

THE REASON OF THE OTHER: "INTERPELLATION" AS SPEECH-ACT

The philosophy of Karl-Otto Apel is extremely suggestive and healthy for Latin America for many reasons, but I wish to underscore the most important among them: its subsumptive criticism of the analytical philosophy of language. To dialogue with this philosophy is a demanding experience, as this must be undertaken with a creative purpose.

2.1 Point of Departure

2.1.1 The Course of K.-O. Apel's Philosophy

Since his habilitation thesis,¹ the philosophy of language has been Apel's preferred thematic. In the *Transformation der Philosophie*² Apel compiles articles where one may observe his new path. From a hermeneutic position, at that time phenomenological and even Heideggerian-Gadamerian, going through Charles W. Morris, Wittgenstein's criticism is conciliated with Heidegger,³ where the "analysis of language" is subsumed. From approximately 1970, with Peirce's critique of Kant's solipsism⁴ and with the discovery of the "community of communication" as a transcendental⁵ and ethical⁶ presupposition of all possible "linguistic games" or argumentation, there emerges the "last Apel." Step by step, in dialogue with the philosophy of science, Apel opens a new discussion concerning a typology of rationality, and defines the subject of the possibility of an "ultimate foundation of ethics"⁷ in a growing confrontation with Habermas. A new moment, starting from the pragmatic turn,⁸ where the thematic of "transcendental pragmatics" had originated, is constituted by the problem of "transcendental semantics," which is in dialogue with semanticist intentionalism, that is to say, with reference to the intentional state of the second Searle.⁹ At the same time, there emerges the need for a mediation between the basic norms of discourse ethics and the problem of its application (*Anwendungsproblem*), that is, the problem of an ethics of responsibility,¹⁰ in order to be *a posteriori* capable of being responsible for the consequences of the acts of those "affected"

by the "agreements" reached discursively. To end, Apel has undertaken the possibility of a macro-ethics for humankind.¹¹

If in the sixties and seventies his opponent was the Popperian reductivist epistemology or an analytical abstract philosophy of language, in the style of the first Wittgenstein, who had only arrived at the linguistic turn, Apel later moved against those having discovered pragmatics, returned to a pre-communicative position. In addition, during the mid-eighties, Apel's discourse was more oriented to a confrontation with postmodern thought-Derrida, Lyotard, and especially Rorty-which he considered radical opponents of rationality. The *Philosophy of Liberation*, inspired by Latin American reality and also by Levinas's philosophy, could, for example, be regarded by Apel as a peripheral representative of such postmodernity. Let me elaborate.

2.1.2 Latin American Philosophy of Liberation

Without assuming the representation of a broad movement, the Philosophy of Liberation, which I have practiced since 1969, sets out from our particular regional reality: the increasing poverty of the majority of the Latin American population;¹² dependent capitalism, which transfers value to central capitalism;¹³ the growing consciousness of the impossibility of an autonomous philosophy under these circumstances;¹⁴ the existence of different types of oppression, which demands not only a philosophy of "freedom" but also a philosophy of "liberation" (as an action, as a praxis, the starting point of which is oppression, and its goal, *télos*, liberty from such oppressions as ancestral *machismo*, for example, in the case of women's oppression).¹⁵


Philosophically, starting from Heideggerian phenomenology and the Frankfurt school at the end of the sixties, the Philosophy of Liberation was inspired by the thought of Emmanuel Levinas, because it allowed us to clearly define the position of "exteriority" (as a philosophy, as popular culture, as the Latin American economy with respect to the United States, Japan, or Europe) as "poor", that is to say, from an anthropological and ethical economical level,¹⁶ and in regards to a hegemonic "totality"¹⁷-political-authoritarian, economic-capitalist, erotic-machismo, cultural-imperialistic, fetishist religion, and so on. We were conscious of being the "other face" of modernity. Modernity was born in 1492 with the "centrality" of Europe eurocentrism originated when Europe was able to dominate the Arab world, which had been the center of the known world up to the 15th century). The "I," which begins with the "I conquer" of Hernan Cortés or Pizarro, which in fact precedes the Cartesian *ego cogito* by about a century, produces Indian genocide, African slavery, and Asian colonial wars. The majority of today's humanity (the South) is the other face of modernity; it is neither pre- nor anti- nor postmodern, nor can this South "end" or "realize" such a modernity as Habermas pretends. In 1976, when I wrote the *Philosophy of Liberation*, before the European movement called

postmodern,¹⁸ I criticized modernity, inspired in the use of this concept by the late Heidegger.¹⁹ We are not, as periphery, the, Other *than reason*.²⁰ We pretend to validly express the reason of the Other, that of the genocidally murdered Indian, of the African slave reduced to merchandise, of women as sexual objects, of the child pedagogically dominated ("the lectern" objects as Paulo Freire defines them). We pretend to be the expression of reason, a reason of one who places him/herself beyond eurocentric, machist, pedagogically dominated, culturally manipulated, religiously fetishist reason. We propose a Philosophy of Liberation of the Other²¹ that is beyond the horizon of the economic-political-hegemonic world (fratricide), of the eurocentric communication community (filicide), of the phallic eroticism which castrates women (uxoricide) and last but not least, the subject which uses nature as an exploitable mediation for the valorization of the value of capital (ecocide).

2.2 Interpellation

Our argumentative strategy will start from the most relevant of Apel's thought. This is located within the horizon of a transcendental philosophy of language. In fact, Apel clearly points out how a mere "sentence" (*p*), the object of the post-linguistic-turn philosophy since Frege or the first Wittgenstein, remains subsumed in the "speech act" ($F \vdash p$), the pragmatic turn. Schema 1 offers the possibility of visualizing the problem. We have chosen a speech act which gives us the possibility to place the subject we pretend to expose from the perspective of a Philosophy of Liberation.

Schema 1. Sentence and the speech Act



Our discourse starts, at least pedagogically, in an abstract form, from the Levinasean intuition that the "Other" (*Autru*) is the *original* source of all possible discourse, which is essentially an ethical relation and "appeals" from the "exteriority." It means the irruption of the Other, of the poor (of the dominated woman, etc.) which "appears" *in* the "communication community" of current institutionalism, of the "totality," claiming and demanding justice.²²

The initial "sentence" with its "propositional content" could thus be approximately stated:

1. *This is an act of justice.* Several speech acts can be expressed from this sentence. One of them could be developed as follows:

2. *You must fulfill the act of justice for me.*²³ Even more developed and if item 2 is not fulfilled, it could be stated:

3. *I accuse you for the justice you should have given me.*²⁴ The speech act to be taken into account, which may now seem incomprehensible, can thus be stated:

4. *I interpellate*²⁵ *to you for the act of justice you should have fulfilled for me.*

Since we are dealing with a speech act that is intentionally very peculiar and not with a mere sentence [object of theoretical or analytical understanding (*Verstand*)], we are located at an ethical level, or one of practical reason, the level of the "face-to-face," as Levinas would say, where two persons face each other without external mediation, except for the linguistic one. This is an encounter that takes place also through the immediate corporeality of both: proximity.²⁶

2.2.1 Exteriority and Interpellation

We wish to distinguish interpellation from other speech acts, such as ordering:

5. *I order you to fulfill an act of justice for me.* Ordering may be followed by a sanction if the command was not fulfilled. I would also like to distinguish it from those speech acts such as asking or begging:

6. *I ask you to fulfill an act of justice for me.* This is a speech act which may be followed by remorse for an act of unfulfilled mercy, if the asking or begging is not accepted. Or that of demanding:

7. *I demand that you fulfill an act of justice for me.* Or even, and repeating item 2. in another way:


8. *It is your obligation to fulfill the act of justice for me.*

Which may be followed by various possibilities; one of which we will analyze next. In any event, in each of these cases, the speaker (*S*) places himself in a different position in front of the hearer (*H*). In a command (5.) *S* is the authority (from top to bottom) and *H* must obey (the arrow *a* of Schema 2). By begging, *S* is in a dependent position, while *H* now has the power of decision (6.; arrow *b*). Regarding the demand, *S*, from the current institutionalism, has the right to expect a (the perlocutionary effect) from *H* (that is to say, the fulfillment of the act of justice) (arrow *c*). In the "obligation" position (8.), *S* assumes a position of right (another way for arrow *a*). We would still propose one last case, interpellation in its normal sense:

9. *I appeal for the act of justice (I ordered, asked, demanded) you should have fulfilled for me.*

In this case, based on current norms, *S* makes *H* accountable (in the "totality" of the life-world (*Lebenswelt*) or even on the economic, political, "systems," etc.) (arrow *c*).

Schema 2. Intra- and Extra-Institutional Speech Acts



Explanation of schema: a, «command" speech act; b, 'begging"; c, "demand," "recrimination," etc.; d, "inter-appellation." Arrows e (from *H*) y f (from *S*) are the praxis which join in the construction of a Liberation Project (*Entwurf*) "new" institutional moment 2).

The speech act which I call interpellation, and which I formulated in 4., is the one privileged by Emanuel Levinas but placed by him *before* his linguistic explanation, in the prior silence of the expression (according to the "principle of expressability"²⁷ developed by Searle).

By interpellation, then, I will understand a performative, *sui generis* statement uttered by someone (*S*) which is, regarding a listener (*H*), "out" or "beyond" (in this sense, transcendental) the horizon or institutional frame, normative for the ruling "system," beyond the Husserlian-Habermasian *Lebenswelt* or the Hegelian *Sittlichkeit*, which acts as the totality²⁸ for Levinas. Searle is referring to the subject when he writes:

Proudhon said: *Property is a theft*. If one tries to consider this as an internal observation, then it is non-sensical. It is meant as an external observation which attacks or rejects the institution of private property.²⁹

For now, I only need this simple description of what is "outside" the institution. Marx refers to this type of situation in the following example:

To speak here of natural justice, as Gilbert does... is nonsense.... This content is just whenever it corresponds, is appropriate, to the mode of production. It is unjust wherever it contradicts that mode. Slavery on the basis

of capitalist production is unjust; likewise fraud in the quality of commodities.³⁰

For Marx, bourgeois "morals," or "right," justifies "from inside" that which applies to its own principles. Slavery is unjust for the bourgeois or socialist order; it is just for the slavery order. Salaried labor is unjust for Marx or in the socialist regimes, insofar as it is an institutionalism which steals from the worker part of the product of his labor (surplus value). In this case, the ethical criterion is "external" and "prior" to capital as such; it is the living labor, the dignity of the person of the worker *ante festum*. This is the "ethical" criterion, the realm from which interpellation emerges and in which Levinas places himself in as far as the exteriority of the Other, as the other than and of the Totality (totality as both system and current *Lebenswelt*). In other words, to explain this better:

Political economy therefore does not recognize the unoccupied worker, the working man insofar as he is *outside* this work relationship. The swindler, the cheat, the beggar, the unemployed, the starving, the destitute and the criminal working man are *figures* which exist for *for it*, but only for other eyes—for the eyes of doctors, judges, grave-diggers, beadles, etc. Nebulous figures [*specters*] which *do not belong within the province of political economy*³¹ ... the *abstract* existence of man as a mere *workman* who therefore tumbles day after day from his fulfilled nothingness [*Nichts*] into absolute nothingness, into his social and hence real non-existence.³²

Interpellation would be the speech act of what Marx metaphorically called "specters which remain outside the province of political economy." Ali this is expressed in the testimony of Tupac Amaru, a rebel Inca of Peru, in 1781, when during his trial stated:

We are the only conspirators, Your Honor, for having burdened the country with unbearable exactions, and I for *having wanted to liberate the people* from such a tyranny.³³

The liberators who make the interpellation of the poor their own, in the end, are declared equally guilty by the established and ruling moral order. They are "specters" of another realm.

2.2.2 Interpellation and Validity Claims

a. First, let us consider the condition of all communication: intelligibility. The speech act which I have called interpellation has a propositional content (in trying to fulfill the first condition, that of intelligibility, that is to say, in stating an interpretable meaning), which the speaker (*S*), being an excluded "pauper," in the exteriority, may hardly formulate a sentence correctly, due to a certain linguistic incompetence³⁴—from the hearer's (*H*) point of view—a phonetically defective pronunciation along with the Speaker's³⁵ lack of knowledge of the hearer's language and, essentially, the meaning in its full pragmatic³⁶

sense (and not reductively from a pre-communicative "semanticism"³⁷) which *S* grants to 1 in 2. (see list of sentences above) and to both in 4. Therefore, at the beginning at least, only "quasi-intelligibility" is obtained, a quasi-communication, a quasi-interpretation of meaning, which puts us on guard regarding the real difficulty of all communication and of its necessary pathologies.³⁸ Full intelligibility becomes possible in a path of solidarity (in the praxis of liberation, represented by arrows *e* and *f* in Schema 2, as a diachronical process). Here we have at least to note the critical intention of the postmoderns—or Richard Rorty, for example—in the sense that communication can be frequently no more than an act of "conversation," who acknowledge the difficulty and maybe even impossibility of achieving full communication. Without agreeing with the postmoderns, we wish, however, to listen to the difficulties we suffer—as persons, cultures or peripheral philosophical communities, non-hegemonic, dominated, exploited, excluded—from communication. Let us take one more step.

b. We must now consider the first validity claim: truth. Since we are dealing with a performative utterance and not a *constatif* (assertive) one, it does not originally claim to be a true speech act. However, the propositional and full pragmatic content of the interpellative speech act allows us to develop it as a constative speech act (which subsumes the performative in this case). Subsuming 1. (see list above, p. 22), we have:

10. *I affirm that this is an act of justice.* Or, uttered as an speech act, which subsumes 2.:

11. *I affirm that you must fulfill the act of justice for me.*

Or subsuming 4.:

12. *I affirm that I appeal to you for the act of justice you should have fulfilled for me.*

In this case there could be a validity truth-claim, insofar as *S* (an Indian, a Turk in Germany, a woman) can try to intersubjectively justify (if it were to be problematized, thanks to a possible argumentative discourse) how just is his claim to reach an "agreement" on 1. and 2., an agreement which cannot be based on the obligations and responsibilities³⁹ of current right, norms, or institutions, but on transcendental ethical demands regarding the dignity of a pauper as person.⁴⁰ It must be considered that the "interpellant," and this is the basis for the difference with respect to a mere demand, or the difference between intra-systemic interpellation (from the current right and as a member of the "real communication community") and the interpellation of the Other (as the one that demands from outside, as one excluded from current right, the without-right [*rechtsloss*]), in principle "opposes" the current consensus and the "agreement" intersubjectively obtained *in a past (communication community) that excluded him/her*. His/her argumentation will be radical and, *in fact*, difficult accept.

c. Let us now consider the second validity claim: veracity. It deals with the essential moment of the interpellative speech act. The only communicative validation of this speech act, to be "accepted" with illocutionary force by the hearer (*H*), is neither full intelligibility (because, at the beginning at least, it is quasi-intelligible, because the full interpretation of meaning is a complex act), nor the truth (because it is not properly a constative speech act⁴¹), nor even a reference to norms or rightness (because the interpellation questions the current norms of hegemonic institutionalism), but definitely full "veracity." The hearer (*H*) does not have another genuine possibility for "serious communication" with *S*, except for his rational⁴² "belief" or "acceptance" of the pauper's (*S*) sincerity regarding his interpellation. The latter, on the other hand, must express him/herself in such a way so that his/her "intention"⁴³ can be clearly interpreted, so that his sincerity and veracity may be disclosed because they are the fundamental warrant of the communicative validity claim of his/her speech act. The aforementioned is intersubjectively valid because it is a statement resulting from a sincere act; it is sincere in its intention and performance. The "appealed" (*H*) believes that 1., is convinced in 4 (see list above, p. 22). before *f*2 ("You must fulfill..."), and decides to act before *f*1 ("I appeal to you for..."), due to the veracity of the one that "appeals." The "acceptance" of such sincerity is the effect of the illocutionary force, it is the perlocutionary effect (the effect which is the practical change of *H*, which will be turned into a responsible subject of a "liberating praxis," arrow *e* in Schema 2, in a solidarity action with *S*; and, thus, arrow *f* converges in a mutual praxis addressed to the "Liberation Project"⁴⁴). These "beliefs", "convincement", "deciding" are rational, because one has discursively reached or is willing to reach an "agreement" through argumentation (even though all this, once again, has complexities and difficulties due to the existing asymmetry between *S* and *H*).

d. Let us now consider the third validity claim: rightness. As I mentioned, the interpellant, by definition, cannot fulfill the current norms. The norms (the dominating institutionalism) are the cause of his/her misery. In any case, insofar as the dignity of the person is assumed in all rational communication as the basic norm, ethically it can not affirm the current norms, questioning them from its own basis: from the dignity denied to the pauper who "interpellates." The non-normativeness of the interpellation is inevitable, since it is founded on the originary moment of a *new* normativeness-the future institutionalism where the interpellant will have effective rights.⁴⁵

We could follow Searle on his account of the rules for the use of the indexical device of illocutionary force,⁴⁶ regarding "reference" and "predication" (applying what he exposes regarding the "promise" for interpellation), but this would take an exceedingly long time.

2.3 *The Reason of the Other, Exteriority and the Community of Communication*

What has been said should only be taken as an "indication," not as a description of the interpellative speech act, but it is sufficient to stage the argumentative strategy we wish to develop.

On our part, as Latin Americans, participants in a peripheral communication community, where the experience of exclusion is an everyday starting point that is to say, an *a priori*, and not an *a posteriori*, we must find "philosophical room" from our experience of misery, poverty, difficulty to discuss (due to lack of resources), uncommunicativeness, or merely not "being part" of the hegemonic communication community.

2.3.1 Exteriority and the Ideal Community of Communication

Part A,⁴⁷ or the ethical transcendental, in Apel's terminology, the ideal communication community⁴⁸ (or the "ideal speech situation," which is Habermas's "communication free of domination" [*herrschaftsfreie Kommunikation*]⁴⁹), must be differentiated from the mere, real, or empirical communication community, Part B, of ethics, where one can present cases of irrationality and injustice. We will place ourselves, first, in Part A, that of transcendental pragmatics (Apel) or universal pragmatics (Habermas), to complete the minimum description required for the performance of an argumentative rationality.

In fact, the unlimited communication community, as defined by Peirce (without coercion, with equality and respect for all the possible participating persons) defines what we could call the positive moment, but this is not explicit with reference to the negative moment. There would be a certain blindness in discovering the possible negative moments or those suppositions which always permit the irruption of disagreement (the non-agreement, the "dissent" of Lyotard) as the starting point for the development of all new argumentation, if the negative moment was not to be elucidated. That is to say, in rationality, even at the transcendental or universal level, it would be necessary to include as a moment of its definition, as a critical reason, the virtual exteriority (of diverse degrees) of each person, of each participant in the community as one other potential, but not yet, participant. The Other, not as "other" than reason but as the "reason" of the Other is the other reason which "interpellates" and from where one may show norms to be invalid or statements to be false.

The extended description of some determinations of the ideal communication community could be stated as: 1) all argumentation always presupposes an ideal communication community, free of domination, respecting the equality of personhood of all possible participants (positively), and 2) each of the current or possible members, presupposed *a priori*, both pragmatically and transcendentially, always have the right to place themselves as the Other in the community (*negatively*).⁵⁰

Thus, it is then a community, and only because of this is it a human community (which is a redundancy), in which every member has the right to place himself within a certain exteriority of the community. Evidently there are degrees of exteriority, which range from those of the absolute situation (such as death and madness) to those of the right to dissent, which still does not yet find *sufficient* reasons to prove the validity of the *new* discovery-and probably will never find them-but which nevertheless had the right to reasonable dissent. There is virtual exteriority, which does not deny the community but always discovers it as a “re-union” or a “con-vergence” of *free* persons.⁵¹ No “agreement” may be granted the claim of denying the possibility for each current or possible member to place him/herself before a community as an Other (this would amount to the “*absolute* agreement” in Hegel’s account of “*absolute* knowledge [*Wissen*].” It would be the end of all possible argumentation). Reason, which bears that name, is always open to the “reason of *the Other*,” to *another* reason and only this is a *critical* and *historical* reason; more than that, it is an *ethical* reason.

If this explicit determination is admitted in the description of “ideal” communication community, explaining the *negative* moment, we thus have a sort of path on which we will now be able to move to less abstract levels, having thereby also warranted the grounds for the “application” (*Anwendung*) of discourse ethics (in Part B).

2.3.2 Exteriority and the Scientific Community

In general, and with reason, more importance has been given in epistemology to scientific reason, referred to in the debate concerning explanation (*Erklären*). Apel showed that this always presupposes transcendently a hermeneutic-comprehensive reason (*Verstehen*), which from an unlimited communication community intersubjectively opens itself to an every day life-world (*Lebenswelt*), in which all pragmatic statements⁵² are uttered.

All this presupposes, evidently, “being-part” of the community, participating in a “linguistic game,” in the “agreement.” Our problem begins when one tries to explicitly problematize the “non-agreement,” the “dis-agreement” of that participant (or if not an actual participant, when he/she is excluded or simply ignored), which is no longer “in agreement” because of a “discovery” which is presented by him/her with the evidence of something with a truth-claim, not yet valid for the community, because the current agreement has not been falsified to that moment. Here I am interested in the “inventing” or the “discovering” moment (and the logic of the discovery, which may seem chaotic, as Paul Feyerabend’s saw it⁵³) more than in the “comprehension-explication” moment (of the logic of explanation).

From the moment a member of a community no longer agrees with the current agreement, because of a discovery given to him/her “as certain” (cer-

tainty not yet validated; that is to say, not publicly discussed and accepted as justified and, thus, as true or valid), the subjectivity of the discoverer is located with reference to the scientific communication community as Other.⁵⁴ It is not someone absolutely other, because it frequently starts from the same linguistic game, but it begins to be "alienated," distanced, made into an otherness. And there are even cases where the community expels them, excludes them (as in the case of Galileo, condemned by the Inquisition, under the power of Bellarmino); they are pursued and even killed—the "victims." The community, negatively and irrationally, based on an institutional inertia principle, defends itself against novelties, reaffirms the current agreement. Even though the community proposes it as falsifiable, it impedes, fears and intends its agreement to be non-falsifiable. To start, the Philosophy of Liberation is interested in the novel and in scientific discoveries,⁵⁵ not as an end but as a moment in the realization process of a person's dignity.

In the same manner, the interpellation of the pauper is played at the scientific community's level by a speech act which could be called the proposal of the scientist (like arrow *d* of Schema 2):⁵⁶

13. *I "propose"⁵⁷ this new explanation (or comprehension) x for the state of affairs z, not yet explained (or comprehended or not yet observed).*

If the proposal supposes a new paradigm (to speak like Kuhn), or a degree of greater than standard novelty, the discoverer is frequently, or for a certain period of time, not comprehended, excluded, not taken into consideration. It is the moment of experiencing a certain exteriority of being-Other from the scientific community, which begins to appear to him/her as outdated, over-come, closed-defending its interests with growing egotism.⁵⁸ What has to be remembered is that all new argumentation (and novelty bears, in the long run, the realization of an unlimited rationality in time) supposes placing oneself as the Other before those who continue sustaining that which is valid up to that moment. The scientists included in the annals of the history of science are the innovators who were to be honored, and their biographies relate their suffering, isolation, silence, and even obscure deaths.

These comprehensive lines of argumentation serve as an indication of the problematic.

2.3.3 Concrete Types of Interpellation. From those Excluded from their Respective Hegemonic Communities of Communication

Continuing with Part B, we can now return to the interpellation in the real, everyday communication community (in the life-world [*Lebenswelt*]), of every person who can argue because he/she is rational (and not because he/she has or does not have the ability or control of a science). Once again it is a question of exteriority, but now at various possible levels.

For example, Apel in *Diskurs und Verantwortung* discusses "social class conflicts"⁵⁹ or "North-South conflicts."⁶⁰ In reality the euphemism "conflict" does not clearly describe the structures of domination, exploitation, and alienation of the Other. In the subject we are discussing it is stated as "exclusion" of the Other from the corresponding communication community.

To start, it is worthwhile to underscore a point already mentioned. Habermas has proposed a distinction between life-world (*Lebenswelt*)⁶¹ and system.⁶² In an economic system, such as the capitalist, or political system, or the liberal democratic system (in the North American and West European societies), the life-world sustains a double relationship: on the one hand, it maintains a certain measure of exteriority, where subjectivity may insure for itself a genuine everyday room; and on the other, it is kept as a realm for colonization. However, the life-world (European-North American) of the North can locate the "world of life" of the South, the peripheral, for example, as the excluded, that which is "disconnected" (as Samir Amin would say), the underdeveloped, the barbarian. That is to say, a life-world that is the hegemonic, dominating one that, with respect to the other worlds, exercises a function very similar to that of the colonizing systems.

a. We can begin, thus, with the interpellation which starts from the exclusion of persons of other races, by the racism of Apartheid in South Africa, Black discrimination in the United States, or discrimination of Turks in Germany, of Palestinians in Israel, of Afro-Americans⁶³ and Indians in Latin America in general. For example, the racially excluded launches an interpellation to the real communication community of the "whites." It holds them accountable for the legitimate rights which have not been granted or fulfilled. All that was discussed in paragraph 2.2, above, should now be specified in the case of the anti-racist interpellation. The struggle for the defense of equal racial rights is a central thematic of the Philosophy of Liberation.

b. In the same manner, in the *machistic* life-world, women, who with greater or smaller differences for all humanity, classes, and cultures, are dominated, alienated, and used as sexual objects (as indicated by Freud)⁶⁴ "appeal." Feminist liberation is also one of the central subjects of the Philosophy of Liberation.

c. In the same way, in a capitalist society, the domination of the salaried laborer, who must sell his living labor for money⁶⁵ to the owner of capital, appears as a new type of excluded from the communication community of businessmen, capitalists, the hegemonic members in the life world of the society colonized by the system they control. This is what the struggle of the classes consists in (always virtual for the anti-ethical essence of capital,⁶⁶ and frequently effective), a matter which Habermas and Apel no longer take into consideration, because they do not find it pertinent.

d. No less essential is the ecological problem, which Apel frequently con-

templates, because it virtually excludes future generations from the benefits we are currently destroying. In this case, the responsible interpellation is launched by ecologists, with an acute and just ethical conscience. Even here, once again, they do not sufficiently take into consideration that the ecological destruction is to a great extent induced by industrial powers (North America, Europe, and Japan), while all humanity is held responsible. There is consciousness of the destruction of the Amazonian jungles, but not for the death of its Indians, nor for the fifty million northeasterners whom the Brazilian peripheral capitalism has impoverished to extreme and inhuman misery, who in order to eat have to destroy the jungle.

e. We must also remember the cultural eurocentrism (including the Anglo-North American culture), which plays the civilized life-world role for all human culture, and presents itself as the paradigm for all other cultures. Here, once again, the position of Richard Rorty regarding the “incommensurability” of an intercultural dialogue always remains healthy if we consider the irresponsibility of those who do not believe that the chore of dialogue also demands a theory that implies *the difficulties*. The members of another culture, the cultural Other, “interpellate” for their own cultural popular rights (Africans, Asians, Indians, Latin Americans, North American Blacks, et al.). It is a life-or-death struggle.

f. Last, maybe the most serious problem at the end of the 20th century, which began in 1492 (when Latin America was incorporated as the first European periphery,⁶⁷ because Africa and Asia up to the 19th century were only an exterior forum) is the ever increasing distance between the richness of Northern Central capitalism and the ever growing misery of Southern peripheral capitalism. Be it clearly understood: Africa, Asia, and Latin America (with the exception of China, Vietnam, Cuba, and some other countries) are “capitalist dependent” regions.⁶⁸ This is the subject that should be the focus of our dialogue: the interpellation which the majority of the population of the planet, located in the South, raises, demanding their right to live, their right to develop their own culture, economy, politics, etc.

This subject (because hunger, misery, poverty are effects of a capitalism which is exhibited as triumphant before Eastern European socialism, but which, in fact, impoverishes and peremptorily fails the South) demands from the Philosophy of Liberation that it overcome (and adequately integrate) mere pragmatic rationality to other types of rationality, which the Northern philosophy of developed capitalism pretends to abandon: the rationality of a practical, ethical economics; of an interpersonal communitarian relationship, and not only as a system, the way Habermas considers it and Apel accepts.

In any case, we agree with Apel that all interpellation in Part B must always proceed rationally, starting from a basic ethical norm which is presupposed in all argumentative discourse⁶⁹ (procedurally democratic), but which in our case,

and because of the reality in which we live, gives more attention to the negative aspects of domination and to the demands for a liberation struggle at each of these levels: racial, erotic, social, cultural, economic, North-South, etc. It would be too exhaustive to try to show, at this point, the different ways one may think these problems, such as the a priori responsibility for all life- and not a posteriori as is done by Apel and Hans Jonas-or that of an "ethical" consciousness, which does not apply principles as is done by the "moral" conscience. These are possible subjects for future dialogues.

2.4 From Pragmatics to Economics

The originary interpellation is, above all, a communicative act; that is to say, it explicitly puts in contact persons as persons (what we have called face-to-face). It is an encounter resulting from the illocutionary component of the speech act as such. In uttering the performative statement (from 2, see list above), in the first moment, *S* enters into a relationship, a communicative contact; she encounters *H*. The *a* in *H* effect mayor may not be performed, even though it must be noted that the said encounter may not be performed, if *H* does not allow *S* to express herself or, simply, does not pay any attention to her utterance. Thus, it is necessary to analyze this same practical relationship ("ethical," according to Levinas) among persons, which cannot be identified as the "communicative action" of Habermas.

All relations among persons, as such, can be called *praxis* and not *poiesis*.⁷⁰ But a practical relationship is more than a mere communicative action. On the contrary, all communicative action is always a practical relationship. With this we want to point out that in practical relations there are other dimensions which are not exclusively communicative, even though every practical relationship (virtual or potential) must always be able to become a relationship when the linguistic or pragmatic communicative action is performed-on the "principle of expressibility" of Searle. That is to say, the communicative, linguistic, pragmatic, argumentative action can always be explained in all interpersonal practical relations. When someone shakes hands with another person, he/she may say nothing, or a practical relation may develop with a linguistic expression, such as:

14. *Good morning!*

But there are dimensions of the practical relation which are not only communicative, as for example, the erotic relationship-which Levinas considered to overcome the eidetic, intellectual, or wordly moment of the phenomenology. Consider the following expressions of Levinas of a trans- or pre-communicative erotics:

In the caress, a relation yet, in one aspect, sensible, the body already denudes itself of its very form, offering itself as erotic nudity. In the carnal given to tenderness, the body quits the status of being [*étant*].⁷¹

Voluptuousness profanes; it does not see. *An intentionality without vision*, discovery does not shed light: what it discovers does not present itself as *signification* and illuminates no horizon.... Profanation, the revelation of the hidden as hidden, constitutes a model of being irreducible to intentionality.... It grasps nothing, issues in no concept, does not *issue*, has neither the subject-object structure nor the I-thou structures.... Being-for-the-Other must not suggest any finality and not imply the antecedent positing or valorization of any value.⁷² To be for the Other is to be good. The concept of the Other has, to be sure, no new content with respect to the concept of the I... [t]he fact that in existing for another I exist otherwise than in existing for me is morality itself.⁷³

The relationship established between lovers in voluptuousness, fundamentally refractory to universalization, is the very contrary of the social relation. It excludes the third party, it remains intimacy, dual solitude, closed society, the supremely non-public.... The feminine is the other refractory to society, member of a dual society, an intimate society, *a society without language*.⁷⁴

Speech refuses vision, because the speaker does not deliver images of himself only, but is personally present in his speech, absolutely exterior to every image he would leave. In language exteriority is exercised, deployed, brought about.... Language is the incessant surpassing of the *Sinngebung* by the signification⁷⁵

The ethical, beyond vision and certitude, delineates the structure of exteriority as such. Ethics is not a branch of philosophy, but *first philosophy*.⁷⁶

We suggest that the effect of the illocutionary component, the practical-communicative relationship itself with the Other (face-to-face) in proximity, cannot be reduced to a communicative-linguistic act. The *Linguistic*, like the *erotic* or *economic* aspects of the practical relation, is a moment of the relationship.⁷⁷ And, as the performative moment could constitute a relationship under the ruling of instrumental reason (uttering a speech act to reach an effect A, but not to establish a face-to-face relation regarding the Other), in the same manner all the remaining dimensions (the erotic, the economic, etc.), may equally constitute themselves as the finality of an instrumental reason;⁷⁸ but not necessarily. Gadamer demonstrated how the Heideggerian “finding oneself in the world” (*Befindlichkeit*) was always to “find oneself linguistically.”⁷⁹ In the same way,⁸⁰ as living beings in a culture (as a material-symbolic instrumental totality), we can say that we always *a priori* live in a community and world where we find ourselves being instrumentally. The material instrument (Heidegger's hammer, Plato or Aristotle's shoe), product of human manual labor, analogously plays in economics the role of the sign in pragmatics. Let us observe the various

degrees of interpersonal and instrumental relationships in these three statements:

15. *I ask you to accept this flower as a gift.*

16. *I need you to trade this flower for this fruit.*

17. *I need you to buy this flower for x money.*

In the first case, 15, we are dealing with a gift. The flower (product of the labor-act of the gardener) is a mere free mediation of the interpersonal, face-to-face practical relation (which plays the role of the illocutionary moment performance). In the second case, 16, we find ourselves in a pre-monetary society of trade. In the third, 17, we are in a monetary interchange relationship (purchase-sale). In 17, the essential is not to forget that the interpersonal practical relation is always present, as an ethical, constitutive and genuine situation (regarding the medieval *Justitiam ad alterum est*). Let us see these aspects in a comparative scheme.

Schema 3. Pragmatic and Economic Moments

Efficient subject	Material effect	Practical relation		Receptor subject
		Genuine relationship	Instrumental reason	
Utters the speech act	Sign	Practical reason Communication	Instrumental effect ⁸¹	Interpreter
Performs the labor act	Product or object (flower)	Economic community ⁸³ relationship	Capitalist social relationship ⁸⁴	Consumer

As the speech act always presupposes *a priori* a communication community (ideal and factually real), in the same manner all labor acts (which, for example, produce something: a flower, bread, or wine) always presupposes *a priori* a community of producers, in order to fulfill "human life needs."⁸⁵ If Apel speaks of a "transcendental pragmatics" (at the linguistic-communication level), with the same right one could speak of a "transcendental economics" (at the productive-practical relationship level). That which is for a speech act the illocutionary moment, for the labor act is the practical relation with the Other, as clearly shown in the case of the gift (example 15.), which intentionally *a priori* determines all the productive process (I produce the flower "for" him/her). The moment of the interpersonal relationship (denied in the "social" capital relationship) is what Marx indicated when speaking of the community, of the "Realm of Freedom" or of "communism" (where each one would have to work "according to his/her capacity" and consume "according to his/her needs"⁸⁶), the presupposed community always ideally *a priori* and factually denied in "capital" (as a "social relationship"⁸⁷).

Here we are now able to consider the second example, specifying economically the abstract interpellation formulated in item 4 at the beginning of this paper:

18. *I “appeal” to you for the food⁸⁸ you should have given me.*

Giving something supposes a previous production, supposes the labor act of the material transformation of nature. It is not a sign, a material word as in the speech act. It is a product, a material object: flower, bread, wine, oil, food (products), as cultural symbol or food to eat, or an instrument (machinery, computer). But in this realm, economics is not merely a system (in the Habermasian sense⁸⁹) which colonizes the everyday life-world (which can also be colonized by advertising and manipulative communication of instrumental reason by the media), but it is equally the *a priori* always presupposed in all labor acts or consumption acts: the community of producers/consumers (ideal or real; in the latter case colonized today by capitalism as a defective form of the domination of instrumental reason). But the community of producers/consumers, *transcendentally presupposed in all economic labor-act/consumption*, has as constitutive moment the establishment of an interpersonal practical relation (as much as, even though in another dimension, the illocutionary moment of a speech act). Communicative action or economic action are two dimensions of the practical relation among persons.

The one who “appeals” from outside the real community of producers/consumers (whose material objects are also always cultural and symbolic), the “pauper,” places as the content, referent, and meaning of his speech act (in statements 4. or 18.) his/her *suffering corporality* (what was implicit, presupposed in the interpellation launched before the one who had not assumed his responsibility before the Other). In modern history, the hearer (*H*) never heard the speech act, which at the end of our 20th century becomes an imperative:

19. *I am hungry, thus, 4 and 18!*

This suffering corporality is the subject of an economics in the critical (and even transcendental) sense of Marx. The “misery» (*Elend*) of the worker is the subject, but it has “noroom” in the bourgeois “moral system” (because it is only an intra-institutional moment, in Rawls' sense⁹⁰). It is from that “noroom” (*ouk-topos*; Utopia) that interpellation emerged.

In all acts of work (economic, and not only technologically) one always presupposes *a priori* a community of producers, to reproduce life, which equally and radically presupposes an ethic,⁹¹ in the same way that all speech act presupposes a communication community. But in both communities (which are truly two aspects of the same human community), insofar as they are real (not ideal), there are equally the excluded ones, the Others (but in a different way: some as speakers, others as producers-consumers). These Others, however, are not the others “of reason,” but they are the Others who have their “reasons”

to propose, to "interpellate" against exclusion and in favor of their inclusion in a community-of-justice.

The Other, excluded from the communities of communication and producers, is the pauper (as Marx used to say). The interpellation is an originary speech act, with which the pauper erupts into the real community of communication and producers (in the name of the ideal), and makes them accountable, demands a universal right, as a human being-part of the community; and, in addition, expects to transform it by means of liberation praxis (which is also frequently a struggle), into a future, possibly more just society. It is the excluded one who appears from a certain *nothing* to create a *new* moment in the history of the community. He/she erupts, then, not only as excluded from the argumentation, affected without being-part, but as the excluded from life, from production and consumption, in misery, poverty, hunger, and imminent death. This is a painful problematic that produces a wound caused by the daily anguish of the premature death of the majority of people in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the excluded so-called minorities in the metropolitan centers of the "North." This is the philosophical subject of the peripheral world, the South; this is the subject of the Philosophy of Liberation, a liberation from exclusion, from misery, from oppression. This is the foundation, reason (*Grund*), "reason (*Vernunft*) of the Other, a philosophy which has the right to give its reasons. There is no liberation without rationality; but there is no critical rationality without accepting the interpellation of the excluded, or this would inadvertently be only the rationality of *domination*.

To end, I would like to recall the ethical reflections of the Bedouins:

The wealthy speaks and many approve and consider eloquent the senseless speech.... *the pauper speaks with sense and the words are not regarded.*

The wealthy speaks and is heard in silence and the talent highly praised; *the pauper speaks and they say, "Who is he:" and if he falls over he is shoved.* (Ben Sira 13: 22-23).

Notes

1. See Apel's "Habilitation" in *Die Idee der Sprache in der Tradition des Humanismus von Dante bis Vico* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1963). Apel, beginning with Dante's discovery of the question of the "mother tongue," and going up through Vico's "institution of institutions" (language), treats the theme of intersubjective validity through language. He began on this path, in his doctoral dissertation, *Dasein und Erkennen. Eine erkenntnistheoretische Interpretation der Philosophie Martin Heideggers* (Doctoral Dissertation, Rheinischen-Friedrich-Wilhelm Universität, Bonn, 1950).
2. In German, *Transformation der Philosophie*. A partial translation has appeared in English: *Towards a Transformation of Philosophy* (London: Routledge, Kegan and Paul, 1980).

3. Apel, *Transformation der Philosophie* 1973, 1, p. 223; pp. 217ff.
4. Apel, 1973, 2, pp. 157ff. English, Apel, *Towards a Transformation of Philosophy*, trans. Glyn Adey and David Frisby. (London: Routledge Kegan & Paul, 1980), pp. 77ff.
5. This especially since his work "Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft und die Grundlage der Ethik» (translated as "The *a priori* of the Communication Community and the Foundations Ethics: The Problem of a Rational Foundation of Ethics in the Scientific Age," *Towards a Transformation of Philosophy*, pp. 225ff). This last article was elaborated between 1967 and 1972.
6. Apel immediately abandons the project of a "philosophical anthropology" and discovers the "already always presupposed ethics" in the communication community itself, still scientific. This question has formulated in the previously mentioned article.
7. This question absorbs the Apelian reflection up to the present. See, for example, Apel's "Notwendigkeit, Schwierigkeit und Möglichkeit einer philosophischen Begründung der Ethik im Zeitalter der Wissenschaft," in P. Kanellopoulos, ed. *Festschrift für K. Tsatsos* (Athens; Nomikai Ekoloseis Ant., 1980); up to the recent article; "Normatively Grounding "Critical Theory" through Recourse to the Lifeworld? A Transcendental-Pragmatic Attempt to Think with Habermas against Habermas" in Honneth, Axel, McCarthy, Thomas, et al., ed., *Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992).
8. I am thinking of Jürgen Habermas's work "What Is Universal Pragmatics?" in Jürgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*; and later *The Theory of Communicative Action*, 2 vols. These works gave Apel much material for reflection. In any event, the work of John Austin, *How to Do Things with Words* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), and that of John Searle, *Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), will be determinant in Apel's work.
9. In fact, J. Searle, in his *Intentionality. An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), writes: "Language is derived from Intentionality and not conversely" (p. 5); or "We define speakers' meaning in terms of forms of Intentionality that are not intrinsically linguistic" (p.160). This leads Apel to critique Searle II from the perspective of Searle I of *Speech Acts*, in Apel's works "Linguistic Meaning and Intentionality: The Compatibility of the *Linguistic Turn* and the *Pragmatic Turn* of Meaning-Theory within the Framework of a Transcendental Semiotics" in A. Eschbach, ed., *Foundations of Semiotics* (Amsterdam: John Benjamin Pub. Co., 1989); with different versions in German: "Ist Intentionalität fundamentaler als sprachliche Bedeutung? Transzendental-pragmarische Argumente gegen die Rückkehr zum semantischen Intencionalismus der Bewusstseinsphilosophie" in *Intentionalität und Verstehen* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1990), pp. 13-54. For a slightly altered version in English see "Is Intentionality More Basic than Linguistic Meaning?" in E. Lepore and R. Van Gulick, eds. *John Searle and His Critics* (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1991), pp. 31-55. The small work by Habermas "Intentionalisrische Semanrik» (1975-76), in *Vorstudien und Ergänzungen* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1984), pp. 332-351, is an anticipation of this problematic.
10. In Karl-Otto Apel *Diskurs und Verantwortung*, this intention can be observed, which departs from the challenge of Max Weber, and especially of Hans Jonas's *The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984).

11. See his presentation in Hawaii of July 1989: "A Planetary Macro-Ethics for Humanity: The Need, the Apparent Difficulty, and the Eventual Possibility" in Karl-Otto Apel, *Ethics and the Theory of Rationality: Selected Essays*, Vol. 2 (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1996).
12. Hence the need for a "philosophy of misery." Marx criticized Proudhon in *The Misery of Philosophy*, but, in reality, the important theme was already pointed to by Proudhon himself: misery. If in the Parisian marginality of the 19th century there were poor, this cannot be compared, in either relative or absolute numbers, with the poverty of the 20th century; that is, with the peripheral capitalism of India, Nigeria, or Brazil. Today there are a thousand times more poor people than there in 1847.
13. On the theory of dependence as re-thought in the present, see my work, "Marx's Economic Manuscripts of 1861-63 and the Concept of Dependency" in *Latin American Perspectives*, 17,2, 1990, pp. 61-101.
14. Especially in the work of Augusto Salazar Bondy, *¿Es posible una filosofía en nuestra América?* (México: Siglo XXI, 1968).
15. We therefore should not only concern ourselves with a political-economic liberation, but also with an erotic liberation (see my work *Filosofía ética de la liberación*, vol. III (México: Edicol, 1977), whose Chap. is entitled "La erótica latinoamericana," pp. 50-122. In the same work I deal with "La pedagógica latinoamericana," pp. 123-226, which concerns the pedagogic liberation of the child, the youth, and thought through the experiences of the "Reforma de Córdoba en 1918" and 1968. Vol. 4 deals with political liberation: "La política latinoamericana" (Bogotá: USTA, 1979), pp. 15-124. The fifth volume deals with the "Latin American Archeology: A Philosophy of Antifetichist Religion" (Bogotá: UST A, 1980). This work will be continued in 1993 with *Las metáforas teológicas de Marx*. We have thus traversed several "regions" of oppression-liberation, from the perspective of a Latin American poetics.
16. This hypothesis, when applied to a re-reading of Marx since 1976, can result in a new transcendental interpretation of the ethical critique of political economy as it was practiced by this great philosopher economist. See my recent *El último Marx (1863-1882)*, especially Chaps. 8 and 10, pp. 295-450.
17. As we will see later, this totaliry can also be the Habermasian *Lebenswelt* and also the "systems" (economic or polirical). The life-world can also functions as a ruling and dominating totality (in Levinas's thought). See Schema 2.
18. In *Philosophy of Liberation* I wrote in the prologue: "Philosophy of liberation, postmodern philosophy, popular, feminist, of the youth, of the oppressed, of the wretched of the earth, of the condemned of the world and history" (p. viii).
19. See Vol. 1 of my *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, Chap. 3, pp. 108ff, where I criticized the solipsistic totalization of modern thinking up to Husserl ("Lo otro como di-ferencia interna de la mismidad moderna," where I show that in the Cartesian Meditation of Husserl solipsism is not superseded), Heidegger himself, and the Frankfurt school. During those times, I criticized Adorno, Marcuse, et al. for remaining totalized in a "purely negative" dialectic, one without exteriority (See my *Método para una filosofía de la liberación. Superación analéctica de la dialéctica hegeliana* (Salamanca: Sigueme, 1974) where I attempted from Schelling up through Levinas to discover a "point of support" external to the totalizing solipsism of European thinking. which includes, as we have already indicated, the Frankfurt school itself. The confrontation with the later Heidegger, however, was carried out in Vol. 2, paragraphs 34 and 35: "La hermenéutica existencial" (pp. 141ff),

- and "¿Es la tematización dialéctica el límite del pensar?" (pp. 146ff).
20. See J. Habermas, 11 th lecture " An Alternative Way out of the Philosophy of the Subject: Communicative versus Subject-Centered Reason" in J. Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: twelve lectures*, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987), pp. 294ff, where Habermas refers to the expression *das Andere der Vernunft*, taken from the Böhme brothers' work *Das Andere der Vernunft*—a position which I do not share. Habermas has not considered seriously Levinas's work. I must also clarify that Levinas was determinant in the late sixties in my development of a Philosophy of Liberation, just as Feuerbach was able to help Marx (between 1842 and 1844): Levinas awakened us from the "closed" ontological dream. But we had to go beyond him rapidly because of his inability to develop a politics of liberation (see the doctoral thesis of Enrique Guillot, *La política de Emmanuel Levinas* [Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, Mendoza, 1975, 410 pages]).-Guillot is the translator of *Totality and Infinity* into Spanish. See my work *Emmanuel Levinas y la Filosofía de la Liberación* (Buenos Aires: Bonum, 1974), where I showed the points on which we needed to transcend Levinasian philosophy. In any event, for Levinas the Other is anthropologically the poor. Evidently, a Philosophy of Liberation took exteriority as the poor, and only years later could we develop this "analectic category" (of a critical political economy) through Marx (this is the fundamental intention of the four volumes which I have written on the four redaction of *Capital* and fetishism).
 21. Through Schelling (see Dussel, *Método para filosofía de la liberación...* pp. 116ff) we were able to point the theme. See the doctoral dissertation of Hans Schelkshorn, *Diskursethik und Befreiungsethik* (University of Vienna, March 1994, 450 pages). On the theme of the Other consult the work of Michael Theunissen, *The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Buber*, trans. Christopher Macann (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1984), which nevertheless does not deal with Levinas; and Bernhard Waldenfels, *Das Zwischenreich des Dialogs* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971).
 22. See my *Philosophy of Liberation*, 2.4.4.; *Para una ética de lo liberación latinoamericana*, Vol. 1, paragraphs 16ff, pp. 118ff.
 23. "You must fulfill" is the performative moment *F*. The formulation would be, just as we indicated above: $F \vdash p$
 24. The formulation would then be: $F1 \vdash (F2 \vdash p)$. Incidentally, in the recrimination the responsible person is only made culpable for an improper act, but both subjects (the one who speaks, *S*, and the hearer, *H*) are passive.
 25. From the latin *interappellare*, which does not exist in English. "Appeal," however, comes from the same root. We write the Spanish, *interpelar* (to confront someone asking them to give account of a responsibility or a contracted duty) between quotation marks in order to indicate that it has a meaning different from the usual one. In Latin *interpellare* is to "call" (*apellare*) or to "confront" someone, with whom a relationship is established (*inter-*); one interpellates before a judge in a tribunal (the responsible). In contrast to recrimination, *interpelar* is active, it demands a reparation, a change.
 26. In *Philosophy of Liberation* I distinguished between *proxemia* (relation between "things" or with things) and *proximity*: the practical relation between persons (paragraph 2.1).
 27. *Speech Acts*. 1,5 (pp. 19ff). That one may be able to "express" a speech-act does not imply that "the thing said" (*le dit*) is the same thing as "the saying" (*le Dire*) of the "face-to-face" that is always already presupposed. The "illocutionary moment"

(and even the "illocutionary act" as a "communicative act") is precisely what Levinas calls the "face-à-face": "The fact that the face maintains a relation with me by discourse does not range him in the same; he remains absolute within the relation.... For the ethical relationship which subtends discourse is not a species of consciousness whose ray emanates from the I; it puts the I in question. This putting in question emanates from the other." (Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, p. 195). "It is not the mediation of the sign that forms signification, but signification (whose primordial event is the face to face) that makes the sign function possible" (ibid., p. 206). "If, on the contrary, reason lives in language, if the first rationality gleams forth in the opposition of the face to face, if the first intelligible, the first signification, is the infinity of the intelligence that presents itself (that is, speaks to me) in the face..." (ibid., p. 208). "The thing becomes a theme. To thematize is to offer the world to the Other in speech" (ibid., p. 209). My entire work, *Philosophy of Liberation* is based on this fundamental category of "proximity" (which Habermas would call the "illocutionary moment" of the performative speech act).

28. See Martin Jay, *Marxism and Totality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
29. *Ibid.*, p. 186. In paragraph 59 of John Rawls's *Theory of Justice*, pp. 3821f, which deals with "The Role of Civil Disobedience," the author contemplates the "illegal device" of a just act which has its support in the constitution: "The parties would adopt the conditions defining justified civil disobedience as a way of setting up, within the limits of fidelity to law, a final device to maintain the stability of a just constitution," (ibid, p. 384). But, what if the constitution were unjust or no longer valid (as English law was no longer valid for Washington, the liberator)? Rawls situates "civil disobedience" *between the constitution and the proclaimed law*. How can civil disobedience be located *between the basic ethical norm and the constitution*? This is the case that we would like to define as "trans-institutional," namely, as "outside" the institution. That is where the *Philosophy of Liberation*, Levinas, or Marx locate themselves, and certainly not Rawls or Habermas.
30. Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 3, p. 339-40; German: MEW 25, pp. 351-52.
31. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, in Karl Marx *Early Writing*, p. 335; German: MEW, EB 1, p. 523.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 336. For the sense of this term, see my works *La producción teórica de Marx* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1985), pp. 140ff; *Hacia un Marx desconocido* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1988), pp. 61ff; and Chap. 10 of *El último Marx (1863-1882)* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1990).
33. B. Lewis, *La rebelión de Túpac Amaru* (Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1967), p. 392.
34. "Incompetence" not because of irrationality, but because the institutional world of His unknown, it is not the same as that of *S*.
35. Here I refer to, for example, an Indian who would make a pronouncement to a Hispanic *conquistador* of the 16th century in Mexico or Peru; or a Turk who may express him/herself in incorrect German to an employer in Germany.
36. "Full pragmatic meaning" supposes not only the "conceptual content" of the "propositional content" of a sentence (*p*), but the "mental intention" (with its "intentional content") which has its "meaning intention." This entire level of "intentionality" is simultaneously given at the same level of the "sign", name, or term, which directs itself to a "designatum" that cannot be identified with the *real* "denotatum" (the object of the "reference dimension). The "meaning," in a pragmatic sense, ought to, in addition, take in to account that the "denotatum" (the

referent) is situated within the inter-subjective sphere of "public validity," or within the "agreement" of an "unlimited communication community" (always presupposed by any "meaning intention" or "meaning content.") Therefore, as in the case of the "poor" who "interpellates," the search for a *publicly sharable meaning-claim* (Apel, "Linguistic Meaning and Intentionality" p. 56) turns into an impossible task since the "public intersubjectivity" is that of a *real* communication community, of a "life world" hegemonized by another culture, another language, etc., where the "poor-excluded" cannot reach to *signify* what his/her "communicative intention" pretends.

37. Apel's article, mentioned in the prior note, give us an opportunity to clarify several things. The "poor" certainly have "meaning intentions," as much in "interpelar" (*F1*), as in demanding the fulfillment of a duty by the hearer (*H*), out of their right as a transcendental person with respect (this is the entire question of reference) to the established order (institutionality 1, of Schema 2) (*F2*), as well as item 1. ("an act of justice," *p*). The poor's "referential intentionality" directs itself to a historically possible "denotatum." (See my article, based on my Freiburg dialogue with Apel: "Die *Lebensgemeinschaft* und die *Interpellation des Armen*. Die Praxis des Volkes," 2; in Fernet-Betancourt, ed., *Ethik und Bekreitung* (Aachen: Augustinus Buchhandlung, 1990), pp. 74-77. It is obvious that the "public validity" of the "denotatum" (a "project of liberation" which delineates itself as an intended finality in "hope"-in E. Bloch's sense of the *Hoffnungsprinzip*) cannot be "understood" or "correctly interpreted" by *H* (who finds himself in a ruling and hegemonic "institutional totality 1").
38. J. Habermas, in "Considerations on the Pathologies of Communication" in *Vorstudien und Ergänzungen*, pp. 226-71, deals with the questions of pathologies, what we could call intra-systemic pathologies. I am referring to the quasi-pathology (or what appears as a pathology to *H*), in the case in which *S* finds itself outside the normativity and life world of *H*. There of the difficulty of the four validity pretensions required for communication: "to express oneself intelligibly, to make understandable something, and thus to make oneself intelligible, and to be understood by others." Habermas, *Vorstudien und Ergänzungen*, p. 233.
39. In its daily sense, responsibility is to assume charge for someone (Latin *spondere*: to take charge of someone). In a Levinasian sense, "responsibility" is to take charge of the Other, the poor, she who finds herself without the protection or security of the ruling institutionality. See my *Philosophy of Liberation*, 2.1.2.2 and 2.6.3; and especially my work *Religión* (Mexico: Edicol, 1980).
40. It is here where the question of an "ultimate foundation of ethics" receives its entire meaning, since the life world, or *Sittlichkeit*, of a *conquistador* cannot be the last point of reference of an argumentation or "discourse" (although in fact it has always been, and there never was or has been in reality an argumentative communication community in which the Indian could give his reasons). The violence of the Conquest was the way in which modernity opened its way from 1492 up to today. It was not thanks to "argumentation," as Bartolomé de las Casas intended in his work *The Only Way*. The United States occupies Panama by force, and the moral consciences of the West applaud. Hussein occupies Kuwait, and everyone, scandalized, protests. The "dictator" Hussein should not be compared to Bush? We need a "planetary ethics" where the South is considered human, persons with equal rights.
41. In addition, it would be extremely difficult -because of their own culture, etc- to justify the validity of the truth of his pronouncement, which opposes itself to

- everything which is held as true or “justified” within the normativity of the life world of a hegemonic system.
42. This has been the source of the misunderstanding in which Liberation Philosophy is accused of fideism. The rational “faith” act has to do precisely with the rational evaluation which precedes the “acceptance” of the veracity of the Other (*Philosophy of Liberation*, 2.4.7, pp. 45-47).
 43. Here the “intention” is complex. There is intention to meaning (thus it is expressed) a “propositional content” (*p*); furthermore, an intention to manifest a “right” (F1), and another intention of demanding rights through interpellation to *H* as responsible for the fate of *S* (F2). The complete analysis of this pragmatic-linguistic intention would take us again to Apel's article (“Linguistic Meaning and Intentionality”). The important thing is not to separate, although knowing how to distinguish them, between (he intentional and linguistic moments within the frame of reference of a pragmatic community always already presupposed. But, again, in the case of *S* all of this turns problematic because of her actual, empirical *exteriority*).
 44. On this theme I have written a paragraph in *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, Chap. 2: “El Otro, el bien común y el Infinito”, pp. 59ff. In 1971, when writing these lines, I was distancing from myself Levinas when discovering the necessity of “a *new* political Totality” (p. 62), or, in other words, the future historically possible order, which is neither the actual “*real* community” nor the ideal (it is a *tertium quid* that Apel does not consider, because for him there is only an “open society” and “ideal”; for us there are: 1) “closed society,” 2) “historically possible society of liberation,” and 3) “ideal community.” This is the difference between being in the rich North or in the poor South. The North does not need to change radically the society in which it finds itself; the South, instead, needs this change, and urgently.
 45. Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* departs always from a given institutionalization (in fact the North American). See for instance the following text: “By major institutions I understand the political constitution and the principal economic and social arrangements. Thus the legal protection of freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, competitive markets, private property in the means of production, and the monogamous family are examples of major social institutions” (*ibid.*, paragraph 2, p. 7). Rawls always speaks of the “least advantaged” (see paragraph 13, p. 75), but he never asks: “From where have these historical differences emerged?” The structures of domination have been dehistoricized (or they have been naturalized). Better said, perhaps, is that there is no consciousness of domination in Rawls. Our interpellation locates itself, then, underneath and before Rawls's “original position.”
 46. *Speech Acts*, III, 3.3 (p. 62ff). It would be worthwhile to go step-by-step through Searle in order to clarify conclusively this interpellative speech act.
 47. On Part A of discourse ethics see “Diskursethik als Verantwortungsethik-eine postmetaphysische Transformation der Ethik Kants,” Fernet-Betancourt, ed., *Ethik und Befreiung*, pp. 21ff.
 48. In 1969 Apel spoke of an “unlimited communication of critics,” or the “critical communication community” (“Wissenschaft als Emanzipation?” in *Transformation der Philosophie*, Vol. 2, pp. 153-54). From then on the texts become frequent. Apel recognizes that for this community there exist some essential determinations: namely an “unlimited communication community of *persons* who recognize each other as equals” (“Notwendigkeit, Schwierigkeit und Möglichkeit einer philosophischen

- Begründung der Ethik im Zeitalter der Wissenschaft" in P. Kanellopoulos, ed. *Festschrift für K. Tsatsos* (Athens: Nomikai Ekdoseis Ant. 1980), p. 264).
49. The theme of Apers ideal communication community receives a different treatment by Habermas. Thus, for instance, in "Warheitstheorien" (*Vorstudien und Ergänzungen*), Habermas writes: "I call ideal a speech situation in which communication is neither hindered only by contingent external factors, nor by the co-actions which follow from the very structure of communication" p. 177.
 50. Someone may object that this possibility cannot obtain because another person that is "other" stops being a person. It then becomes the question of defining the *degrees* of "exteriority" that reason knows how to deal with practically and daily. The question rides on considering explicitly the "rights of the *other* reason": "the reason of the Other." This has not been negated by Apel. It simply has not been made explicit, and this is required in order to continue our argumentation.
 51. And "free" of "domination" (*herrschaftsfrei*) means, exactly, to be able to situate oneself in the exteriority of the community itself; for it is the free subjects which can, through their "alterity," constitute a community (the "thou" as *alien*). A community without virtual exteriority would be that of a hegemonic, dominating, *one dimensional* reason (which Marcuse criticized in his famous book).
 52. See Karl-Otto Apel, *Understanding and Explanation: A Transcendental-Pragmatic Perspective*, trans. Georgia Warnke (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1984), which contains an exceptionally profound account of the thematic that in the decade of the eighties was still central, but which is in crisis today because of the abandonment of the Hempelian position.
 53. Apel criticized Feyerabend's irrationalism and Lyotard's position (see *Diskurs und Verantwortung*, pp. 156ff). Apel states: "Und Erfindung (*invention*) entsteht immer aus dem Dissens. Postmodernes Wissen ist nicht einfach ein Werkzeug der Autoritäten, es verfeinert unsere Sensibilität für Differenzen un verstärk unsere Fähigkeit, das Inkommensurable zu tolerieren. Sein Prinzip ist nicht die Homologie der Experten, sondern die Paralogie der Erfinder" (p. 158). Paul Feyerabend appears as the irrational, the anti-methodical. But what if he precisely indicates the difficulty with a *logic of discovery*? Is not a "discovery" the creative moment par excellence of every science? Are not the great "discoverers" of science (Newton, Einstein) whom science remembers as its founders? What is essential to science is "explanation," but every explanation was "discovery" in its origin.
 54. Luis Villoro in *Creer, saber, conocer* (México: Siglo XXI, 1982), pp.145ff, has formulated this problem ("epistemic communities"): "If in the epoch of scientific normality the consensus of the scientific communities approach intersubjectivity, this situation *is ruptured when the problems that normal science can not solve are formulated*. When *new* reasons appear... the progress of knowledge is not possible if this discrepancy is not admitted.... A *person* may be justified in affirming that they know although the general consensus denies it" (pp. 151-52). This work, of great importance for the Latin American philosophy of language, however, still situates itself in a pre-pragmatic or pre-communicative moment; that is, what is there affirmed would have to be unfolded within a communicative or pragmatic horizon in order to be able to reach new possibilities of description. Thomas Kuhn himself calls this the "emergence of a discovery or a new theory" (*The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962]). For Kuhn, the appearance of new paradigms is not a question of the accretion of new discoveries, but complete changes in perspective (*ibid.*, pp 1441f). This is the whole question of alterity, the new, and that which cannot be anticipated from within a

- given interpretative horizon. Richard Rorty explores this question also when he writes: "So bad arguments for brilliant hunches must necessarily precede the normalization of a new vocabulary which incorporates the hunch. Given that new vocabulary, better arguments become possible, although these will always be found question-begging by the revolution's victims" (*Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979], p. 58; n. 28). Latin American Philosophy of Liberation finds itself in this situation.
55. See my work "Histoire et praxis (orthopraxie et objectivité)" in *A la recherche du sens/In search of meaning*, Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa (Ottawa) 4, Vol. 55 (Oct.-Dec. 1985), pp. 147-61, a *Festschrift* in honor of Paul Ricoeur, as a reaction to a presentation by Carlos Pereyra (Oaxtepec, 1984).
 56. The "institutional totality 1" is the community of scientists as an already superseded paradigm by the subjectivity of the discoverer (*S*). The praxis of liberation is now the constructive action of a new scientific community ("new institutional totality 2"), which departs from another paradigm, theory, explication, or agreement.
 57. I "propose" (put forward, place before) or "to consider" (*pro-poner*) are placed in quotation marks in order to indicate this stronger sense.
 58. Richard Rorty refers to another type of egotism when he writes, not without a certain sadness: "My story has been one of struggles between different kinds of professors, professors with different aptitudes and consequently with different paradigms and interests. It is a story of academic politics-not much more, in the long run, than a matter of what sort of professors come under which departmental budget" (Rorty *The Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1982), p. 228). It is at this level of the "real scientific community" that the theme of exteriority plays all of its role: the tolerance of which Rorty speaks can only be founded on the equal dignity of the reason of the other. This does not negate that there is reason; rather it suggests that there is a reason that is critical, historical, open to *other* reason (in its double sense, namely, open to other arguments and other persons with *their* other reason).
 59. Karl-Otto Apel, *Diskurs und Verantwortung*, pp. 20ff.
 60. Ibid. In his presentation from Hawaii (1989), "A Planetary Macro-Ethics for Humanity: The Need, the Apparent Difficulty, and the eventual Possibility" Ethics and the *Theory of Rationality, Selected Essays*, Vol. 2 (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1996) Apel proposed a "universally valid principle of co-responsibility." But, with Rawls in mind, what type of global legality can there be in the organization of the United Nations when the great powers have veto power (an anti-rational, anti-democratic principle, and, in reality, non-*herrschaftsfrei*)? In reality, at the level of North-South relations imposed by the United States, there exists the irrationality of violence. How can one, from this juridical fact, think of co-responsibility?
 61. This "Lifeworld" is of Heideggerian origin, inasmuch as the facticity of being-in-the-world, from which (the later) Husserl developed his own notion of *Lebenswelt*, and from where later social scientists are inspired to develop a social phenomenology, such as Alfred Schütz's. See Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann, *The Structures of the Life-World*, trans. Richard M. Zaner and H. Tristan Engelhardt (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
 62. See Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, 2 volumes, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983-87).
 63. See my article "Racismo y América latina negra" in *Servir* (Mexico) 86, 1980, pp. 163-210.

64. See my *Filosofía ética de la liberación*, vol. III, "La erótica latinoamericana."
65. This is the theme of "economics"-still in a universal or transcendental sense, virtually- just as Marx formulated it. It concerns a "critique" (from the exteriority of living labor) of the capitalist system as an anti-ethical perversion of the communitarian "practical relationship." We will deal with this in section 2.4, below.
66. See my *El último Marx (1863-1882) y la liberación latinoamericana*; Chap. 10.4: "El capital es una ética" (pp. 429ff).
67. This is the correct thesis by Emmanuel Wallerstein in his work *The modern World System. Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1974).
68. See my article on the concept of dependency cited in note 13, where I deal with the issue of the transfer of value from the South to the North.
69. Apel describes this problem in the following manner: "Who argues-and this means, one who, for example, seriously formulates the question of the basic ethical norm in a dialogue or also in a solitary self-understanding qua internalized dialogue-can be led to recognize or to be convinced through self-reflection that, necessarily, inasmuch as *arguer*, he or she has already recognized a *basic ethical norm*. The arguer has already given evidence *in actu*, and with that has recognized that practical reason is responsible for human action. That is to say, that the truth pretensions can and ought to be satisfied through arguments. This means that the *ideal rules of argumentation* in an, in principie unlimited, communication community of persons who recognize each other reciprocally as equals, represent *normative conditions of possibility of the decision on ethical validity claims [ethischen Geltungsansprüchen] through the formation of consensus*, and that therefore, *with respect to all the ethically relevant questions of practical life, it is possible, in a discourse* which respects the rules of argumentation of a an ideal communication community, to arrive, in principie, at a *consensus*, and, therefore, that one *ought to aspire* to bring about this consensus in practice" Karl-Otto Apel, "Notwendigkeit, Schwierigkeit und Möglichkeit einer philosophischen Begründung der Ethik im Zeitalter der Wissenschaft", in P. Kanellopoulos, ed., *Festschrift für K Tsatsos* (Athens: Nomikai Ekdoseis Ant., 1980), pp. 264-265.
70. See my work *Filosofía de la producción*. The praxis relation is practical (in a last instance, ethical); the *poiesis* relation is technological. The economic relation is ethical-technological (practical-poietical) and not only productive (as is reductively interpreted by Habermas in his "Excursus on the Obsolescence of the Production Paradigm," against Marx, in his *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987) pp. 75-82). Habermas does not arrive at the discovery of the moment of the "practical relation" (ethical or interpersonal) that is included in economics.
71. Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, p. 258.
72. Note the concepts of "instrumental" or "strategic" reason.
73. *Ibid.*, pp. 260-61.
74. *Ibid.*, pp. 264-65. This could be understood along the lines of the second Searle, and even still more radically. However, by the "principie of expressibility" we could say that it is "a society without language," *still*, in the "origin" of language and qua language "already presupposed but not expressed." The following text expresses this sense.
75. *Ibid.*, pp. 296, 273. Now language is made "explicit." It is "expressed."
76. *Ibid.*, pp. 304, 281. "La morale n'est pas une branche de la philosophie, mais la philosophie première." What Levinas calls "La morale" is here translated as "ethics,"

- and has parallels with Habermas's "communicative action," but is even more radical.
77. Once again we agree with Apel, as with the theme of "intention" in the second Searle, namely, that intention, linguisticity or significance (as much the sign as the meaning) are given organically, co-implicated, simultaneously. To have an intention is to constitute it linguistically. In other words, the "economicidad" (the *economic* relation between persons by means of *instrumentalized* culture, even if it is the hand itself, as Aristotle put it; "the tool of all tools"; that is, as corporality) is also simultaneously co-implicated and organically related to intentionality, linguisticity, etc.
 78. And this case would be, for example, an economic colonizing system of the life world.
 79. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marschal (New York: Continuum, 1993) part III, pp. 381ff.
 80. It is interesting that in *Sein und Zeit*, paragraph 15, the analysis begins with the *Werkzeug* (tools), which is precisely to "find oneself instrumentally" (in a cultural, technical, material, and symbolic sense) always already.
 81. If the performative act transforms itself into the fundamental intention of the speech act, then it is a matter of an act of instrumental reason and not of communicative reason.
 82. The Consumer is the Receiver of the gift, the other party of the exchange or the buyer. In the end, these are moments which are accomplished *in actu*, in the use or consumption.
 83. We will see the meaning of this communitarian relationship (*gemeinschaftliche Verhältnis*) in Marx.
 84. For Marx the "social [*gesellschaftliche*] relation" has an instrumental sense, as we will see. The capitalist constitutes the person, the living labor, as a means (an instrument for the valorization of value: thing) and not as an end in itself (the person). The commodity (or the increase in the rate of profit) is the goal of the productive act of capital, and as much is an act of instrumental rationality. It is strange that Habermas (or Apel) has not been able to reason in this clear and evident manner. Can it be that because "they find themselves trapped within the bourgeois horizon" (as Marx loved to write) they cannot account for their own life world as it falsely projects itself as the actual-universal-human world (*Spätkapitalismus*)? In the example given, the flower is a product of the labor from which surplus value was obtained (that is, ethically, from the trans-institutional right of the person of the worker, and not "morally" from the capitalist system, as robbery), and which is sold in an *instrumental* "practical relation" (in the speech act it is the performative).
 85. Apel writes; "Furthermore, I believe that the members of the communication community (and this implies all thinking beings) are also committed to considering all the potential claims of all the potential members-and this means all human 'needs' inasmuch as they could be affected by norms and consequently make *claims* on their fellow human beings. As potential 'claims' that can be communicated interpersonally, all human 'needs' are ethically relevant" (Apel, "The a Priori of the Communication Community and the Foundations of Ethics: The Problem of a Rational Foundation of Ethics in the Scientific Age," Karl-Otto Apel, *Towards A Transformation of Philosophy*, paragraph 2.3.5, p. 277. To speak of "needs," evidently, means to refer to the needing-productive-consuming corporality. It is to go over to the level of economics.
 86. It concerns, precisely, an "ideal" (transcendental?) which is *a priori* to every act of

production or consumption, The community (*Gemeinschaft*) is the ultimate horizon of the constitution of all philosophical-economic categories of Marx (See my work *La producción teórica de Marx* pp, 87ff, 265ff, 291ff, 355ff. This is the horizon where the question of fetishism is formulated; see my work *Hacia un Marx desconocido*, pp. 226ff; it is the transcendental formulation of the "kingdom of freedom" (this theme is elaborated in my work *Las metáforas teológicas de Marx*). In fact, according to Apel, "*The realm of freedom [Reich der Freiheit]*" really begins only where labour determined by necessity and external expediency ends; it lies by its very nature beyond [*jenseits*] the sphere of material production proper, Freedom, in this sphere, can consist only in this, that socialized man, the *associated producers*, govern the human metabolism with nature in a, rational way, bringing it under their collective [*gemeinschaftliche*] control instead of being dominated by it as a blind power" (This refers to Part A of Apel) (Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 3, pp, 958-59; German: MEW, 25, p, 828), That which for Marx was "beyond" as a transcendental "after" is, for Apel, a "beyond" as presupposed (*Vor-aus-setzung*) transcendental. It is not difficult to see the Kantian-Hegelian presence. In the *Critique of the Gotha Program*, Marx proposes an ethical norm that is not possible to institutionalize: "from each according to his capacity; to each according to his needs!" (MEW; 19, p, 21). It is my opinion that Marx touches on the transcendental problem or the "regulative idea" of an *utopian-transcendental* "community of producers," This would be the "economics" in his Part A,

87. This is dealt with in my three volumes of commentary on the four redactions of *Capital*, already cited, I think that, as with all peripheral production (and in the Spanish language) this work, in fact and until now, remains "excluded" from the European-North American philosophical communication community. It is a question, then, of a "manuscript" published for the "critique of rodents," On the difference between the "social" (defective) and "communitarian" (genuine) relationship see my work *El último Marx (1863-1882) y la liberación latinoamericana*, Chap, 10,4, notes 131 to 148.
88. Food, clothing, housing are the three fundamental *human-material* needs (see F. Engels, *The Origin of the Family*, prologue; MEW 21, pp, 27-28: "Nahrung, Kleidung, Wohnung"), where there is a coincidence with the founder of Christianity, whose absolute ethical criterion is formulated as: "For when I was hungry, you gave me food; when thirsty, you gave me drink; when I was a stranger, you took me in your home; when naked, you clothed me" (Matthew, 25: 42-44, In item 18, the South "appeals" to the North, for "food" symbolically; objectively, for the economic and political system that the South has a right to constitute, and that has been blocked by the colonial powers since the 15th century: neocolonialism under mercantilism, imperialism in the 19th century, and financial-transnational in the 20th century,
89. Apel refers to the science of economics (see *Diskurs und Verantwortung*, pp, 270/f: "Diskursethik als Verantwortungsethik und das Problem der ökonomischen Rationalität"), but he deals with economics as an empirical science and not in the transcendental sense which we have given it in our re-reading of Marx,
90. We have already made reference to *A Theory of Justice*, to the whole second section: "Institutions," Marx refers to how, theoretically, the intra-institutionality disallows arriving at a critical interpretation (which is what takes place in Rawls, and perhaps also with Habermas): "from the bourgeoisie point of view, within the *limits of capitalist understanding* (*El capital III*, cap, 15, III; MEW 25, p, 270). Here we could copy, applying it analogically, Apel's text from note 69: "Who works..."

has already recognized a basic norm.... One who works has already given testimony in actu that practical reason, which regulates the act-of-work, is responsible for the pretension of justice in the community and with respect to the Other (and not merely of the validity, because we are at the level of economics and not that of pragmatics), and said pretension ought to be satisfied through the technically adequate acts-of-work (analogically to linguistic competence) and ethically just." All of this will have to be developed in the future.

91. In the previously cited paragraph "*Capital* is an Ethics," Chap. 10.4, of my work *El último Marx*, pp. 429-49, I justified this affirmation. I ought to indicate that presupposed "ethics" is the same for a "community of producers" as it is for a "communication community"; although it may specify some different principles.