

APPENDIX

1

DIVERSE MEANINGS OF THE TERMS EUROPE, THE OCCIDENT, MODERNITY, LATE CAPITALISM

(1) Barbarian *Europe* versus Greece, Hellenicity. Asia is a province of Anatolia, present-day Turkey, and nothing more. According to this oldest and first meaning, Europe signifies the uncivilized, barbarous, nonpolitical, and nonhuman.

(2) The *Occident*, the Latin Roman Empire including Africa as its southern provinces, versus the Orient, the Hellenist sector of the Roman Empire. Asia belongs to the oriental empire, including Ptolemaic Egypt, which is distinct from Africa. There is no relevant concept of Europe.

(3) Constantinople in the seventh century distinguishes the Christian Roman Empire from the Islamic Arab world. Both worlds study classical Greek, and the Arabs in Baghdad and Cordova immerse themselves in Aristotle more than the Christians. There is no concept of Europe. Constantinople is neither Occidental nor European in opposition to Asia and Africa.

(4) *Latin Europe* versus the Arab World. The Arabs consider Aristotle their philosopher more than the Christians do, but Christian Latins such as Abelard, Albert, and Thomas begin to take interest. Aristotle is considered neither Occidental nor European. Slowly Europe begins to distinguish itself from Africa, now Muslim and

black, and Asia, now Muslim. Constantinople and Greek Orthodoxy constitute the Orient.

(5) During the Italian Renaissance after the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the Latin Occident and Greek Orient united against Turks, Arabs, and Muslims, distinguished the Turks from Hellenism, and forgot their Arab-Hellenistic linkages. The equation is born: the *Occident* = Hellenistic + Roman + Christian. According to Toscanelli's letter of 1474, the Occident thinks of confronting the Orient across the Atlantic.

(6) After 1492, *Europe* consolidates definitively in the sixteenth century and distinguishes itself from America, Africa, and Asia. The Islamic world from Vienna to Granada had hemmed in Latin-Germanic Europe until now. But now, for the first time, with the discovery of the fourth part of the world, America, Europe declares itself as the center. The other three parts, America, Africa, and Asia—commence their history as the periphery. The Orient consists of the continent between Asia Minor, the sea of the Arabs (Indian Ocean), and the sea of the South (the Pacific).

(7) In the eighteenth century, the notion of the Occident (somewhat in confusion since number 2) combines with Hellenicity (which in number 1 had been the anti-Europe) and Europe-as-center, with its peripheral colonies. Hegel expresses most articulately this philosophico-theological ideology, and for the first time the concept of *Occidental Europe* appears.

(8) Occidental culture (or civilization) comes to include North America, which shares Europe's colonialist, racist, and nationalist tendencies, whether instantiated in Nazism or the CIA. The North American ideological notion of the occidental hemisphere nevertheless excludes the South—namely, Africa and Latin America—which geographically pertain to that hemisphere. Although the United States restricts its interest to the northern occidental hemisphere, *occidental culture* could encompass Latin America or at least its elites, whether *criollo* or mestizo, as Edmundo O'Gorman thinks.

(9) Even though the Occident arrogates to itself the tag *Christian*, as the *occidental and Christian culture or civilization*, *Christianity* has nothing occidental about it. Like Islam and Judaism, Christianity was born in the Semitic world, and geographically and culturally

deserves to be called oriental and Asian, especially given its oriental status in the Roman Empire. Christianity's origins are more oriental than Hellenism, which at first was not European at all. The syncretistic, ideological, and contradictory expression *occidental and Christian culture or civilization* is both anti-Semitic—excluding Jews as did Hitler and the integrisms of the center and the periphery—and also antisocialist, since Lenin's revolution and socialism succeeded only in the Orient. Orient-Occident form the ideological poles of the cold war at the end of the second so-called world war, which was only an intercapitalist war of the center.

(10) The concept of modernity rises to prominence at the end of the fifteenth century or the beginning of the sixteenth in works such as *Mundus Novus*. However, the terms *new* and *modern* only suit the culture of Europe (meaning number 6) and the Occident (number 7) after the eighteenth century. This Europe-as-center quickly excludes Spain and Portugal, which constitute southern Europe, never mentioned by Hegel.

(11) The eighteenth century provides the scenario for the concept of the industrial, capitalist, cultural system. Max Weber understands modernity through the bureaucratization and secularization proper to capitalism. A new equation emerges: modernity = European (meaning number 6) + occidental (meaning number 7) + capitalist (meaning number 11).

(12) *Spät-kapitalismus* (in Habermas's sense) functions as an advanced stage of capitalism and of modernity in the midst of the twentieth century.

Many people employ these twelve possible meanings unreflectively, without attending to their contamination by Eurocentrism and the developmentalist fallacy.

| THESE TWELVE MEANINGS AND THEIR HISTORICAL DERIVATION | | | | | | |
|--|--------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|
| IN ANTIQUITY | 7TH CENT. | 12TH CENT. | 15TH CENT. | 16TH CENT. | 18TH-19TH CENT. | 20TH CENT. |
| 1, 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6, 10 | 7, 8, 9 | 9, 12 |

APPENDIX

2

TWO PARADIGMS OF MODERNITY

DEFINITIONS

Semantically the word *modernity* carries two ambiguous significations.

(1) For its first and positive conceptual content, modernity signifies rational emancipation. The emancipation involves leaving behind¹ immaturity under the force of reason as a critical process that opens up new possibilities for human development.

(2) But, at the same time, in its secondary and negative *mythic*² content, modernity justifies an irrational praxis of violence. The myth follows these steps: (a) Modern civilization understands itself as most developed and superior, since it lacks awareness of its own ideological Eurocentrism. (b) This superiority obliges it to develop the most primitive, uneducated, barbarous extremes. (c) This developmental process ought to follow Europe's, since development is unilineal according to the uncritically accepted developmental fallacy. (d) Since the barbarian opposes this civilizing process, modern praxis ought to exercise violence (a just colonial war) as a last resort in order to destroy any obstacles to modernization. (e) This domination produces

its diverse victims and justifies its actions as a sacrifice, an inevitable and quasi-ritual act. Civilizing heroes transform their victims into holocausts of a salvific sacrifice, whether these victims are colonized peoples, African slaves, women, or the ecologically devastated earth. (f) For modernity, the barbarian is at *fault*³ for opposing the civilizing process,⁴ and modernity, ostensibly innocent, seems to be emancipating the fault of its own victims. (g) Finally, modernity, thinking itself as the civilizing power, regards the sufferings and sacrifices of backward and immature⁵ peoples, enslaveable races, and the weaker sex as the inevitable costs of modernization.

(3) To overcome modernity, one must deny its myth. I seek to overcome modernity not through a postmodern attack on reason based on the irrational incommensurability of language-games. Rather, I propose a transmodern opposition to modernity's irrational violence based on the *reason of the Other*. I hope to go beyond modernity by discovering as innocent the so often denied and victimized other face of modernity. This innocent victim of modernity's ritual sacrifice convicts modernity of sacrificial violence and proves that its essential, constitutive features are those of the conquistador. To deny modernity's innocence and to affirm the alterity of the Other, the inculpable victim, reveals the other face hidden and yet essential to modernity. This Other encompasses the peripheral colonial world, the sacrificed Indian, the enslaved black, the oppressed woman, the subjugated child, and the alienated popular culture—all victims of modernity's irrational action in contradiction to its own rational ideal.

(4) By denying the *civilizing myth and the innocence* of its concomitant violence, one recognizes the injustice of Europe's sacrificial praxis within and outside itself. At the same time, one overcomes the limitations of *emancipative reason* via a *liberating reason*, purified from the Eurocentrism and developmentalist fallacy ingredient in hegemonic processes of modernization. The discovery of the ethical dignity of the Other purifies Enlightenment rationality beyond any Eurocentric or developmentalist communicative reason and certainly beyond purely strategic, instrumental rationality. Liberating reason declares the victims innocent beginning from the affirmation of their alterity as an identity in

the exteriority even though modernity has denied them as its own contradiction.

Thus I hope to transcend modern reason not by negating reason as such, but by negating violent, Eurocentric, developmentalist, hegemonic reason. The worldwide liberation project of transmodernity differs from a universal, univocal project that seeks to impose violently upon the Other the following: European rationality, unilateral machismo, and white racism, and which conflates occidental culture with the human in general. In transmodernity, the alterity, coessential to modernity, now receives recognition as an equal. Modernity will come into its fullness not by passing from its potency to its act, but by surpassing itself through a corealization with its once negated alterity and through a process of mutual, creative fecundation. The transmodern project achieves with modernity what it could not achieve by itself—a corealization of solidarity, which is analectic, analogic, syncretic, hybrid, and mestizo, and which bonds center to periphery, woman to man, race to race, ethnic group to ethnic group, class to class, humanity to earth, and occidental to Third World cultures. This bonding occurs not via negation, but via a subsumption from the viewpoint of alterity⁶ and in accord with Marx's reversal of Hegelian *Aufhebung* through the concept of subsumption.

This subsumption intends neither a premodern project, nor a folkloric affirmation of the past, nor the antimodern project of conservatives, rightists, Nazis, fascists, or populists. Nor does it envision a postmodern project negating modernity and all rationality only to topple into nihilist irrationalism. This transmodern project really subsumes modernity's rational emancipative character and its negated alterity even as it rejects modernity's mythic character and its irrational exculpation of self and inculcation of its victims. Modernity began in certain medieval European cities under the impetus of the Renaissance proponents of the *Quattrocento*. But modernity could only take off when sufficient historical conditions were in place: 1492, its empirical spreading over the world, its organization of colonies, and its usufruct over the pragmatic, economic lives of its victims. Modernity came to birth in 1492—that is our thesis. Its real surpassing, as subsumption and not merely Hegelian *Aufhebung*,


transcending its Eurocentrism on behalf of its negated alterity. This new project of transmodernity implies political, economic, ecological, erotic, pedagogic, and religious liberation.

I propose two contradictory paradigms: mere Eurocentric modernity and modernity subsumed in a world horizon. While the first paradigm functions ambiguously as emancipative and mythically violent, the second, transmodern paradigm embraces both modernity and its alterity. According to Tzevan Todorov's *Nosotros y los otros*,⁷ *nosotros* refers to Europeans, and *los otros* refers to the peoples of the periphery. Modernity defined itself as emancipative with respect to its *we* without averting to its mythic-sacrificial behavior toward its *Others*. Montaigne aptly captured the paradox:

We can call them barbarians with respect to our rules of reason, but not with respect to us, who exceed the entire species in barbarity.⁸

TWO PARADIGMS OF MODERNITY

(Schematic simplification of the moments determinative for both paradigms)



Read diachronically from A toward G and from a to i

1) Most relevant determinations:

- A: Europe at the moment of discovery (1492).
- B: The European modern present.
- C: Project of realization (Habermasian) of modernity.
- P: Project of postmodern nihilism.
- D: The invasion of the continent (of Africa and Asia later).

- F: Project within the dependent new world order.
- G: World project of liberation (transmodernity).
- R: Renaissance and Reformation.
- K: The *Aufklärung* (industrial capitalism).

II) Relations with a certain direction or arrows:

- a: European, medieval (or premodern) history.
- b: Modern European history.
- c: Praxis of the realization of C.
- d: Amerindian history (also that of Africa and Asia).
- e: Mercantilist colonial and dependent history.
- f: History from the peripheral world to industrial capitalism.
- g: Praxis of the realization of F (developmentalism).
- h: Praxis of the liberation or of the realization of G.
- i: Praxis of solidarity of the center with the periphery.
- 1, 2, 3: Historical types of domination (of A over → D, etc.).

III) The two paradigms of modernity:

- [] Eurocentric paradigm of modernity [R→K→ B→C].
- () World paradigm of modernity/alterity (toward transmodernity): (A/D→ B/E →G).