

NOTES

1. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 312, B 368.

2. Edmund Husserl has already tried to show in his own way that it was necessary for philosophy to reach the level of science. See "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science" where he clarifies: "Philosophy, however, is essentially a science of true beginnings, or origins, of *rizomata panton*" (*Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy* [New York: Harper & Row, 1965], p. 146).

3. See my work *Método para una filosofía de la liberación* (Salamanca: Sígueme, 1974), pp. 17ff. For Aristotle, dialectic is useful "for the philosophic sciences... Further, it is useful in connection with the ultimate (*ta prota*) bases (*archon*) of each science; for it is impossible to discuss them at all on the basis of the principles peculiar to the science in question, since the principles are primary in relation to everything else, and it is necessary to deal with them through the generally accepted opinions (*endoxon*) on each point. This process belongs peculiarly, or most appropriately, to dialectic; for being of the nature of an investigation (*exetastike*) it lies along the path to the principles of all methods of inquiry" (*Topics* I, 2, 101a, 26b [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960], pp. 277-78).

4. Since Kant, "knowing" is of objects (*Erkenntnisse der Gegenstände*, *Critique of Pure Reason*, I, I, 3, A 139): knowing is of science; "rational faith" is of the Ideas. For Hegel, on the contrary, ontological knowledge (*Wissen*) is the intellectual act par excellence and is therefore philosophy. "This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea, the truth aware of itself!" (*Encyclopedia*, 574; in Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* [Oxford: Clarendon, 1971], p. 313). *Cognitio* or *cognoscere* is not *sapere* or *scire*, even in classical thought.

5. The later Husserl spoke more and more of the notion of "lived world" (*Lebenswelt*), which made ready for the concept of being-in-the-world (*in der Welt sein* of Heidegger) (*Die Krisis de europäischen Wissenschaften*, III; *Husserliana* VI [The Hague; Nijhoff, 1962], pp. 105ff.). For Aristotle *ta endoxa* indicated everyday existential comprehension. By all means one will have to surpass the passive position (intel-

lectual sight) of both notions to arrive at a notion of praxis in the sense of "structural totality of human actions" of a group, a social class, or a historical community. In this primary meaning, praxis *precedes* theory. It is *in* and *whence* theory arises. Praxis or the action decided on is *posterior* to the theoretical act and integrates itself as one moment in the totality of *a priori* praxis.

6. Theoretical exercise in its totality is suggested by classical thinkers: "There is a fourth order that reason in planning established in the external things which it causes" (Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics* [Chicago: Regnery, 1964], vol. I, p. 6).

7. "The I posits itself... I as absolute Subject" (Fichte, *Grundlage der gessamten Wissenschaftslehre* [1794], vol. 1,97).

8. *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 78ff.

9. Princeton University Press, 1966, pp. 84ff.

10. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), 2.063, p. 8.

11. *Ibid.*, 6.45, p. 13. This is precisely how the oppressed through practical totality feel the world (the system). But about this "feeling" of the oppressed, there is for Wittgenstein no philosophy.

12. *Ibid.*, 6.423, p. 72.

13. *Ibid.*, 6.41, p. 71. In this way it is impossible to pass complete judgment on the capitalist system as a whole, the task of dialectics. Popper and Wittgenstein will not make this critique that they discard or deny as holistic, foolish, or impossible. The reformist choice, justifying capitalism by claiming to demonstrate the impossibility of a way out (the critique of utopia and socialism limits itself by its own impossibility), becomes methodically antidialectical.

14. For a kind of journalistic example, see Noam Chomsky, "Objectivity and Liberal Scholarship," in *American Power and the New Mandarins* (New York: Vintage, 1969), pp. 23ff.

15. From the time of Aristotle, "our programme was, then, to discover some faculty of reasoning about any theme put before us from the most generally accepted premises that there are. For that is the essential task of the art of discussion (dialectic) and of examination (peirastic)" ("On Sophistical Refutations," in *Basic Works of Aristotle* [New York: Random House, 1941], 183a37-b1, p. 210).

16. See Michael Theunissen, *Der Andere* (Berlin: Gruyter, 1965) and Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity, an Essay on Exteriority* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969).

17. By "matter" or "materialism" I understand not the indemonstrable affirmation that all is eternally cosmological matter (see Engels, *Dialektik der Natur* [Berlin: Dietz, 1951]). This would be a naive mate-

rialism. I take "matter" and "materialism" in the practico-productive meaning: nature as *matter* (that with which) of human work. The "I work" is the *a priori* constituent of "matter" as a practico-productive (and not a cosmological) category. In this sense material determination (never absolute) is an instance that can never be left out of any historical anthropological consideration. On the other hand, "matter" refers to the Hebrew notion of "work-service-cult" (*habodah*); see G. W. Kittel, ed., *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971)—*diakonía, energemata*, etc. See my work, *Filosofía de la producción* (Mexico City: Universidad Metropolitana, 1984) and my preliminary study on Karl Marx, *Cuaderno tecnológico-histórico* (Universidad de Puebla, 1984).

18. Leon Rozitchner, in *Freud y los límites del individualismo burgués* (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1972), analyzes the subject as far as showing the determinations of the system in its most profound subjectivity. That is to say, "class struggle is included in human subjectivity as the nucleus of one's most individual existence," according to the Argentinian thinker.

19. See Christine Buci-Glucksmann, *Gramsci et l'Etat* (Paris: Fayard, 1975).

20. See Antonio Gramsci, *Quaderni del Carcere*, 19(XXIII), II, no. 13 (Rome: Rinaudi, 1975), vol. I, p. 1250.

21. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 4.0031, p. 19. That a philosophy of language is necessary and useful is not to be denied, but it is to be an "instrument" of philosophy and not its essence and ultimate finality. Aristotle already suggested that the art of rhetoric, which was the ultimate finality for the Sophists, was for the philosopher seeking truth only a means to avoid being confused by the Sophist: "As far as the choice of ground goes, the philosopher and the dialectician are making a similar inquiry, but the subsequent arrangement of material and the framing of questions are the peculiar province of the dialectician" (*ibid.*, p. 675).

22. Besides the works cited in the talk by M. Christine Morkovsky, at the 1979 ACP A meeting, see my works, *Filosofía de la liberación* (Mexico City: Edicol, 1977), *Política* (Bogotá: Editorial Nueva América, 1979), *Filosofía de la religión* (Bogotá: Editorial Nueva América, 1979), and my talk at the Third National Colloquy of Philosophy (Puebla, Mexico), "Filosofía, aparatos hegemónicos y exilio."

23. *Einleitung in die Philosophie der Offenbarung oder Begründung der positiven Philosophie*, in *Werke*, VI, B, p. 398.

24. "Erlanger Vorträge," in *Werke*, V, pp. 305-6.

25. *Tractatus*, 6.432, p. 73.

26. See my work, *Religión* (Mexico City: Edicol, 1977).

27. Gramsci's notion of the "organic intellectual" is more or less the

issue here, though in Latin America it includes concrete characteristics that we cannot take up in this short exposition. See Jürgen Habermas, *Theorie und Praxis* (Berlin: Suhrkarnp, 1963). Lukacs explains that "organization is the form of mediation (*Vermittlung*) between theory and praxis" (*Werke*, vol. 2 [Neuwied, 1968], p. 475).

28. For example, the work of Alberto Parisi, *Filosofía y dialéctica* (Mexico City: Edicol, 1979) (on dialectical logic).

29. Our *Revista de filosofía latinoamericana* (Buenos Aires) was stopped in its second issue in 1975 by the military repression in Argentina. Eighteen of the thirty-two professors of philosophy in the philosophy department of the School of Philosophy and Letters at the National University of Cuyo, in Mendoza, Argentina, were expelled. The same thing occurred in the national universities of Salta, Tacumán, Córdoba, Río IV, Rosario, Buenos Aires, La Plata, Bahía Blanca, Comahue, etc. The books published by Siglo XXI (which had published my work *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*), by order of the government, were cut with a paper cutter, each into four parts (so they could not be sold even as waste paper). All these acts of vandalism were approved and justified by eminent rightist Catholic thinkers. Half of the students in the Department of Philosophy of Mendoza were expelled by the university, and they were not allowed to study in any university in the country. This is the policy that dependent capitalism advocates with regard to philosophy in Latin America. It is only one example.

30. Without any doubt the work of J .P .Sartre, *Critique de la raison dialectique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), aided in the rediscovery of "the matter of dialectic." I posed this problem in my work *Método para una filosofía de la liberación*, pp. 162ff.

31. See the work of General Golbery do Couto e Silva (a West Point graduate), *Geopolítica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Olympio, 1967), pp. 24-27.