TOWARD A NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE

I have noted elsewhere that the thought of Karl-Otto Apel is extremely healthy for Latin American philosophy, especially as it concerns his critical stance toward the linguistic turn, which he does not negate but instead subsumes under his pragmatics. In this manner, the "communication community" is situated as the always already presupposed a priori moment, which, more radically put, is transformed into an ethics. This is where it coincides with Liberation Philosophy, which also considers the importance of overcoming solipsism, and views ethics as prima philosophia.

3.1 State of the Question

In November of 1989, I presented the fourth part of a much larger work entitled "Introduction to the Transformation of Philosophy of Karl-Otto Apel and Liberation Philosophy: Reflections from a Latin American perspective." Apel clarified his position in a conference, an oral presentation given on 1 March 1991, in Mexico, with the title "Transcendental Pragmatics and North-South Ethical Problems." There, in the first place, Apel showed (from a "standard" interpretation of Marxism) that the crisis of 1989 in Eastern Europe was a determinant for the overcoming of Marxism. A great part of his conference referred especially to this theme-thinking to critique the position I had presented in a lecture in Freiburg-and to the possible error of confusing utopia (in Marxism) with the transcendental plane itself, as is seen in the Apelian sense. In the same sense he insisted that the "life community" (Lebensgemeinschaft) that I had proposed in Freiburg cannot be transcendental; that the co-responsibility of all possible members of a community of argumentation is a priori and not, as is the case with Hans Jonas, a posteriori. He concluded by indicating that the standard of living of the North is neither convenient nor is it possible to be imitated by the South. The South cannot renounce its standard of living, because of an ambiguous anti-ecological development, proposed Apel.

As for me, in the seminar organized in Mexico in 1991, I presented the already mentioned lecture on the "Reason of the Other: Interpellation as a
Speech Act." There I developed, working from the very same discourse of Apel and Habermas, the theme from the perspective of Liberation Philosophy.

As for Apel, he continues to discover new arguments in the line of the performative self-contradiction, in order to attain what could be called an *apologia rationis* against the skeptics and irrationalists. But if one were to ask, outside the consequences in the realm of theoretical reason, Why reason? Apel demonstrates the practical "danger" of irrationalism, and among those dangers he always takes as an example German nazism. Reason is defended in order not to fall again into the traumatic experience of National Socialism. But what was nazism, if not a concrete expression of the "irrational face" of modernity? Like Janus, modernity has two faces. One face is the rational emancipatory nucleus that, in the last instance, Apel defines as the ethical position that respects every person as person, as equal (to which I would add: as Other), and as possible participant of an ideal communication community. The other face of Janus is exactly the negation of this principle, which could be enunciated as: some persons are superior as persons over other persons. In this conviction or belief is grounded a type of irrationalism. Indeed, modernity inaugurates the first irrationalism in a global scale: Racism and ethnocentrism as expressions of the superiority of Europe over the other races and peripheral cultures (eurocentrism), *ad extra*, with two holocausts: the holocaust of the conquest of America with more than 15 million exterminated Indians; and the holocaust of slavery with 13 million Africans (more than 30 percent would die in the Middle Passage-the transatlantic transport). The second irrationalism is nazism as the corollary *ad intra* of racist eurocentrism: the superiority of the supposed Aryan race over the Jewish race, with the third modern holocaust of the systematic assassination of 6 million Jews (with the complicity of the nationalist capitalism of the German bourgeoisie through firms like Siemens, Thiessen, Krupp, Volkswagen, etc., who saw the disappearance of a competitor: transnational Jewish capital with a presence in France, England, and the United States).

Indeed, little has this second face of Janus been developed in discourse ethics, that is, the tradition of the irrationalism of modernity, which is the negation of the Other, negation of Alterity, by the "evident" affirmation of the superiority of European culture over other cultures.

To negate the Other is to exclude the majority of humanity. The more than 75 percent of humanity that is found in the South faces a structural crisis which increases with the fall of socialism in Eastern Europe and that precipitates millions of women and men in the periphery into a growing misery. "PetIPHERAL" capitalism (not the *Spätkapitalismus* of the North, the minority of the ones who suffer the "colonization" of the capitalist system in the world) has been in crisis since its origin because of a structural transference of value. A philosophy that departs from this reality cannot simply imitate the philosophical discourse of Europe or the United States. A certain creativity is re-
quired in the discovery of the very point of departure, of the method to be used, of the categories to be developed, etc. Neither science nor philosophical skepticism is the interlocutor in this case of philosophical discourse, but instead the misery, the person of the "poor" (*pauper ante festum* as Marx called them⁸), as exteriority.

3.2 Toward the Origin of "The Myth of Modernity"

On a historical plane, which in any case is empirically already presupposed (not transcendentally, but concretely), the modern philosopher departs from a belief in European common sense that situates itself in the "life world" and that manifests itself in descriptions such as those of Kant with respect to the Enlightenment:

Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity [*Unmündigkeit*].... Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why such a large proportion of men... nevertheless gladly remain immature for life.⁹

This "immaturity" (*Unmündigkeit*), which is culpable (i.e., self-incurred), will also be posteriorly applied by Hegel in a global historical vision to Africa, Latin America, and even Asia, finalizing his judgment with the well-known eurocentric conclusion:

World history travels from east to west; for Europe is the absolute end of history, just as Asia is the beginning.... ¹⁰ just as Europe is the centre and end of the Old World-i.e. absolutely the west-so also is Asia absolutely the east....¹¹ the western part, which includes Germany, France, Denmark, and Scandinavia, is the heart of Europe....¹²

From this narrow, ethnocentric point of view, modernity inherits an eurocentric point of departure. Commenting on the Hegelian position, Habermas writes:

The key historical events in establishing the principle of subjectivity¹³ are the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the French Revolution.¹⁴

For Hegel the south of Europe is only valid as the Italian Renaissance (Spain is outside history, and with it, Latin America, which is not even periphery). The culmination of modernity is found in Germany and France, or in England:

And the English have undertaken the weighty responsibility of being the missionaries of civilization [*Zivilisation*] to the whole world.¹⁵

Modernity, in its emancipatory rational nucleus, is a departure or exit (*Ausgang*) of reason (*Vernunft*) out of a state of “self-incurred immaturity” in order to reach the universality of the equality of all persons as such. Against, in contrast, the background of a global horizon, this modernity is born. This is my
hypothesis. Modernity is born when Europe (the peripheral Europe of the Muslim and Ottoman world), begins its expansion beyond its historical limits. Europe arrives in Africa; in India and Japan, thanks to Portugal; in Latin America, and from there to the Philippines, thanks to the Spanish conquest. That is to say, Europe has become itself "center." The other races and cultures now appear as "immature," barbarous, underdeveloped. It is thus that the second moment of modernity is inaugurated no longer as an emancipatory rational nucleus but as a irrational sacrificial myth. The argument was clearly developed by Ginés de Sepúlveda, in the Valladolid dispute of 1550 with Bartolomé de las Casas. This argument can be summarize in the following way:

1) European culture is the most developed superior to all other cultures (eurocentric).
2) That other cultures abandon (the Kantian Ausgang) or exit from their own barbarity by means of the modern civilizing process constitutes their progress.
3) But the underdeveloped are opposed to the civilizing process, and therefore it is just and necessary to utilize violence in order to destroy such opposition.
4) On the other hand, the modern violent warrior (who exterminates Amerindians, enslaves Africans, etc) thinks that he is innocent because he exercises violence as a duty and virtue.
5) And lastly, the victims of modernity in the periphery (the extermination of the indians, the enslavement of the Africans, the colonization of the Asians) and in the center (the genocide of Jews, the third holocaust) are the "responsible" ones for their own victimization.

This irrational myth of modernity will be applied from the conquest of America (genocide of the Amerindian), to the enslavement of the African, to the Chinese Opium War, to the invasion of Panama (1990) or the Gulf War (1991). We read in Torquemada's Monarquia Indiana, on the conquest of the Aztec empire:

Less than one hundred castellians died, a few horses... Of the Mexicans one hundred thousand died, without counting the ones who died of hunger and plague.

It is irrational to argue in favor of the inferiority of other persons as such, or to attempt to treat them in practice as inferior. Ginés de Sepúlveda held the opinion that a "just war" could be undertaken in order to destroy the opposition to the civilizing process, and, posteriorly, these barbarians would be educated with rational arguments. Bartolomé de las Casas, on the contrary, was of the opinion that every war or use of violence was irrational. Rational argumen-
tation and the testimony of an exemplary moral life ought to be used from the beginning:

The rational creature (the Indians) have a natural aptitude so that they may be led... so that they may voluntarily listen, voluntarily obey, and voluntarily lend their respect.... In such a way that out of their own motive, with free deliberation and with natural faculties and disposition, they may hear everything that is proposed to them.\(^{29}\)

In analogy to Bartolomé de las Casas, Liberation Philosophy criticizes the “the sacrificial myth” of modernity as irrational, albeit presupposing its “rational emancipatory nucleus,” thereby also transcending modernity itself. Our project of liberation can be neither anti- nor pre- nor post-modern, but instead trans-modern. As rational critique from the Exteriority of modernity, the “other face” of modernity, trans-modernity (Amerindians, Africans, Asians, etc.) criticizes the irrational myth of violence against the colonies, peripheral capitalism, against the South.

To take into account this question is the condition of all possible philosophical dialogue between the North and the South, because we are situated in an asymmetrical situation.

3.3 Exteriority- Totality, "Lebenswelt"-System

A second theme of dialogue, which is related to the prior one and which deserves to be treated anew, is that of exteriority. When I say that in every real communication community there is an irrationally excluded one, the Other, in the exteriority, I am referring to a Levinasian category, but all the same to one also elaborated by Liberation Philosophy.

When, for instance, Habermas speaks of the life world as suffering a colonization by the economic or political systems, such a Lebenswelt retains a certain exteriority and priority with respect to the system. It would be the case of a concrete exteriority (the life-world) with respect to a Totality (the economic or political system as self-referential or autopoietic).\(^{30}\)

Emmanuel Levinas, in his work *Totality and Infinity*,\(^ {31}\) locates exteriority in a trans-ontological realm from which the Other (*Autrui*) irrupts as the origin of the ethical interpellation, as "poor." But, in this case, the contradiction Exteriority- Totality is absolutely abstract with respect to every possible system, including the “world” (in the Hegelian phenomenological or existential Heideggerian sense). From a “beyond” of the horizon of the world, the Other irrupts “into the world,” demanding justice. This is the ethical stance par excellence, the face-to-face stance.\(^ {32}\)

At a more concrete level than that of Levinas (but much more abstract than that of Habermas's Lebenswelt-system), Marx situated “living labor” as
Nicht-Kapital,\textsuperscript{33} as the Nothing (\emph{Nichts}) outside capital, prior to any contract. We read in the \emph{Manuscripts of 44} of

the abstract existence of man as a mere workman who therefore tumbles day after day from his fulfilled nothingness [\textemdash \emph{Nichts}] into absolute nothingness, into his social and hence real non-existence.\textsuperscript{34}

This radical Other with respect to capital is living labor as absolute poverty (\emph{absolute Armut}),\textsuperscript{35} the person, subjectivity as capacity (\emph{Tätigkeit}), as the corporeality (\emph{Leiblichkeit}) of the worker. In this sense, extremely abstract in its essence, capital is a system \textit{apparently} self-referential and autopoetic, because in fact it "subsumes" (the "substitution" is the act by which Exteriority is incorporated into the Totality or the system of capital in the abstract), formally or actually,\textsuperscript{36} living labor as the "creative\textsuperscript{37} source\textsuperscript{38} of value out nothing\textsuperscript{39} of capital itself (hetero-referential and hetero-poetic moment). This was done in such a way that, against Lukács, Marcuse, and others, Totality was not the generative and primordial category for Marx, but instead living labor (which is not the labor force [\emph{Arbeitskraft}]\textsuperscript{40}).

The "transcendentality" of Exteriority with respect to Totality, evidently, does not have a Kantian or Apelian sense. It is the trans-ontologocity of that located "beyond" the horizon of the world. the system: the Other as free, unconditioned.\textsuperscript{41} The "transcendentality" of Alterity or Exteriority can also be applied at the empirical level.\textsuperscript{42} This meta-category aids Liberation Philosophy as a radical negativity with respect to every transcendental (in the Kantian or Apelian sense) or empirical system: from this position (inasmuch as they are social, the totalization of systems as self-referential "fetishization"), domination, exclusion, and the negation of the Other can be discovered. From this negated Other departs the praxis of liberation as “affirmation” of the Exteriority and as origin of the movement of negation of the negation.\textsuperscript{43}

Exteriority can likewise be situated at the erotic level–and in this case with appeal not to Marx but to Freud\textsuperscript{44}–at a pedagogical level (in this case we would appeal to Paulo Freire\textsuperscript{45}), or in other practical dimensions of human existence, from which Liberation Philosophy departs.

\subsection{Communication Community and Life Community}

I would like now to deal with a third question. Accepting the Apelian denomination of a communication community at a linguistic level, I ask, How could we now denominate that community which is presupposed in every just "labor act," when a useful product is made? I have called this the life community (\emph{Lebensgemeinschaft}) or community of producers. It is this community which is always already presupposed \textit{a priori} by every labor act,\textsuperscript{46} for which and through which something is produced or is made as a product. Every product is “for
another” in a community. Like the originary linguisticality (Sprachlichkeit; Gadamer), the instrumentality (Werkzeuglichkeit) is also an originary, equipri-
mordial ontological moment. because both are the fundamental existentialle of
being-in-the-world, to use Heidegger's terminology. The community of pro-
ducers or of life does not make reference to communication, but instead is
the community that serves as support for the labor-act as this is directed to
the reproduction of human life. Marx speaks of it explicitly; as if anticipating our
suspicions he writes:

Production by an isolated individual outside society... is as much of an
absurdity as is the development of language without individuals living to-
gether and talking to each other.47

If language presupposes a community, then no less does production. At the
level of production, in the economic dimension. Marx accomplished a critique
from the Exteriority of the capital-system in the abstract, from the standpoint
of living labor, an extetiority presupposed a priori before every possible eco-
nomic system (the Levinasian Totality).48 The community, instead, is a hori-
zon or ideal moment-the “third stage” of the Grundrisse:

Relations of personal dependence... are the first social forms, in which
human productive capacity develops only to a slight extent and at isolated
points. Personal independence founded on objective [sachlicher] dependence
is the second great form, in which a system of general social metabolism, of
universal relations, of all-round needs and universal capacities is formed for
the first time. Free individuality, based on the universal development of in-
dividuals and on their subordination of their communal [gemeinschaftlichen],
social productivity as their social wealth, is the third stage.49

The second stage is the colonized form of the Lebenswelt, which determines
between individuals an abstract individual relation, a non-communitarian “so-
cial relationship.”50 For Marx, the communitarian, or pertaining-to-the-com-

The labour embodied in them [commodities] must be represented as social
labour, as alienated labour.... This transformation of the labour of private
individuals contained in the commodities into uniform social labour....52

The references are even more frequent in the Manuscripts of 63-65, especially
in the Unpublished Chaper 6, where there are continuous reflections on fetish-
ism (but not necessarily on the distinction between “social” and “communitarian”),
and in Chapter 7 of the Main Manuscript of Book III of Capital. In fact, Marx writes:

The command that the products of past labour exercise over living surplus labour [lebendige Mehrarbeit] lasts only as long as the capital relation, the specific social relation in which past labour confronts living labour as independent and superior.  

The "ideal community of producers" or of "life" is found in the Main Manuscript of Volume III, of 1865, in a central text on the theme with which we are here dealing, namely, when Marx submits the following formulations concerning the "realm of freedom"-so much belonging to Schiller-"The realm of freedom [Reich der Freiheit] really begins... beyond [jenseits] the sphere of material production proper.  

Here we ought to ask what constitutes this "beyond" (a transcendentality to be defined) of the "realm of necessity" and of material production. Whether it is located beyond history or in it as future, or whether it is located as a transcendental "horizon" of understanding, as a regulative idea, as an "always already presupposed a priori." The text continues with reference to the theme that, from the savage to the civilized man (this is the "developmentalism" of Marx before the great "turn" of the late Marx), although necessities continue to be fulfilled, continue to grow at the same time, therefore, they are never able to be met fully:

Freedom, in this sphere, can consist only in this, that socialized man, the associated producers, govern the human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their communal [gemeinschaftliche] control instead of being dominated by it as a blind power.  

The communitarian level appears again, but now it receives a concrete content, which will be postulated as an "economics," as an ideal community of producers,

under communal control... accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy and in conditions most worthy [würdigsten] and appropriate for their human nature.

It concerns, exactly, the definition of an ideal community of producers: minimal effort, maximum adequacy to human dignity and worth. Already in the Manuscripts of 44, the third notebook, in the paragraph on "Private property and communism," the young Marx had written:

Social activity and social enjoyment exist by no means only in the form of some directly communal activity and directly communal enjoyment, although communal activity and communal enjoyment-i.e. activity and enjoyment which are manifested and affirmed in actual direct association with other
men—will occur wherever such a direct expression of sociality stems from the true character of the activity’s content and is appropriate to the nature of enjoyment. 

What catches the attention in this formulation, "will occur wherever such...," is that it makes us think of how the “ideal community” is actualized in the empirical “real community.”

Only now can we confront the definitive text on fetishism published by Marx in 1873, in section 4 of Chapter 1 of Capital. We will not repeat everything there said. We will only cite some texts:

As the foregoing analysis has already demonstrated, this fetishism of the world of commodities [this is the question of a phenomenology] arises from the peculiar social character of the labour which produces them.

As in the Grundrisse and the Contributions, Marx always begins by criticizing the solipsism of Robinson Crusoe utopias; later he refers, in order to elucidate the theme of fetishism, to pre-capitalist communities. In the third place, Marx refers to an "ideal community," and this is perfectly coherent with our interpretative hypothesis:

Let us finally imagine, for a change, an association of free men [Freier Menschen], working with he means of production held in common [gemeinschaftlichen], and expending their many different forms of labour-power in full self-awareness as one single social labour force.

It is clear that this example, this regulative idea, serves analogically (as a parallel or metaphorically) to clarify the case of an empirical society which he intends to analyze: the capitalist ("For a society of producers, whose general social relation of production consists in the fact...").

I believe we have indicated sufficiently how Marx uses the ideal “communitarian Relation” as a point of reference to critically clarify the empirical “social relation” (capitalist).

We have seen, then, that in the nucleus of Marx’s thought itself there lies the theme of community (Gemeinschaft). This community of producers is the “transcendental condition of possibility” that is always already a priori presupposed when simply working “honestly,” “earnestly” (as in the case of the speakers or arguers in Apel or Habermas). In fact, all persons who honestly engage in an act of work do so, evidently, as a means to reproduce communitarian human life. If one intends to reproduce only one’s own life, as a solipsistic experience, this means we are already determined by a system which has colonized him/her: the "mode of capitalist production." Thus, the mere honest act of work presupposes a community of producers of human life. This warrants our copying a text of Apel, applying it to our problem (when Apel speaks of "arguing," we write “work”, etc.):
Who works can be led to recognize or be convinced through self-reflection that, inasmuch as producer, he or she has necessarily already recognized an ethical norm. This ethical norm can be made explicit in the following manner: who works has already attested in actu, and with that has recognized, that practical reason is responsible for human action; that is, that the claims to justice can be and ought to be satisfied through acts-of work, which are not only technically adequate, but also practically just.

The basic ethical norm can be formulated approximately. Taking into account the dignity of persons, I respect them when engaging in act x. This x can be an act of arguing (or a discursive speech act) or an act of work. Why do I say that in working honestly it is always already presupposed as an a priori ethical norm? Because just as the arguer does not "impose" his reason by means of force, but instead intends to convince with arguments, in the same way, one who works does not intend to attain the necessary product through force or robbery, but instead through labor. That is, one respects and considers the other person as one's equal, in such a way that one applies oneself to work just as the Other works in what is ours. One works honestly (and not in a solipsistically distorted system like capitalism) in the production of a product which is "ours," which will be "distributed" by "us," in order to be consumed by each one of the members of the community (the best example is the feast).

This ethical norm can be made explicit in the following manner: who works has already attested in actu, and with that has recognized, that practical reason is responsible for human actions, that is, that the claims to justice, can and ought to be satisfied through acts-of work, not only technically adequate, but instead practically just.

We have simply changed "argue" for "work," and the "claim to truth" for "claim to justice." What does this mean? Simply that when someone works, considering that they do so always within a community always already presupposed a priori, they also presuppose that all the other members of the community work in just proportions ("according to their capabilities"; and therefore, ethically according to the ethical norm, each one should consume "according to their needs"). If this were not presupposed, they would stop working honestly and seriously (that is, they would begin to work intentionally, against the community, in lesser degree than they can or to consume in greater degree than they ought). On this depends not "truth" (because it is not a theoretical argument), but "justice" (which is an act of "equality" about the products of work: to each according to what corresponds to them according to their capacities and their necessities in a community).

A Liberation Philosophy must know how to unfold a discourse from the misery and oppression of the periphery of global capitalism, from the oppression of woman under machist rule, of the child, the youth, and the popular
culture that struggles in order to supersede the control of the hegemonic cul-
ture (post-conventional in Kohlberg's position, against which we will defend a 
post-contractualist moment, since his position inscribes itself within a liberal 
tradition).

To summarize, Liberation Philosophy thinks that the "absolute pragmatic 
condition of all argumentation" (therefore of all communication communities) 
is the factum of reason that the "subject be alive" (a dead subject can hardly 
argue). With respect to real "life" (and therefore just the same transcendentally 
for the possible subject), economics 68 (Oekonomik and not the economy, or 
Wirtschaftswissenschaft) is an equally transcendental pragmatic condition. That 
economics (ordo rationis) is argued about in the communication community 
does not mean that it could be its a priori (ordo realitatis). We will return to 
this theme in later essays.

Notes

1. Lecture presented at the Forum für Philosophie Bad-Homburg, 13 March 1992, 
on the occasion of Karl-Otto Apel's seventieth birthday.
19ff.
3. The fourth part was published in Fornet-Betancourt, ed., Ethik und Befreiung (Aachen: 
Augustinus Buchhandlung, 1990). The complete text has appeared in Spanish in 
Karl-Otto Apel, Enrique Dussel, Raúl Fornet-Betancourt, eds. Fundamentación de 
la ética y filosofía de la liberación (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1992).
4. See Apel's “Fallibilismus. Konsenstheorie der Wahrheit und Letztbegründung,” in 
Forum für Philosophie Bad Homburg; ed., Philosophie und Begründung (Frank-
furt: Suhrkamp, 1987).
5. It is thus announced: "Argue that some persons are as such, as possible partici-
pants of a communication community, superior to other persons." This argument 
falls into performative self-contradiction because it negates the equality which it 
presupposes in the very act of arguing. It is clear, as we will see, that it will 
pretend to make do without negating a potential equality, but a real; that is, here 
and now are inferior, which will allow us to “negate their alterity” and with that 
the dignity of person as other. Because of that, the equality of the other is not 
sufficient. Instead, what is needed is the affirmation of the dignity of the alterity 
of the Other.
6. Simply because before 1492 there was no empirical "global" history.
7. On this theme see my article "Marx's Economic Manuscripts of 1861-1863 and 
the 'Concept' of Dependency," in Latin American Perspectives 17, 2 (1990), pp. 
61-101. This article contains a substantive bibliography. The “transference of value” 
began with the extraction and robbery of the precious metals (gold, silver, first 
global currency) at the expense of the lives of the Indians during the 16th and 
17th centuries; it continued with the slavery of the tropical plantations, with un-
equal exchange, the price monopoly of raw materials (undervalued), the manufac-
tures of the center (overvalued) controlled by the colonial metropolis, and with 
the payment of international interest arbitrarily raised, etc.
11. Ibid., p. 191.
12. Ibid., p. 195.
13. In my *The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of “the Other” and the Myth of Modernity* (New York: Continuum, 1995) I show that 1492 begins the constitution of this “subjectivity,” as an *ego conquiro* (I conquer), a century before its ontological expression as an *ego cogito* (in 1636).
17. See Chap. 6 of *The Invention of the Americas.*
19. Before 1492, Europe could not have any effective self-consciousness of superiority, because it knew well the wealth, wisdom, and power of the Muslim and Ottoman worlds. It is in Mexico, with Cortés, that Europe first exercises its triumphant "will-to-power" (see my *The Invention of the Americas,* Chap. 3).
20. This second moment has disappeared in Apel and Habermas.
21. "Myth" in the totally different sense meant by M. Horkheimer and T. Adorno in *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (Frankfurt; Fischer, 1971), and to which Habermas refers in *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity,* Chap. 5, pp. 106ff. On sacrificial irrationality, one would have to think of a René Girard, *Le sacré et le profane* (Paris; Gallimard, 1965); and his *Le Bouc émissaire* (Patis; Grasset, 1982). See also Franz Hinkelammert, *Sacrificios humanos y Sociedad occidental* (San José, Costa Rica: DEI, 1991).
22. Departing from the arguments for slavery of Aristotle's *Politics*, Ginés de Sepúlveda thinks that "the perfect ought to dominate and reign the imperfect, the excellent over its contrary" (*De la justa causa de la guerra contra los indios* [Mexico: FCE, 1987], p. 83). Or: "Being by nature slaves, the barbarians, uncultured and inhuman men,... being furthermore a just matter by natural right that matter obey form, the body the soul, the appetites reason, the brutes men, women men, the imperfect the perfect, the worse the better, for the good of all" (ibid., p. 153). In this major argument there resides the racism of eurocentrism, of ethnocentrism, of extreme nationalism, etc. It is an argument that falls into a performative self-contradiction.
23. “What other better or more healthy thing can occur to these barbarians, but that
they be governed by the empire of those whose prudence, virtue and religion will convert the barbarian... into civilized men" (ibid., 133).

24. "And if they refuse our empire [imperium], they can be compelled by arms to accept it, and this will be just war by natural law" (ibid., p. 135).

25. "Were we not to do it, we would fulfill neither the natural law nor the commandment of Christ" (ibid., 137).

26. Is this not the "global" sense of the "culpable immaturity" of which Kant speaks? It is clear that Kant finds "culpability" in the "laziness" and "cowardice," but already a natural ineptitude had been projected on the Indian as a cultural culpability. See my work 1492: el encubrimiento del Otro. Furthermore, Kant associates cool weather with the white race as being superior, over those that inhabit the regions of tropical climates, etc. The culpability of the barbarians resides in their "opposition" to modernization and Christianization. Never could modernity understand such an opposition as a desperate act of affirming their "identity" as alterity.

27. In Panama there was no culpability in the invasion of a sovereign country (personally, I cannot defend Noriega, but with less ethical reasons I can also not defend an "invasion").

28. Juan de Torquemada, Monarquía India (Mexico: UNAM, 1975), Vol. II, p. 312. This was in 1521. In 1991 we read in the newspapers that 125 "boys" died and something more than one hundred thousand Iraqi soldiers died in the Gulf War. The same proportion, almost 500 years later, out of the same logic of modernity. The horses in 1521 are the airplanes of today.


30. See Niklas Luhmann, Soziale System (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988). In Spanish see the excellent introduction by Ignacio Izuzquía, La sociedad sin hombres. Niklas Luhmann o la Teoría del escándalo (Barcelona: Anthropos, 1990).


32. See my Philosophy of Liberation (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1985), 2.1 and 2.4; and Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1973) Vols. I and II; and Método para una Filosofía de la Liberación (Salamanca: Sigueme, 1974).


35. See Grundrisse, p. 295-96.

36. On real or formal "sublation," see my El último Marx (1863-1882) (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1990), on the “Capítulo VI inédito” (pp. 33-49).

37. Marx distinguishes between “producing” (produktion) and «foundation» (Grund) as well as between "to create" (schaßen) and “creation” (Schöpfung).

38. As Quelle (source, in a Schellingian sense) and not as Grund (in the Hegelian sense).

39. On the "creation out of nothing" (aus Nichts), see my work El último Marx (1863-1882), Chap. 9.3: "El trabajo vivo como fuente creadora del valor" (pp. 368ff). This means the "creation of surplus out of the nothing of capital"; or put another way: from beyond the grounding, it indicates that for Marx capital is not self-referential nor autopoetic (this is fetishism, the pretension of self-reference and autopoiesis of capital as system).
41. In "Exteriority and the Ideal Communication Community." Chap. 2.3.1, above I situate the exteriority of the Other at the transcendental level of the ideal communication community, when I indicated that equal persons, participants in said community, ought, in addition, always respect every member as an Other (as potential origin of a *new* discourse). Levinas’s exteriority is abstract, and therefore it needs to be located at the transcendental or empirical level of Apel, or in both. In the transcendental, as respect and recognition of the unconditional dignity and liberty of the Other; at the empirical level, as "excluded," as the "dominated," the "poor."
42. See above, Chap. 2.3.2, "Exteriority and the Community of Scientists," 2.3.3, "Concrete Types of Interpellation, from the Excluded Ones of Such Respective Hegemonic Communication Communities."
43. See my *Método para una filosofía de la liberación.*
45. See "La pedagogíca latinoamericana" in Ibid., pp.123ff.
46. In the speech act there is a propositional content; in the labor act there is a functional content. In this way one may proceed to analyze the analogies.
47. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 84.
48. This is the question I have dealt with in *El último Marx (1863-1882)*, Chaps. 9 and 10, pp. 334-450, under the title "Generative Matrix" of every possible economics (as concrete economic moment of the still more abstract philosophical-ethical "rational matrix": the non-being as creative source of Being).
49. *Grundrisse*, p. 158; German, p. 75, lines 34-45.
50. "The conditions of labour from which exchange value emerge... are social determinations [*gesellschaftliche*] of labour or determinations of social labour [*gesellschaftlicher*], but not social [*gesellschaftlich*] in any form [!], but instead in a particular manner... of the *single* [einzelnen] *individual.*" (Zur Kritik [1859], Chap. 1; *MEW*, 13, p. 19). "Something which characterizes labour that originates exchange value is that the social relation of persons [*gesellschaftliche Beziehung der Personen*] presents itself, so to say, inverted [verkehrt]. It could be said as a social relation of things" (ibid, p. 21). For Marx, in this case, "social relation" is a defective relation, negative, non-communitarian.
51. Marx, writing on Ricardo, says that he was imprisoned within the "bourgeois horizon" (Zur Kritik, p. 46). It is properly a phenomenological category of great importance in our theme.
54. Which would be the realm of "instrumental rationality" inasmuch as it concerns goals (*Zweckmässigkeit*).
59. See El último Marx, Chap. 5.7.c, especially pp. 192-93. On the history of fetishism in commodities see Thomas Marxhausen, "Die Entwicklung der Theorie des Waren fetichismus in Marx oekonomischen Schriften zwischen 1850 und 1863" in Arbeitenblätter zur Marx-Engels Forschung, 1, 1976, pp. 75-95.


61. Ibid., pp. 169-70.

62. Ibid., p. 170.

63. Ibid., p. 171. Emphasis added.

64. Ibid., p. 172.

65. See my work La producción teórica de Marx, Chap. 4.2 (pp. 87ff); 14.4 (pp. 291ff); 17.4 (pp. 355ff). In the present work see Chap. 1.1 and 3.2.a. Also the “Introduction to the Transformation der Philosophie of K-O. Apel and the Philosophy of Liberation” cited in Apel, ed., Fundamentación de la ética y filosofía de la liberación pp. 39ff, and pp. 73ff; also published in Fornet-Betancourt, ed., Ethik und Befreiung (Aachen: Augustinus Buchhandlung, 1990). The expression “ideal community of producers” was then criticized by Apel. In part, this is my response to that criticism. This community has to do with the “ethical community” of Kant, with the “Invisible Church” of Hegel, and with the “Kingdom of God” on earth of Württemberg pietism.


67. See my Philosophy of Liberation, 4.3.9.6 and 4.4.9.2-4.4.9.3.

68. We understand by it the ideally presupposed belonging of every human being to a “community of producers/consumers” where life is reproduced as condition of the “living” character of the rational subject.