates, represses.
4.3.7.2 Untapped work potential—"surplus work"—a productive force unemployed by a system that does not know what to do with it (in contrast to the beginning of a system, when productive forces must double their efforts in order to achieve increased production)—leads to the conscious apparition of a historical subject exercising poietic or productive praxis.

4.3.7.3 Subjectivity concretely constituted by the structure of a system manifests itself as historical subjectivity—as an emergent class aware of its exteriority, by both anteriority and posteriority (the historical anteriority of the oppressed, the utopian posteriority of the struggle that begins for ushering in a new system). It takes shape in the space left vacant by the noncoincidence of labor and production, in the form of the unemployed time of the underemployed—that is, as marginality, lost time. But lost time can be subversive time, time in which awareness matures, in an emergent class, of the need for a new system.

4.3.7.4 It is precisely in the crisis of a productive system that historical subjects emerge. Poietic exteriority comes in the emergence of the internal transcendentality of historical subjectivity with awareness that it is capable of doing something more ("surplus work"). Unemployment leads to deeper awareness of the human condition; a face emerges and demands a new system.

4.3.7.5 The pure negativity of contradiction is neither the source nor the resolution of dialectics. Dialectical change is passage to a new totality. It takes place by the overcoming of a contradiction. Contradiction appears in the emergence of a historical subject—an unemployed class, with untapped productive potential. When the other one in the system emerges—as other with both exteriority and internal transcendentality (deeper consciousness of a class as capable of greater productivity, and consciousness of a longer history anterior to the dominating system), contradiction crystalizes. Opposition is real when, in view of a dominant class, there emerges a dominated class as a rebellious class, a nonconforming class, an other class. Neither passive negativity or contradiction (one class is not another class) nor active negativity (one class struggles against another class) originates and resolves itself in pure negativity. Negativity, passive as well as active, originates in the exteriority of internal transcendentality, in the analectical affirmation of the alterity of an emergent class, emerging as distinct. It is inevitable, dreadful, new. Its posi-
tive irruption founds opposition and struggle. The system enters into crisis.

4.3.7.6 The dialectical process as passage to a new totality cannot support itself only in the negative thrust of negation. It must also promote the affirmation of the alterity of the new system that arises from the manifestation of the exteriority of the other in the internal transcendentality of "surplus work," unemployed, unproductive.

4.3.7.7 It is because of this that the analitical moment of dialectical movement is the origin and resolution of that same dialectics and its negativity. The historical subject, as unused poietic or productive potential, is the origin of the affirmation of alterity, the internal manifestation of the exteriority or transcendental anticipation of the new system. It will be necessary to show how the essence of the subjectivity in power is the origin of "surplus work," beyond the totality.

4.3.8 Productive Alienation

4.3.8.1 Dependent and exploited nations behold with dismay the contradiction of an alien design on their own soil. They deplore the haphazard imitation of diverse technologies exported by powers of the center with conflicting poietic criteria. The main street in a rural village is coursed by a donkey and an oversize Chevrolet. Alongside the campesino dressed in clothing spun by his wife walks another dressed in the latest Western fashion. Cultural, economic, and political dependence is an internal contradiction affecting all instrumental constituents. The negation of popular culture also negates its technology and the possibility of a technology and design that would harmoniously plan the ecology of the nation, of the continent—the rightful goods of dependent groups.

4.3.8.2 An alienated design is an ideological design. It is not only the ideological concept of formulation that conceals domination (4.2.7). A form that deceives or exploits the dominated is likewise ideological; it is a form that hides domination to the benefit of a dominator. In design, the styling (stylization of a product so that its appearance fascinates buyers and escalates sales) fulfills the function of an ideological sign. A particular automobile has the appearance of enormous power, with fins to
deflect or capture a possible current of air; in reality it is a car of reduced velocity, duration, and stability. The cleavage between the use value (functionality) and the sheer value of exchange and of status symbol (4.3.4.7) leads to the discovery of a profound sense of alienation, its ideologico-semiotic and technological meaning. Esthetics puts technology at the service of profit for capital investment.

4.3.8.3 In the dependent nations such ideologically embellished products can be acquired only by minority groups, oligarchical and dominative, to the detriment of the national balance of imports and exports.

4.3.9 *Productive Liberation*

4.3.9.1 Liberation on the level of technological design and production implies a self-determination that only politically and economically free peoples can have. These two freedoms are secured in an authentic, ideological, cultural revolution that knows how to appraise adequate national production. "Adequate technology" is not that of the folkloric production of alternative artifacts on a small scale, in the small-minded, reformist manner encouraged by the dominant capitalist system. It is a question of beginning with a technology and design that have other criteria, native to the underdeveloped countries.

4.3.9.2 The first criterion of all technology or design of liberation in the peripheral countries is the guarantee of the right to work. The need for manual labor, much greater than in the developed countries, highlights the imperative of full employment. The right to life is fulfilled not by guaranteeing the necessities of survival such as nourishment and health, but by fostering human dignity. It is by work that a person earns the right to life.

4.3.9.3 Other criteria are minimal use of capital, use of middle technology (though superior technology may sometimes be necessary), and use of national resources whenever possible (e.g., the use of natural, not enriched, uranium, so as not to depend on developed nations). Liberation of technology and design is an essential objective, though it may be a long-term one. China itself has abandoned in part the creation of its own national technology and has opened itself to the influence of foreign tech-
technology, which will bring with it a whole world of destruction and unnecessary consumption.

4.3.9.4 If the economic and technological labor that goes into products that bear the value of exchange, of sign, and of use would become imbued with the significance of being at the same time labor that goes into products that bear the esthetic value of art, when the laborer would work on matter to manufacture a useful product as the artist works on the same matter to create a work of beauty—at that moment economy and esthetics would become identical. If at the same time justice would reign in politics and sexuality (and therefore in pedagogy) and before the Absolute, then immediate proximity (2.1) would no longer leave room for antagonistic mediations (2.3)—that is, there would be no more alienation (2.5). This utopia, impossible in history, nevertheless can guide our reflection even though it be only to see the alienation in which we live and realize the need for liberation at diverse levels. The eschatological utopia is a source of clear-sightedness, of praxis, and of poiesis.

4.3.9.5 But as long as the utopia is not realized, and it seems that by definition it is unrealizable, the truth is that the majority of nations (the peripheral, dependent, and oppressed ones) and the majority of their inhabitants (the farmers, laborers, and marginals), the everyday economic-poietic laborers, live in a vulgar selling of their being, their reality, and their lives for wages that do not even replenish the energy expended in their labor. The wretched of the earth live in a monstrous chasm between economy and esthetics. They work like animals to produce artifacts that others will use; they eat less than do animals, they cannot express their own culture; the fruit of their labor is alienated from them. It is hell on earth, the land that Europe founded when it sent the Amerindians to work in the gold and silver mines, when it enslaved Africans, when it colonized Asians.

4.3.9.6 In the liberating act the other recovers human appearance. The apparent ugliness (for the white and blond Occidental) of the copper Amerindian, of the black African, of the yellow Asiatic, the degradation of the sexual object, the prostituted woman, the passive attitude of sheer memory of the child who imitates the paternal culture. Such “ugliness” will soon appear as the most radiant and fascinating (but not fetishist) beauty.
The expression and exposition of such beauty—the countenance of an oppressed people, of its culture, its reality—this is the supreme esthetics, popular esthetics. It is the coincidence in the product or artifact of functional-esthetic coherence, of mediation as creation, of the useful as service or gift—the wedding gift of sexuality, the merited and worked gift of a new country injustice. It is the beautiful, fresh, warm, fragrant, and flavorful bread that renourishes life for love, for the embrace, the celebration, the kiss ...in the freedom of the free persons who have liberated themselves from a prison.

4.4 ECONOMICS

4.4.1 Status Questionis

4.4.1.1 Economics is the part of philosophy that thinks out the practical-productive person-to-other relationship mediated by the product of the person-to-nature relationship. The economic relationship is concrete and real; in comparison with it merely practical or poietic-productive relationships (4.2-3) are abstract or lacking in historical and institutional reality. Practical relationships, even when they are totalized, are abstract with respect to economics. The practical face-to-face relationship, as a metaphysical moment in justice, is the ultimate instance of the reality of economics. All production, distribution, or interchange is done for someone (and this is the practico-metaphysical moment of economics, always, in all systems or conceptions of economics).

4.4.1.2 Economics, then, is the relationship of the practical level (political, sexual, pedagogic, and antifetishist) to the productive level (semiotics, technology, design, etc.). Without work (productive level) there is no concrete proximity (practical), but there is no poietics without practical reference. The unity of both is economics; someone makes a gift or sells to someone, or buys or steals from someone. The first "someone" is the point of departure of economics; the "something" is the product of a work; the "other" is the frontier of the practical, now economic, relationship.

4.4.1.3 Economics studies the mechanisms of concrete production, of interchange, distribution, and consumption of a
given social structure, and the interdependencies among those mechanisms and structures. It questions present-day systems with regard to alienation of the other at the productive-practical level and liberation of the other.

4.4.1.4 Scholars have frequently succumbed to economism (forgetfulness of practical or poietic moments) or to ideological positions that deny the consistency of economics (idealisms that justify economic oppression, as in the case of Scheler: he so overrates spiritual values that he weakens material ones such as eating, clothing oneself, or dwelling). Both extremes will be surpassed by an economics with a metaphysical sense, where the practical-productive has its own unity, which derives from the human essence of the same relationship.

4.4.2 Primitive Economics

4.4.2.1 Human beings gather or produce from nature what is necessary to fill their needs (poietic), but always in a group, in a family, clan, tribe, or society (practical). The origination of the practico-poietic relationship makes of economics a primary human experience: we barter for the necessary things in life. Even the innocent suckling of the child is already, as we have said
(2.1.3.2), a utopian economics: it is nourishment exchange without work (on the part of the newborn).

4.4.2.2 The utopian economics of giving nourishment to the infant had an undifferentiated prolongation in primitive economies within which humanity for hundreds of millennia fulfilled in the individual all the functions of the group: hunting, gathering, fishing, maintaining a household. There were simple products and a primary community. This was the practico-productive mediation of the nomads, lost in an inhospitable and infinite nature. Humankind produced and reproduced the life of the group. Some products (that had use value) were already exchanged by barter with other members of the group (thus exchange value appeared in the world of economic relationships). Little by little one group would exchange with another group. Human intelligence had no trouble distinguishing between the use value (the "what-for") of a product and its exchange value (its value "for another").

4.4.3 Economic Systems

4.4.3.1 Human exchanges (in productive and practical systems) gradually increased across the millennia; they became systematized, reproducing and sometimes destroying themselves, some imposing their dominion over others. The practico-productive totality guaranteed survival (modes of production of human life). The distinct manner in which their terms related, the distinct content of the relationship itself, kept on generating in history diverse modes of practico-productive totality; in some cases they retained their primitive simplicity (nomadic clans or tribes of hunters, fishers, gatherers), and others began to be planters until, some eight millennia before Christ, some groups developed agriculture as such; others subsisted on shepherding; others improved hunting techniques and transformed them into war methods. Thus began the era of complex practico-productive totalities or Neolithic modes of production.

4.4.3.2 Because they excelled in the techniques of warfare (for example, in the domestication of the horse and the use of steel), the Indo-Europeans dominated politically (practically) the agricultural peoples of the valley of the Indus, of Mesopotamia, of what is today Turkey, Greece, Italy, and Europe in general.
Some persons dominated others (practical domination) and appropriated for themselves the product of the other's work. They did this in two ways: because they defined themselves as proprietor of the very being of the other (slavery) and thus possessed the other's life, work, and the fruit of that work; or because they demanded that part of the product of the other's work be given to them (tributary system). All the group economies practico-productive totalities or modes of production up to the fifteenth century can be reduced to these two.

4.4.3.3 On account of the crisis of the fourteenth century, Europe underwent the collapse of feudalism (recessive tributary system); this nearly coincided with the founding of overseas colonies. Thanks to revenue from rural areas and from the colonies, Europe witnessed the birth of a new practico-productive system, capitalism. During the eighteenth century, mercantilism became industrialized. Product as merchandise began to predominate.

4.4.3.4 The being of the capitalist economy is merchandise, the product that bears an exchange value. Merchandise or exchange value are not an absolute moment; they are relative to a totality that explains and sustains them: capitalist social formation. An economic system always tends toward a projected goal (within capitalism, "to-be-in-wealth"), toward the foundation whence come the possibilities or mediations that are like bridges that permit their realization. In economics such mediations are the products or fruits of human labor (4.3.4.5); they have been produced as mediations for a proyecto. The simplest is nourishment (by cultivation of the soil) in order to satiate hunger. In capitalism, however, products are produced not primarily to fulfill necessities but to be a mediation of profit; merchandise, not need. Merchandise, then, as mediation, lets us view the economic system as a totality. All economic reality takes place in a concrete system, be it microeconomic (e.g., the level of erotic economy or the industrial enterprise), or national, regional, or global macroeconomics. Small systems are only subsystems of the global economic system, which today is dominated by imperialist management of capital and the planetary dimensions of the transnational corporations. The controlling system is the capitalist, central mode of production, whose history Emmanuel Wallerstein records.

4.4.3.5 If all economy takes place in a system, the discov-
ery of the basis of that system permits us to explain the parts from the viewpoint of the whole. It is necessary to know how to ascend from the abstract (the part: the company, for example, or the nation) to the concrete (the historical whole: a national or international economy). The ultimate foundation, the Being of all economic systems, is human labor not yet differentiated; laboriousness, work as work (indeterminate, unconditional, unsevered from the person-to-nature relationship). In each concrete historical system or social formation composed by one or many modes of production, work as work is the foundation of being, of the crystalized or objectified work—product as product.

4.4.3.6 A mode of production is always an internal moment or subsystem of a historical social formation. The mode of production includes person-to-nature relationship (4.3.2 and 4.3.4) and a person-to-person relationship (politics; 4.1). The mode of production is not only political (e.g., the master-slave relationship) or technological (the metallurgy of the Iron Age), but properly economic (5.9.3.5) insofar as it is the unity between politics and technology, and vice versa. Against economism it must be said that the mode of production does not determine absolutely the political or technological, but that it is the necessary condition that is conditioned (by politics and technology) and conditioning (of both).

4.4.3.7 Social formations are the concrete structures that are organized in reality, in history, by one or several modes of production, one being dominant and the others subordinate to it. Contemporary social formations are dominated by the capitalist imperialist social formation, as global and central system. Peripheral social formations—in Latin America, the Arab world, black Africa, India, or Southeast Asia (but not China, for it has a socialist social formation)—have diverse and even contradictory modes of production. There are modes of communal primitive production, tributary in some places; there are even some that perpetuate feudalism and slavery; and there is the mode of production of the simple small trader who is slowly absorbed into the dependent, capitalist, peripheral mode of production. Therefore, in analyzing peripheral social formations one must keep in mind precapitalist structures and the form of aggression taken by capitalism (whether mercantile, industrial, or imperialist.)
4.4.3.8 The historical concrete content of its foundation defines a system or social formation. In this manner the capitalist system is adequately defined by the fact that division of labor crystallizes in capital that absorbs the surplus value achieved by the productive work of the industrial laborer, whether of the center or the periphery. Dialectical and ontological description forms the beginning of the elucidation of economics as apodictic science.

4.4.3.9 Every economic product, merchandise, or being is always found in an economic system or totality that can be described dialectically (5.2), from the parts to the whole, and scientifically, from the foundation to its constitutive elements. This is true from the systems of the distant Paleolithic or Neolithic ages to industrial or subsequent society.

4.4.4 Economic Exteriority

4.4.4.1 As in all the anterior moments of our discourse—because reality itself imposes it—there always arises a moment that is not comprised within the system. It is an asystematic, asymmetric, anarchic moment, a kind of ana-economy (as there is ana-oedipus or ana-lectics). Something is beyond the present-day system of economics. Without doubt, that which is ana-economic—the exteriority of the system—cannot be anything else but that which has not been included in the totality. It retains autonomy and independence. It will be given a derogatory name because it does not adhere to the values of the system; it is not included within the proyecr of the system and cannot be manipulated by its mediations: the economics of poverty, of the poor, of the oppressed classes, of dependent, underdeveloped, "uncivilized" nations that have not been absorbed by the system.

4.4.4.2 It is easy to understand that the Neolithic systems that European colonial powers confronted, beginning in the sixteenth century, in Latin America, Africa, and Asia were exterior economic totalities to what a little later would be the center. What is more difficult is to rediscover such exteriority in the periphery after the impact of conquest, colonization, and imperialism. The preexistent economic systems were transformed into subsystems assumed within the system in force, into dominated or secondary
modes of production in peripheral social formations. Nevertheless, there is always some economic exteriority if there are distinct structures (in indigenous minorities, in African and Asian popular classes), distinct procedures for exchange, distinct signification (exchange value is a cultural symbol or a status symbol [4.3.4.7] of a product because, simply, there is cultural exteriority [3.3.3.3-4]). In the capitalist mode of production, there is a marked distinction between hourly employees (the subjects of work) and salaried employees. National culture (3.3.8.2) and popular culture (3.3.8.3), the human productive subject as exteriority, set up an economy of exteriority.

4.4.4.3 In the economic (and therefore cultural) experience of China or Nicaragua (simultaneous national and popular exteriority with respect to the center) one could expect some novelty for the global economic system. Otherwise, that system will continue the policy of reformist modifications of a totality that is heading for the ruin of both humanity and nature.

4.4.5 The Alienation of Erotic-Pedagogical Economic Systems

4.4.5.1 All of what has been said so far can be situated on the level of sexual economics (topics suggested by Engels in The Origin of the Family or Freud when he talks about work as the postponement of desire) or on the level of pedagogy (issues treated, e.g., by Illich in his deschooling hypothesis or that of the death of medicine). Both levels are not mere subsystems of the political economy; they retain a relative exteriority.

4.4.5.2 In the totality of the family, the house (oikos, whence oikonomía), there can be found an economic-erotic system. The father goes out the door and comes back with his wages. The wife, alienated in the macho system, works as a "housewife" (married to a house) doing domestic chores, an unpaid servant of the male. Within the dominant classes her work consists in augmenting comfort and consumption (she is the principal target of advertising). Through the economic alienation of the wife, family alienation is maintained.

4.4.5.3 In the same manner there are economic-pedagogic subsystems or services (schools, social services, clinics, etc.). They all become autonomous and instead of serving the user,
they systematically exploit users. The medical system through its chemical therapy produces new sickness; it demands unnecessary analysis; it eliminates popular, less expensive medicine; it increases the cost of medications and therapy. The school that shuns the traditional methods of educative communication makes itself the only means of education. In this way a people is left definitively illiterate and uncultured (because the school does not start from popular culture). The costly service systems in the periphery do not do their job. Bureaucracies dominate.

4.4.6 National and International Economic Alienation

4.4.6.1 We return here to a fundamental thesis of philosophy of liberation (see diagram 1). European expansion, beginning with the sixteenth century (1.2.2), and later American expansion (1.2.5), have alienated the economies of the peoples that are now their neocolonies (in Latin America, the Arab world, black Africa, India, Southeast Asia, with the exception of China, Vietnam, and a few other countries). Peripheral social formations (dependent nations) are dominated by the imperialist system. Its domination results in enormous profits from manipulation of the low price of raw materials and the high price of manufactured goods. Samir Amin has demonstrated that 80 percent of the benefits that the center realizes in its commercial interchanges come from the periphery. The work of the laborer and farmer and even the capital of dominated nations are continuously exploited. Part of the labor of the periphery is paid to the center in the form of licenses, insurance, exorbitant interest rates on loans, technology (inadequate), false sales reports of the products of transnational corporations in peripheral countries, and so forth. The theft of the surplus value achieved in the periphery accounts for the structured dissymmetry in the world of today. Philosophy of liberation takes this fact as the origin of a radical theoretico-epistemological rupture. It is on this level that the most devastating human alienation in our time takes place, the alienation of alienations, the one that conditions all the others.

4.4.6.2 Even though in an abstract, but precise, manner, the question of the dependence of peripheral countries—at the level of both invested and circulating capital—can be sketched as
in diagram 8. A more developed country \((A)\) gains "extra profit" \((ep)\) in the sale of its products, whereas a less developed country "transfers" (surrenders) its surplus value \((sv)\) in the sale of its products.

In terms of the "organic composition of capital," a more developed country \((A)\) can produce merchandise at a lower market value \((mv)\) than that of a less developed country \((mv')\) because the peripheral country has a lower productivity due to less advanced technology. In the sale of its products to a less developed country, a more developed country can offer a sale price \((sp)\) equal to what it sells for domestically \((sp = mv + ep)\). On the contrary, the peripheral country must sell its products at a lower price \((sp' = mv' - sv)\) than if sold domestically, in order to compete. It thus transfers its surplus value to the more developed country \((a \ b = \text{surplus value robbed from peripheral labor})\). This type of profit and transfer constitutes the life of the poor of the Third World, who feed the economy of the more developed countries.

**DIAGRAM 8**

4.4.6.3 The alienation that reigns at the global level (discovered by the "theory of dependence") is doubled on the national peripheral level by internal geopolitical domination and dependence. Spatially, certain regions (populous capital cities: Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, Cairo, Bombay, etc.; or more affluent regions because of industry, mining, etc.) wield power over others, achieving a fictitious appearance of high development (e.g., the bureaucracies of neocolonial African states), which contrasts with the level of extreme poverty of the majority of the population. External dissymmetry (imperialist center vs.
neocolonies) is reproduced internally (neocolonial center vs. urban and rural poverty). It is evident that privileged regions are geopolitical mediations of the center.

4.4.6.4 Developmentalist models of economy are intended to make the world believe that the origin of underdevelopment is the fact that backward countries do not imitate the models of the developed countries. The solution would be to bring capital and technology to the poor countries (substitution of imports). This developmentalist ideology does not understand or admit that the origin of underdevelopment is theft—international structural injustice that dates back five centuries: the exploitation of the periphery because of the low prices paid for its exports. There will not be any true development without cessation of dependence, without liberation of national economies, without transforming the capitalist imperialist social formation of the center, its very mode of production.

4.4.7 Peripheral Capital-Labor Alienation

4.4.7.1 Another mediation of center-periphery alienation or transnational-dependent national market alienation is the one that is carried out by means of dependent national capital (dependent capitalism). The theft of capital-labor surplus value (that is, the profit that capital extracts from what should be paid to workers) produces intranational distortion in the periphery that not only consolidates class differences but also impedes national liberation and entrenches the hegemony of imperialism.

4.4.7.2 All neocolonial national enterprises depend, for their technology at least, on the large transnational enterprises. Moreover, they live parasitically off their propaganda, organization, and expansion. Managerial dependent microeconomy is nothing else but a secondary mediation of the imperialist international macroeconomy.

4.4.7.3 The dependent neofascist models of economy (such as the Brazilian, or Chilean, Argentinian in 1976, with social repression and dependent capitalism) and populist models (a coalition of classes under the hegemony of the national bourgeoisie, with collaboration of the proletariat—Haya de la Torre, Vargas, Cárdenas, Perón, or Nasser) appear to be unacquainted with the fact that, in their essence, such models accept the transnationals
and therefore permit capital-labor surplus value to leave the country in the form of center-periphery surplus value. If there is not a restructuration of the neocolonial system, there will not be economic liberation of the periphery. A new mode of production is necessary in dependent nations.

4.4.8 Economic Liberation of the Periphery and Its Laboring Classes

4.4.8.1 We are dealing, then, with an anti-economics, an economy that bears the ideological significance of micro-economics or of developmentalist or imperialist economics. Because economic alienation is the fulfillment of all alienations (inasmuch as it enslaves persons to work nature for the benefit of a dominator, emptying their very Being; 2.5), economic liberation is the concrete realization of human liberation, the process by which the oppressed hurl themselves into a new projection of a system of economics through the affirmation of their cultural exteriority.

4.4.8.2 Economic liberation of the dependent nation is the first objective. The proyecto of economic liberation should be realized in view of an operative model. Such models are essentially three in number: those that formulate development by the intervention of transnational corporations (dependent capitalism), by means of the managerial leadership of the national bourgeoisie (independent capitalism), or by the leadership of the popular classes (socialism). Populism is a version of the second formula, with claims of affinity with the third. In the end, it would turn to either the first or the third version.

4.4.8.3 In the periphery the largest national enterprises are those of the state. And because the bourgeoisies of the periphery "were born too late" (they cannot obtain surplus value from colonies, as the English and French bourgeoisies did, or as much surplus value from the proletariat as the exploitation of labor in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did), it is predictable that the exchange pattern of the periphery will tend either toward dependent capitalism (with fascist politics) or toward a socialism of transition (with popular or national politics) — the transition from one mode of production to another.
4.4.8.4 Bourgeois humanism, which was based on manual labor in its struggle against the hereditary nobility from the ninth century to the English and French revolutions, established private property and its inheritance as human and divine rights. It was thus able to accumulate and increase over the years a given capital possessed by the same hands, the same families, the same classes. Capitalism rests on this fixation, this institutional crystallization—exclusive possession perpetuated by inheritance.

4.4.8.5 Once some possess everything and the others nothing, freedom of economic production, of sales, of purchases, of advertising, is decreed: competition. It is evident that the big wolf will eat the little one, according to Hobbes's definition (1.1.7.3). Therefore, the liberation of the people or oppressed classes implies first the reestablishment of justice so that authentic economic freedom can be exercised—not the freedom by which the powerful destroy the weak, but the freedom in which equals can choose what is just. This will demand the dismantling of the structures that anchor the distortion and dissymmetry of the present economic order, which permits and promotes the system whereby some derive benefits through the purchase of the labor of others, sold to the highest bidder.

4.4.8.6 The system of capitalist enterprise, with hereditary capital on the part of some and the sale of their labor on the part of others (which originated during the Middle Ages with the guilds of masters and apprentices, went through a fundamental change due to the accumulation of colonial capital, was again redefined during the Industrial Revolution, and yet again with the coming of national and international monopolies), can no longer be imitated in the periphery. The liberation of the rural and working classes calls for a total economic revolution. Philosophy of economics must clarify this problematic, the one of transition to another global system, this time without a periphery, beyond the capitalist mode of production.

4.4.9 Economics of Liberation

4.4.9.1 Economics or service (habodah) to the other as other, to the oppressed, the poor, women, and youth is the economics of liberation; it is the act par excellence in which
metaphysics is historically realized (2.6.7). It is worship offered to the Absolute (3.4.7), because praxis (the pedagogical suckling, the erotic kiss, the political embrace, the religious prayer) is equivocal until it is tested by factual, real, effective mediation. It is not a matter of becoming informed that the oppressed are hungry; it is necessary to give good bread to the hungry. Bread implies preparing the ground, sowing the seed, cultivating the field, taking in the harvest, grinding the seed, kneading the dough, baking the bread, storing it, transporting it, and putting it on the plate of the hungry person. It implies work, suffering, skill, technology, design, and art. It implies poiesis, justice, structures, equality, freedom, and habodah; it implies service, culture, and worship.

4.4.9.2 Liberative economy is service in justice, mediation that ministers to the other, technical innovation and technology for the other—for the other's growth, development, happiness. Without economy everything is an illusion, anarchy, or utopia (in the sense of flightiness: proclaiming the impossible because the mediations necessary for its realization are not worked on). Liberation does not imply only one proyecto and one enthusiasm, but planned, effectuated, viable mediations that are technologically efficient. Without economic liberation—which implies inspiration from popular, traditional, national institutions—there is no real liberation. If it is true that political revolution produces an opening in the previous system, only with the mediation of technological design and labor can a new system be organized in justice today. Without work, efficacious work with scientific mediation, there is no bread. Without bread a people is not liberated. It dreams of the fleshpots of Egypt, where at least there was bread. But without just distribution, bread is kept in the granary by the oppressor; the poor have no access to it.

4.4.9.3 Economy as service to the other, to the oppressed, builds the house—the home of the liberated family—the factory, and the assembly of the community where all forge their own destiny in political economy. It provides schooling, radio, and television. It constructs the cultural world and history—in justice!