

MODERNITY, EUROCENTRISM, AND
TRANS-MODERNITY: IN DIALOGUE WITH
CHARLES TAYLOR

I would like to compare Charles Taylor's ethical project of describing the material (or substantive) contents of modern identity, arrived at from a philosophical and historical narrative of the *Sources of the Self* (1989), with the ethical project of the Philosophy of Liberation, which agrees with Taylor's project in many aspects but differs in many others. It is not a question, then, of making a commentary or exegesis of the Canadian philosopher's work, but instead of effectuating a critical confrontation from a clearly defined and situated point of view ("from" the perspective of the Philosophy of Liberation). And as we are also engaged in a debate with Karl-Otto Apel, I would like to refer to him in order to achieve greater clarity in my exposition.

The exposition will be divided into two parts. In the first, we will confront the historical reconstruction of the sources of the modern self that is carried out by Charles Taylor. In the second, we will confront the background question, namely, whether an ethic that attempts to orient itself toward the good, substantively (Taylor), or an ethics which is formal and procedural (Habermas), is necessary or even possible. At both levels the Philosophy of Liberation will adopt its own, differing positions.

7.1 The Project of the Historical Reconstruction of Modernity

During the decade of the sixties, I had the intention of describing the "material contents"¹ of Latin American culture. For methodological reasons, this project transformed itself into a "historical" description—in an analogous manner to that intended by Taylor—of the cultural contents of the Latin American world.² I therefore have extreme sympathy for Taylor's project. In fact, in his most important work, *The Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*, our philosopher explains his intentions:

That is what I want to try to do in what follows. But to do so is not easy.... Often it will be a question precisely of articulating what has remained implicit.... But there is one great recourse here, and that is history. The articulation of modern understanding of the good has to be a historical enterprise.³

This historical journey is "a combination of the analytical and the chronological" (*Sources of the Self*): In fact, it is an analysis of the contents of the modern self through its historical sources. The selections of his exposition, which are inspired from philosophical works (a) departing from Greek philosophers (b) and the later focus on exclusively European thinkers (c) would appear to be an obvious matter or a secondary issue without consequences. I believe this is not so, and will attempt to demonstrate it.

a) I wish to *methodologically* refer to the way in which Taylor attempts to carry out his historical analysis of modern identity, taking into account the sources of the self. For his project, Taylor almost exclusively uses works by philosophers⁴ (Plato, Augustine, Descartes, Locke), which are thought through their own discourses, that is, self-referentially. It is as though it were a history of philosophy, from philosophy itself.⁵ He writes with a magisterial hand, with knowledge, with a creative manner of obtaining results, but it is only an "intra-philosophical" exploration, which lacks a history, an economy, and a politics-as moments of the "world," in the Heideggerian sense. This methodological limitation will prevent the author from reaching more critical results, as we will see. It would appear as though capitalism, colonialism, and the continuing use of violence or military aggression had no importance.

b) A second aspect consists in underscoring that Taylor departs from Plato in his reconstruction of modern identity. With that, he repeats a long tradition of Western philosophy: the Greeks are taken not only as a point of departure for all philosophical methodology, but also as a privileged example in order to analyze the concrete contents of our culture,⁶ in this case, of the ethical articulation directed toward the good (*agathón*). It is a question of a *hellenocentrism* of grave consequences.⁷ Toward the end of Taylor's reconstruction, with respect to the concept of the self,⁸ it would have been more useful to have recourse to "sources" such as the following: where the dead (in their "carnal" individuality) confront the tribunal (which means an ethical self-reflection of the *Self*) as a person, and assume charge of the acts committed with free responsibility during their temporal existence:

I have given bread to the hungry man [exclaims the dead as a justification before the gods of the underworld who stand in judgment], and water to the thirsty man, and apparel to the naked man, and a boat to the shipwrecked.⁹

A daily reader in Montreal, Frankfurt, Moscow, or Mexico will find with this text more "familiarity" than with those of Plato. Certainly, this is one of humanity's more remote "sources" of orientation toward the good. In fact, the

Egyptian god Osiris resuscitates the dead;¹⁰ that is to say, personal individuality is attempted to be retained. Hence, the existence of cemeteries, an institution of modern Europe that existed neither in Plato's Greece nor in Indo-European India, for the bodies, sources of evil,¹¹ were destroyed so that the only positive which counts would remain: the immortal, non-personal soul.¹²

In analogous manner, it would have been more useful to have departed, for instance, from the following tradition:

By my protecting genius, their brethren in peace are guided: by my wisdom are they sheltered. That the strong may not oppress the weak; that the orphan and the widow may be counselled.¹³

Here, we have already expressed the ethical principles of alterity,¹⁴ which are totally absent in Plato's thought. I think that these traditions are more important to Taylor's hypothesis, inasmuch as it is a question of effective "sources" for the orientation of the later Christian-Mediterranean and Western-Latin culture. Taylor falls into an obvious hellenocentrism. Paul Ricoeur had already demonstrated in *The symbolism of Evil*¹⁵ that the treatment of the tragic myth of Prometheus (that Plato repeats with his doctrine of the *ananke*) is radically opposed to the "Adamic myth," where the structure of "temptation" is given as a dialectic of free will (and certainly within the Adamic tradition we may locate the "sources of the modern self"). Hellenocentrism completely distorts Taylor's investigation.

c) A third aspect. Just as in the case of Hegel—who was philosophically the initiator of this question in the history of philosophy¹⁶—for Taylor the originary diachronic process of modernity also follows the linear movement Augustine-Descartes-Locke, et al. In short, I argue that this manner of interpreting modern identity is eurocentric, that is to say, provincial, regional, and does not take into account modernity's global significance and, thus, the inclusion of Europe's periphery as a "source," also constitutive of the modern "self" as such.¹⁷ This will allow us to discover certain aspects (and to occlude others) of "modern identity" and the "sources of the self."

Modernity, according to my interpretation (and in this, as is obvious, I would oppose the hegemonic opinion of the Euro-North American philosophical community), may have a first definition that I will call eurocentric, and another that I will denominate worldly (planetary, not universal).¹⁸ The eurocentric definition describes modernity with characteristics or determinations solely European. The worldly or planetary description incorporates determinant moments within the constitution of modernity as *center* of a world process in such a way that the phenomenon of modernity, exclusively attributed to the "development" of European subjectivity, would include determinations (and contra-determinations) of its situation of center with respect to a *periphery* (first colonial, then neocolonial; Third World in the epoch of the cold war, up

to the understanding of the structural underdevelopment or the simple "exclusion" from the market or global capitalist system after the so-called revolution of 1989).

To reiterate: modernity is a phenomenon originally European—and it is evident that its sources date back to the Egyptian, Babylonian, Semitic, Greek worlds, but that only in the 15th century it reached worldly implementation; and that it constitutes and reconstitutes' itself simultaneously by a dialectical articulation of Europe (as center) with the peripheral world (as a dominated sub-system) within the first and only "world system." Modernity *originates* in the Europe of free cities (within the context of the feudal world) from the 10th century on, approximately, but is *born* when Europe constitutes itself as center of the world system, of world history, that is inaugurated (at least as a limit date) with 1492. The medieval crusades are a frustrated attempt. The Viking "discoveries" in the North Atlantic and the Portuguese in the African Atlantic in the 15th century are its antecedents, but only with the "discovery" (by Europe) or "invasion" (in a non-eurocentric view of the peripheral peoples)¹⁹ of the "New World" will Europe (a particular "ecumene" without evident comparative advantages up to then) enjoy a true springboard that will allow it to supersede and overcome all other ecumenes, regional or provincial systems (especially that of China). In this manner, from 1492 (and not before), "world history" begins as worldly: that is to say, the history of all civilizations or former provincial ecumenes are placed in an effectively empirical relation. The Persian, Roman, Mongolian, Chinese, Aztec, Inca, and other empires were provincial or regional ecumenes more or less *disconnected*, all of them ethnocentric "navels of the world," whose boundaries divided "human beings" from "barbarians"—the Aztecs, for instance, denominated the barbarians "Chichimecas." All the great neolithic cultures were "centers" of civilizing sub-systems with their own peripheries, but without any historically significant connection with other ecumenes. Only *modern* European culture, from 1492 onwards, was a center of a world system, of a universal history that confronts (with diverse types of subsumption and exteriority) as *all the other cultures of the earth*: cultures that will be militarily dominated as its periphery.

For philosophers, it has gone unnoticed that, because of this fact, the problem of universality should have been formulated for modernity in a *never-before-undertaken manner*. Eurocentrism consists precisely in confusing or identifying aspects of human abstract universality (or even transcendental) in general with moments of European particularity, in fact, the first global particularity (that is, the first concrete human universality²⁰). Modern European culture, civilization, philosophy, and subjectivity came to be taken as such abstractly human-universal. A great part of the achievements of modernity were not exclusively European but grew from a continuous dialectic of impact and counter-impact, effect and counter-effect, between modern Europe and its periphery,

even in that which we could call the constitution of modern subjectivity. The *ego cogito* also already betrays a relation to a proto-history, of the 16th century, that is expressed in the ontology of Descartes but does not emerge from nothing. The *ego conquiro* (I conquer), as a practical self, antedates it. Hernán Cortés²¹ (1521) preceded the *Discours de la méthode* (1636) by more than a century. Descartes studied at La Fleche, a Jesuit college, a religious order with great roots in America, Africa, and Asia at that moment. The “barbarian” was the obligatory context of all reflection on subjectivity, reason, the *cogito*.²² It is so for Marx Weber, and Habermas indicates it explicitly:

Weber identifies in retrospect the "universal-historical problem" on which he endeavored throughout his life to shed light;²³ the question of why, outside of Europe, "Neither scientific nor artistic, nor political, nor economic development entered upon that path of rationalization peculiar to the Occident?"²⁴

It is this "context" that Weber develops in his thought; that is to say, in the relation center-periphery. Weber searches for the cause of Europe's or modernity's "superiority" within certain determinations (capitalist enterprise, capitalist calculus, organization of labor power, technico-scientific knowledge, systems of bureaucratized control, permanent military power, rationalization of existence at all levels). And Weber concludes:

A product of modern European civilization, studying any problem of universal history, is bound to ask himself to what combination of circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western civilization, *and in Western civilization only, cultural phenomena* have appeared which (as we like to think)²⁵ lie in a line of development having *universal* significance and value.²⁶

Weber's eurocentrism consists in presupposing *a priori* that the “cultural phenomena” that were produced in the “soil of the West”, *exclusively and from its own evolutionary direction*, had since the 15th century an implicit universality, “from [out of] itself.” The reverse question should have been: Is it not the case that the chain of events that led, on Western soil and only there, to the production of cultural phenomena that (*against* what we always imagine) given the conquest of a central position at the origin itself of the history of the *world system*, the modern West achieved comparative advantages that lead to the imposition of its own culture on the remaining others, and in addition with pretensions of universality?

Why was it Europe and not China that conquered the center of the emerging world system? China, which knew the coasts of the south of Kenya in Africa, and up to Canada in America, did not have any interest in expansion to America. For Europe—specially for Venice—it was essential to be able to reach India, but they had to circumvent the Turkish-Muslim blockade. There was, therefore, interest in risking an Atlantic voyage. The conquest of America

was easy (there were no iron weapons in the New World). For this reason, the first European periphery was Latin America²⁷—Africa and Asia resisted militarily until the 19th century.²⁸ Latin America gave to Europe the first *comparative advantage* that explains, in part (but it is a part of the explanation that is never considered in the interpretations of modernity), the triumph over the Muslim world, vanquished at Lepanto in 1571 (25 years after the discovery and the beginning of the exploitation of the Zacatecas silver mines in México and the Potosí silver mines in Bolivia), and over China, which “closes” upon itself until the 20th century. Even the phenomenon of rationalization is an effect-cause of a world centrality that allows for the discovery of “other worlds,” which then have to be dominated with “universal” management. We could thus undertake another reconstruction of modernity.

It is thus that a small text of Taylor is not innocent:

This is in fact merely one example of a general process by which certain practices of Modernity have been imposed, often brutally, *outside their heartlands*. For some of them this seems to have been part of an irresistible dynamic. It is clear that the practices of technologically oriented science helped endow the nations where they developed with a cumulative technological advantage over others. This, combined with the consequences of the new emphasis on disciplined movement which I described earlier, gave *European armies a marked and increasing military advantage over non-Europeans from the seventeenth until about the mid-twentieth century*. And this combined with the consequences of the economic practices we call capitalism allowed the European powers to establish a world hegemony *for a time*.²⁹

It may appear as an insignificant question. But, to situate in the 17th century the beginning of the new comparative advantage is to have left to the side the conquest of Latin America (end of the 15th century and all of the 16th century). However, it is in this moment (which I have denominated the proto-history of the *ego cogito*) where the domination over indigenous America is achieved—from Mexico to Peru for the most part—and from it, as a springboard (before the emergence of Bacon, Newton, or Descartes), the structuration of the differential advantage over the Afro-Asiatic cultures. In other words, what was perhaps already the “consequence” of the Europe *centrality* over a world *periphery* (a cultural, economic, scientific, etc. centrality that was based, in its sources, in a technical-military superiority over the American Indian, and not over the equal or superior, from a scientific or “rationalization” point of view, Afro-Asiatic cultures, such as, for instance, the Muslim Mongolian, and Chinese worlds), was instead presented as the “consequence” of rationalization, science, and the “modern self”. In this historical interpretation (and for that reason analytical). Weber as much as Taylor may have been totally mistaken.³⁰

The same takes place with Habermas. In fact, the philosopher from Frankfurt, writing about critical counter-discourses, expresses exactly the type of

eurocentrism I have been discussing, as is shown by the following texts culled from *The Philosophical Discourses of Modernity*:

The change of paradigm from subject-centered to communicative reason also encourages us to resume once again the counterdiscourse [*Gegendiskurs*] that accompanied Modernity from the beginning. Since Nietzsche's radical critique of reason cannot be consistently carried out along the line of a critique of metaphysics or of a theory of power, we are directed towards a *diffirent* way out of the philosophy of the subject. Perhaps the grounds for the self-critique of a Modernity in collapse can be considered under other premises such that we can do justice to the motives, virulent since Nietzsche, for a precipitous leavetaking of Modernity.³¹

Or as in this other remark:

The New Critique of Reason suppresses that almost 200-year [!] old counterdiscourse inherent in modernity itself which I am trying to recall in these lectures.³²

And still:

Modern Europe has created the spiritual presuppositions and the material base of a world in which this mentality has usurped the place of reason- this is the true nucleus of the critique of reason that dates back to Nietzsche. But, who else but Europe could extract from its own [*eigenen*]³³ traditions the penetration, the energy, the will to vision and phantasy....

In these texts we can see, clearly, what I call eurocentrism. Also evident is the "developmentalist fallacy."³⁴ In first place, Habermas situates in time the beginning of this "counterdiscourse": there at the beginning stands Kant (we would therefore be only two hundred years old!). Yet, in historical reality, from a non-eurocentric point of view of modernity (that is to say, worldly), this *counter-discourse* is already five centuries old: it began on the Hispaniola Island when Antón de Montesinos attacked the injustices that were being carried out against the Indians, and from there it reached the classrooms of Salamanca (since it is there that the critique of 1514 is continued with the theoretical and practical labor of Bartolomé de las Casas, and it is there also where this counter-discourse will be expressed in the university lectures of Francisco de Vitoria concerning *De indiis*). As is always the case with Central-European philosophers, and especially Germans, the 16th and 17th centuries do not count, and Latin America much less.

Furthermore, modernity being a world phenomenon (the first epoch that involves all the cultures of the planet, in the manner of a metropolitan center in Europe or as a colony or world impacted by Europe in the periphery), this counter-discourse, precisely this and no other, could emerge within the European critical reason that opened itself and co-constituted itself from the dominated,

exploited alterity: the hidden Other of dominating Europe (that always will pretend to negate such counter-discourse). But that European counter-discourse (European: because of its geographical implantation) is the fruit of the European-center and the dominated-periphery. Bartolomé de las Casas would not have been able to criticize Spain without having resided in the periphery, without having heard the cries and lamentations, and without having seen the tortures that the Indians suffered at the hands of the colonizing Europeans. That Other is the origin of the European counter-discourse. It is evident that Europe, as the visible part of the iceberg, had cultural hegemony (economic and political³⁵), "information," and would be the privileged place on the planet for the "discussion" of world and also philosophical problems. But this intellectual production, when it is anti-hegemonic, although still European (for instance Montaigne, Pascal, Rousseau, or Marx), is not only European. It is so neither because of its exclusive origin nor because of its significance. In addition, in the periphery there existed also an intellectual production (and philosophical; for instance Francisco Xavier Clavigero, 1731-87,³⁶ in Mexico, a contemporary of Kant), but as *counter-discourse* before the European hegemonic world vision, and only with provincial *sources*. Clavigero cannot publish his work in Castilian, but only in Italian. The peripheral cultures were kept isolated and without contact among themselves. They only communicated through Europe, being thus reinterpreted through center-Europe. "European" philosophy is not the exclusive product of Europe. Instead it is the product of the humanity located in Europe, and with the contribution of the peripheral cultures that were in an essential co-constitutive dialogue.

To say that such a "counter-discourse" is *immanent* to modernity could be accepted, if modernity were defined worldly, but in this case modernity would have to include its peripheral alterity. It would be hegemonic modernity and a dominated colonial peripheral world as a world-system. As a matter of fact, inasmuch as modernity is defined as an exclusively European horizon, it is pretended that the counter-discourse is also an exclusively European product. In this manner, the periphery itself, in order to criticize Europe, will have to europeanize itself, because it would have to use a European counter-discourse in order to show Europe its own contradictions, without being able, once again, to contribute anything new and having to negate itself.

If, instead, this counter-discourse is already the dialectical product (affirmation of alterity as principle of negation of the negation: analectical movement) of a critical dialogue with alterity, it cannot be said that it is exclusively and intrinsically European, and least of all that Europe is Europe the only one that can "retrieve from its *own* traditions" the continuation of such counter-discourses. On the contrary, it is likely that it is only outside Europe where this counter-discourse may develop more critically, and not as continuation of a strange or *exclusively* European discourse, but as continuation of a critical labor that the

periphery has already stamped in the counter-discourse produced in Europe and on its own peripheral discourse (in fact and almost integrally, when it is non-eurocentric it is already counter-discourse).

From this it follows that the study of thought (traditions and philosophy) in Latin America, Asia, and Africa is not an anecdotal task or a task with parallels to the study of philosophy as such (without anything else coming to bear). Instead, it is a question of a history that *rescues* the non-hegemonic, dominated, silenced, and forgotten counter-discourse, namely, that of the constitutive alterity of modernity itself. Kant (hegemonic-central philosopher) or Marx (European counter-discourse) and Clavigero (peripheral philosopher) will be studied as the two faces of one epoch of human thinking. Certainly, Kant, because of his hegemonic position, produced a critical philosophy that confronts the best of the world intellectual production (located empirically in Europe), and because of that Kant can be the point of departure of philosophy in all the world during two centuries. Kant, in this strict sense, is not exclusively a European thinker, but a thinker to whom the task fell, because of his historical, political, cultural, and economic situation, of producing a critical philosophy with world relevance. But the philosophical thought of Clavigero, with only regional importance hitherto (and because it is a region or dominated periphery³⁷, rapidly falling into oblivion even in its own Mexico), is the Other face of modernity, or of the world totality modernity/alterity, and for this very reason has equal "world" relevance. In the future we will have to study seriously what was produced philosophically in the peripheral world in order to have a common vision. Kant/Clavigero are part of a center/periphery world philosophy in the 18th century. The future history of philosophy will have a new *world* vision of philosophy and will deepen aspects thus far unsuspected, when the rich thematic of the *refraction* of the center of the system (which produced in Europe a center-philosophy, which up to now is the only one taken as "philosophy") in, or by, the periphery (which produced a peripheral-philosophy) is discovered. The center-philosophies and the peripheral-philosophies are the two faces of philosophy in modernity, and the counter-discourse (as much in the center as in the periphery) is a bequest from all the philosophers of the world, and not only from European ones.

This is essential for our philosophical project. The Philosophy of Liberation is a counter-discourse, a critical philosophy, that is born in the periphery with world pretensions. It has *explicit* consciousness of its peripherality, but at the same time it has a planetary claim (a claim to *mundialidad*). It confronts consciously a *European* philosophy (as much postmodern as modern, procedural as well as communitarian) that conflates and still identifies its concrete Europeanness with its unknown functionality of center-philosophy during five centuries. To distinguish among a) concrete Europeanness (its own European *Sittlichkeit* or *Lebenswelt*), b) the functionality of "center" that was Europe's place to exercise,

and c) strict universality would produce an awakening of European philosophy from a deep sleep in which it has been immersed from its very modern inception: its eurocentrism has celebrated, exactly, five centuries.

It would have to be necessary to have *explicit* consciousness of this always present "horizon," of the colonial Other, of the barbarian, of the cultures in asymmetrical positions, dominated, "inferior,"³⁸ as an essential source in the constitution of the identity of the modern self, permanent source, co-constitutive. The non-consideration of this Other in the constitution of the modern self practically invalidates Taylor's entire philosophical analysis, given its eurocentric character.³⁹ This analysis yields only the discovery of an aspect of self-centered modern identity. Is not the identity of modernity constituted dialectically from a negated alterity (placed or posited *gesetzt*, in the Hegelian sense, as a non-identity⁴⁰ with itself, alienated), from the Other face of modernity?⁴¹

Finally, we should indicate that the Latin American historical reconstruction will require in addition that it be formulated from the standpoint of universal ethical criteria. Therefore, without abandoning the empirical level of "being-in-the-world" or the Husserlian *Lebenswelt*, the Philosophy of Liberation developed universalizable categories, beyond every historical-concrete *telos*.⁴²

7.2 Taylor's Ethics of the Good

Our argumentative strategy will follow two paths: in a) we will present the ultimate "contents" (the "material" or "quasi-metaphysical" of Kantian ethics, in order partly to agree with Taylor and to prepare the way for our critique of Habermas and Apel); in b) we will consider Hegel's critique to a certain extent (and that of Heidegger) of all formalisms, and thus therefore of Taylor's critique of Habermasian formal proceduralism; in c) we will present the habermasian critique of Taylor (and thus implicitly of Hegel and Heidegger); in d) we will consider the critiques of the Philosophy of Liberation to the ontological ethics of the *Sittlichkeit* (Hegel, Heidegger, Taylor, MacIntyre) from the oppressed or alienated (which we will call the *principium oppressionis*) within the Totality that strives after the good; and in e), lastly, we will consider the critiques to Habermas and Apel that are attempted by the Philosophy of Liberation from the exteriority or "exclusion" of the Other (the *principium exclusionis*), of the poor, the oppressed woman, the child, future generations, the discriminated races. In this short work, we will only "point to" the argumentative architectonic without being able to deepen it.

a) Always, as with all "formal" ethics, there is in Kant an ultimate "content" (quasi-metaphysical). In a first formulation of the categorical imperative, Kant appeared to be purely "formal";

So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as the principle of a universal [*allgemeinen*] legislation.⁴³

In this sense the moral law is "merely formal... it abstracts from all matter [*aller Materie*]." ⁴⁴ At this moment, we do not want to insist on this point; nor do we want to focus on the problem of the application (*Anwendung*) of the principle. ⁴⁵ We would like here, instead, to show the "content" (beyond the purely "formal") in a second moment:

Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.... ⁴⁶ Without doubt the person is broad enough, but the humanity in his person (*Person*) ought to be sacred to him. In all of creation... only the person, and with him every rational creature, is an end in itself.... Its personality is the only thing that makes them be ends in themselves. ⁴⁷

The inevitable question is: Why is the person an "end in itself"? An answer to this question *inevitably* leads us to a quasi-metaphysical discussion. But it is this answer which can clarify the reason why I must have "respect" for the law. In fact, given that the person belongs to "both worlds" (to the intelligible and the empirical), "she ought to consider her being referring to her second and supreme destination with veneration (*Verehrung*) and its laws with the greatest respect (*Achtung*)". ⁴⁸

That is to say, in the last instance, "respect" for the law is deduced from respect for the *dignity of the person*. Strictly:

The ground [*Grund*] of this principle [the categorical imperative] is: Rational nature exists as an end in itself. ⁴⁹

This ultimate content is also encountered in Habermas or Apel. In both, as with Kant, ⁵⁰ the communication community (be it ideal or transcendental) has an ultimate reference to the "personhood" of all the participants and all those affected, as persons with equal rights. It is evident that in all "validity claims," the personhood of the Other is a required reference, just as when we say that we "comprehend illocutorily the (acceptable) attempt to establish an interpersonal relationship (*interpersonale Beziehung*)."⁵¹ That is to say, the illocutory moment of the speech-act always already (*immer schon*) presupposes the existence of the Other, of another person, who is respected as an equal; and thus, in the "ideal speech act" arguments must be used, and the irrational force of violence is simply not to be exercised or deployed. Similarly, Karl-Otto Apel presupposes the dignity and equality of the person as an ultimate transcendental moment:

Who argues has already attested *in actu*.... This means that the ideal rules of argumentation in an, in principle unlimited, communication community of persons who *recognize each other reciprocally as equals*, represent normative conditions of possibility of the decision on ethical validity claims [*ethischen Geltungsansprüchen*] through the formation of consensus. ⁵²

This already assumed "person of the Other" as a presupposition is, exactly, the taking charge of the "ethical" par excellence:⁵³ the ethical *content* of every formal morality (or the hidden and always implicit foundation of every "formalism," be it Kantian, Habermasian proceduralism, or Apelian transcendentalism). Is the presupposed relationship with the Other an *intrinsic* moment of the theoretical-argumentative reason, or is it a previous moment of *ethical reason* (strictly *practical* or as *will*) as foundation of the theoretical-argumentative reason?

b) On the other hand, Hegel's critique of Kantian "formalism" dates back to his first intuitions as a student. I am of the opinion, with respect to the theme that is our present concern, that Taylor is inspired by Hegel's critique of Kant.⁵⁴

As a matter of fact, the first hegelian critique of Kant is an ethical critique.⁵⁵ Hegel had studied a cold and scholastic theology in Tübingen, and was thus affected by the pedagogical rebellion of the young Schiller, who in 1795 published *The Aesthetic Education of Humankind*. Hegel had read Kant's *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Hegel was inspired by Schiller in his understanding of reason (*Vernunft*) as the vital faculty of synthesis; while understanding (*Verstand*) determines its object, separates it, kills it. In the *Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate*. Hegel writes:

In the Kingdom of the Heavens he [Jesus] shows to them [his disciples] not the elimination of the law, but instead that these will be fulfilled through a justice, one which will be different and greater than the justice as is obtained from the mere fidelity of duty [Kantian].⁵⁶

For the young Hegel, still a theologian, Kant is the Old Testament of the formal law (morality, *Moralität*); Jesus is the New Testament, the subsumption (*Aufhebung*) of the unilateral in the *pléroma* (the future ethical life, *Sittlichkeit*). There is not only formal universal law, but also equally inclination, love, synthesis (*Synthese*):

The most comprehensive principle may be called a tendency to execute what the law commands, unity of inclination [*Neigung*] and law, thanks to which this loses its form as law; this agreement with the inclination is the *pléroma* of the law.... The same is true with this tendency, a virtue [*Tugend*], is a synthesis in which the law loses its universality (in virtue of which Kant always named it objective), the subject its particularity, and both their contradiction [*Entgegensetzung*].⁵⁷

In this text of 1798, we already have the definitive Hegel (and in him, in some way, the intuitions of Taylor and MacIntyre). The objective law that commands from *without* is sublated by the synthesis of the subject-object (as community or concrete people), and now as a "second nature."⁵⁸ What in "morality" commands, in "ethical life" (*Sittlichkeit*) operates through love, through inclination, through *ethos*: "Agreement [*Übereinstimmung*] is life, and as such

relation of the different: love."⁵⁹ That is to say, "the Kingdom of God... is a living community,"⁶⁰ and not the isolated individual called for by the objective law that kills.⁶¹ It would be fitting to underscore many aspects, especially the Hegelian critique of the impossibility of the effective universalization of the maxim without contradictions (which the consensual proceduralism of Habermas optimizes);⁶² and the empirical possibility of the adequate "application" of the principles;⁶³ but with what has been said, it is enough in order to proceed with our theme.⁶⁴

Heidegger, similarly, also departs from a critique of Kant. He, however, does it in an ontological manner (and not ethical).⁶⁵ The subjectivity of the Kantian subject already "ex-sists" in the "world" as it constitutes objects (also when constituting practical objects). The "world" is openness to the "comprehension" of Being.⁶⁶ *Being and Time* and also *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* are subsumptions of modern subjectivity (and therefore also of Kantian practical reason) in "being-in-the-world." The point of departure, therefore, is "facticity," and re-reading Aristotle, we can translate:

Virtue is a habitual mode of dwelling in the world (*héxis*) which confronts elective possibilities (*proairetiké*) knowing how to determine the just medium between them in view of the fundamental pro-ject, thanks to an interpretative circumspection, such as would locate it within the existential horizon of the authentic man (*hó frónimos*).⁶⁷

In my case, I reconstructed, departing from Heidegger, an *ontological ethics*, from the critique of Kant, at the beginning of my work *Towards an Ethics of Latin American Liberation*, Chap. 1.⁶⁸

In what does Taylor's attempt consist? At the beginning of his major work, our philosopher explains that "I didn't feel I could launch into this study without some preliminary discussion of these links" (p. x). Here he develops his position, in the axiological terminological "style."⁶⁹ In fact, the fundamental intention of the *Sources of the Self* is to show the origin, the content, and identity crisis of the modern self, impossible to discover in a mere moral or abstract formal ethic. The ethical life can only be reconstructed in its concrete horizon, oriented by "intuitions" toward the good, toward "hypergoods" that presuppose a "moral ontology" based, in the last instance, in a "respect for life." "Strong evaluations" are at the base of the "respect for Others," of the "sense of one's own dignity," that have been placed in question by a horizon of "disenchantment," as a "dissipation of our sense of the cosmos." In reality there is something like a "quest" (as MacIntyre has put it) for an "articulation" of life, as an affirmation of "ordinary life." The identity of the self presupposes the recognition and affirmation of the historical moral sources of modernity, implicit but always apparent: the deism of the Christian God, the self-responsibility of the person as a subject, the romantic belief in the goodness of nature. But

as these sources are not recognized, or have been forgotten, modernity finds itself in crisis. In order to be able to awaken an operative ethical "motivation," we would have to count on an aesthetic impulse. It is not argumentation that motivates to the realization of the good life, but aesthetic narrative, as expressed in the tradition of a *pathos*, such as that of Schiller, Nietzsche, or Benjamin. In conclusion:

The intention of this work was one of retrieval, an attempt to uncover buried goods through rearticulation—and thereby to make these sources again empower, to bring the air back again into the half-collapsed lungs of the spirit.... There is a large element of hope. It is a hope that I see implicit in Judaeo-Christian theism... and in its central promise of a divine affirmation of the human.⁷⁰

In *The Ethics of Authenticity*, the theme is deepened, arriving at new results. The three malaises of modernity (individualism, the primacy of instrumental reason or technological capitalism, and the despotism of the system,⁷¹ produce a "loss of meaning," an "eclipse of ends," and a "loss of freedom" in bureaucratized societies. But in the midst of so much "dis-articulation," an "ideal of authenticity" opens up. The original "source of identity," born of a "disengaged rationalism" of a "self that has to think reflexively about itself, child of the romantic epoch, as an "atomism of the community"⁷² is the "inwardness" of a self-determined and autonomous will that attempts being true to itself.⁷³ This authenticity is "dialogical,"⁷⁴ departing from the "significant other,"⁷⁵ where identity as much as "difference" before them is affirmed. This difference emerges from a common "horizon." "Our identity requires recognition by others."⁷⁶ And therefore "to deny recognition is a form of oppression."⁷⁷ This allows Taylor to make a nice description of authenticity as the right to creation, to invention, discovery, and originality; of the opposition to the rules of society.⁷⁸ He concludes:

A fragmented society is one whose members find it harder and harder to identify with their political society as a community. This lack of identification may reflect an atomistic outlook, in which people come to see society purely instrumentally.⁷⁹

The theme of the "universal recognition of difference,"⁸⁰ is the object of the work entitled "The Politics of Recognition,"⁸¹ where we encounter sketches of a more concrete political horizon. Now Taylor broadens the horizon of modernity.⁸² It is a question of a "continuing dialogue and struggle with significant others."⁸³ And now, the philosopher of the center, exclaims:

There are other cultures.... It is reasonable to suppose that cultures that have... articulated their sense of the good, the holy, the admirable, are almost certain to have something that deserves our admiration and respect....

It would take a supreme arrogance to discount this possibility a priori.... But what the presumption requires of us is not peremptory and unauthentic judgements of equal value, but a willingness to be open to comparative culture study.... What it requires above all is an admission that we are very far away from that ultimate horizon from which the relative worth of different cultures might be evident.⁸⁴

From these preoccupations that are our own concern, Taylor criticizes Habermas's philosophy for its pretension to construct a consensual, universalist formalism, which in fact is grounded in a concrete (and material) horizon of orientations toward the good; in a "good life," with substantive contents:

It seems that they are motivated by the strongest moral ideals, such as freedom, altruism, and universalism. These are among the central moral aspirations of modern culture, the hypergoods which are distinctive to it.... They are constitutionally incapable of coming clean about the deeper sources of their own thinking.⁸⁵

It is, somehow, the repetition (*Wiederholung*) of the Hegelian and Heideggerian critiques to Kant: the subject is always already immersed in a *Sittlichkeit* (Hegel) or in the *Welt* (Heidegger). And Taylor cannot but be partly right.

c) We will consider now, in a few words, Habermas's critique of Taylor.⁸⁶ For the Frankfurt philosopher, for instance in his work *Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics*,⁸⁷ the fundamental distinction between "strategic" reason (oriented to ends, as in Aristotle, and in some way in Taylor), "ethical" reason or the concrete *Sittlichkeit* (the level in which Taylor is situated in order to "motivate" an ethics of authenticity), and "moral" reason (the formal universality which Habermas and Apel put forth), tends to revitalize the Kantian problematic, albeit now "transformed" through a "communication community" (pragmatic paradigm of speech acts), beyond solipsism and the paradigm of consciousness. Habermas indicates that contemporary practical philosophies give priority to the question of formal "justice" (as in Rawls) or to the "good life" (Aristotle's *eu bios*). Taylor puts forth an ethics within a strategic horizon (toward good), of strong evaluation and oriented toward the modern concept of the "good life," which "motivates" the self in order to retrieve, affirming its own forgotten identity, an identity which is sought out of its oldest and most antique sources.⁸⁸ For Habermas, this is not the intent of a moral philosophy. In addition, such an ethic does not possess the criteria that would allow it to judge the morality of its own life world and, least of all, to establish a dialogue between the morality of the *ethos* of different cultures. Neither can aesthetics serve as a therapy that motivates authentic ethics, a path attempted by Adorno without any success.

d) We need to take the last two steps. In the first, it is a question of carrying out, if it were possible, the critique already performed many years ago to

the pretensions of every ontological ethics.⁸⁹ I would like to denominate *principium oppressionis* that pronouncement in which the Other is considered as oppressed "in" the Totality, as a "functional part" (and not as subject), *whose different interests are negated in the "system."*⁹⁰ It is a matter of the theme of alienation⁹¹ itself (the reification of the Other).

In every life world, communication community, or ethics oriented to ends (ontological horizon with virtues and values), there is always an Other who is *oppressed*, negated. The oppressed is justified by the good, the end (the *telos*), virtues, values as the non-existing, or at least as the not-yet seen, not-discovered, hidden. More than twenty years ago, I wrote:

To see, to comprehend, to know, to calculate, to think, the *noëin* or the *gnosis* [today I would say: to argue] are supreme modes of being human in the Totality.⁹² Such is perfection for Plato and Aristotle, and equally the *authentic* for Heidegger [for Taylor also?]. In this case *authenticity* does not have any ethical life whatsoever, since the Totality itself, being identity, grounds the intra-world or ontological morality, itself amoral, non-ethical; or ontological ethics as ontology of the Totality. Properly, there is no ontological good or evil. There is only a fundamental structure tragically unmovable [the ethos of our culture] to which we can approach through a certain type of *gnosis* [or aesthetics] (*authenticity*, *Eigentlichkeit*). The foundation is *as it is* and nothing else."⁹³

In a world, in a culture (because all cultures are ethnocentric⁹⁴), in an ethos, in a *real* communication community, negation *a priori* of an Other never stops. In slavery, the slave was not "human" for Aristotle; in feudalism, the serf was not *simpliciter*, part of the *civitas* for Thomas of Aquinas; the wage-earner (who sells his labor) was not the owner of the fruit of his/her labor for Adam Smith (and this because of a second "state of nature,"⁹⁵ superior to the primitive state of nature); in machismo, women are sexual objects, obedient housewives; in ecologically predatory cultures, future generations also do not have rights. All of these Others, invisible in every Totality, life world, or given *ethos* (also the "central" modern ethos that Taylor analyzes), negate the Other without "ethical conscience;" By necessity,⁹⁶ the *telos* or good of a culture, of a Totality, cannot be the last foundation of the morality of our acts. It will only be "for now," while the negated Other is not discovered in this type of system.⁹⁷

It is in this context that the Philosophy of Liberation attempted to overcome the incommensurable relativity of the given systems, and attempted a formal-historical transcendentalism that skirts the difficulties of the communitarians, without falling into relativism. The imperative is: "Liberate⁹⁸ the person unworthily treated in the oppressed Other!" This *principium oppressionis* is absolute, it holds for *every* existential or functional system,⁹⁹ and it is always concrete, not abstract.¹⁰⁰ The negated Other is discovered *from the concrete ethos*, from

the Hegelian *Sittlichkeit*, the Heideggerian world, the daily life of Taylor. The "slave" cannot be discovered as a transcendental, abstract, or universal negated person. The Philosophy of Liberation attempts to describe the logic of a Totality as a totalization (an ontology of the "closed society" as is Popper's), and to describe the logic from which the discovery of the Other as oppressed is possible (the logic of alterity).

Aristotle's Hellenic heroes hunted slaves with "tranquil," "good" conscience, just as the hero of modern authenticity conquered the Amerindian, enslaved Africa, exploited Asia—everything justified by the "good" and the "hypergood," just as Hegel said of the English *gentleman*:

The English become the missionaries of civilization in the entire world.¹⁰¹ Hegel justified colonialism (negation of the peripheral Other) with complete authentic consciousness. Here is the ambiguity of *every ontological ethics*—inevitably also true with Taylor—criticized for a long time by the Philosophy of Liberation!

e) The second step that we should take consists in beginning a critique of the universal morality or the pragmatic formalism of Habermas, where Taylor's¹⁰² formulation of the "recognition" of differences¹⁰³ will be of use, in yet another problematic context, (which we have already presented in the first version of my work *Toward an Ethics of Latin American Liberation* of 1970; since Levinas anticipated it explicitly). Now it is necessary to refer, after the linguistic turn, or out of the pragmatic paradigm, to the *principium exclusionis*: the Other as the "affected" in the exteriority,¹⁰⁴ as the excluded "of" the Totality, or alterity (the Other as nothing¹⁰⁵). As with Hegel, Heidegger, or Taylor, we depart from the factual, concrete situation, of a world or present, given, *Sittlichkeit*. The empirical is not abandoned ideally or transcendently (as Habermas does from an "ideal speech situation," or as Apel does in a "transcendental pragmatics," i.e., ideal communication community); instead the horizon of the system is "perforated" ("transcended"¹⁰⁶) in search of the excluded Other.

The problem is enunciated in the following manner: the fundamental distinction for Habermas between "morality" (universal) and "ethics" (concrete),¹⁰⁷ although it refers to Kant, still tends to discover the real conditions in the problem of the application of principles of universality, thanks to the consensual community:

What in a moral sense is justified, every rational being must be able to will.... Discourse ethics replaces the Kantian categorical imperative by a procedure of moral argumentation. Its ["D"] principle postulates, only those norms may claim to be *valid* that could meet with the consent of *all affected* in their role as participants in a practical discourse.¹⁰⁸

Which is mediated by the procedure (U):

For a norm to be valid, the foreseeable consequences and side effects of its general observance for the satisfaction of each person's particular interests must be without coercion acceptable *to all*.¹⁰⁹

To which Apel adds a "principle of formal complementarity (C)," which helps in the "realization of the conditions of the application of (U), taking into account the situational and contingent conditions."¹¹⁰ The minimal real conditions are: the survival of the real communication community, the participation of all possibly affected. But, when taking into account what we could call the *principium exclusionis*, the "all the possibly affected" becomes ethically problematic. In fact, all the affected can never become real participants:

There will always be excluded-affected from and by every possible real communication community.

Which confronts us with a contradiction: a) although all the affected always have the right (implicitly at least) to participate in the real communication community, b) there are always excluded-affected; that is to say, it is factually impossible that there be none.¹¹¹

This places the problem of validity, of the morality of the agreement (*Verständigung*), in a new perspective. Every agreement is not only provisional and falsifiable, but also ethically defective (has an "originary" defect). "Procedurally," the first question that should be asked by the "participants" in a real communication community is: Whom could we have left "out"—without recognition—and this "excluded"?

Furthermore, since at this level no one can be excluded, it is necessary to recognize transcendently or ideally each "participant" as a distinct person; the Other of everything else, the principle of every possibility of "dissent" (and origin of a new discourse). This respect and recognition at the transcendental or ideal is the point of departure that allows the Other "participation" in the community into which she has factually irrupted as a *new* Other.¹¹² Respect and recognition of the Other, ideally or factually, is the ethical moment (and as such ethical and rational) *par excellence*. This is what is presupposed in every "explication". (epistemological) or "assent" (argumentative) by and to the argumentation of the Other. For to "respect" and to "recognize" the new Other (as a subject of "dissent" of a "new Other," distinct¹¹³) is the ethical act or the practical rationale *kath'exokhén*, since it is the "giving place to the Other" so that she may intervene/participate in the argumentation as an equal, with rights.

The essential difference between discourse ethics, which finds itself practically in the position of the "inapplicability" (*Nichtanwendbarkeit*) of fundamental moral norms in exceptional situations, and the Philosophy of Liberation, is located precisely at that boundary moment in which which discourse ethics discovers its own limit(s):

Revolutions—writes Albrecht Wellmer—against unjust claims should be considered as morally *exceptional* situations; and in such a manner that the foundations of a reciprocity morally understood have been abolished, because moral duties of one side can no longer have correspondence with the moral pretensions of the other side.¹¹⁴

These limit situations are precisely the matter of greatest concern for the Philosophy of Liberation (wars, revolutions, the process of women's liberation, of the oppressed races, of popular cultures, of the majorities without rights in the periphery or the colonial world that by definition find themselves in a structure of oppression). The concrete principle of "Liberate *hic et nunc* the oppressed!" or "Make the affected-excluded participate!" demands procedural realization, but not properly an "application" of the transcendental in the empirical.¹¹⁵ What are "exceptional situations"¹¹⁶ of application for discourse ethics are normal situations of determination for the Philosophy of Liberation. With reason Levinas begins his work *Totality and Infinity* with the expression:

The state of war suspends morality; it diverss the eternal institutions and obligations of their eternity and rescinds ad interim the unconditional imperatives.¹¹⁷

In this case, for the impoverished world periphery (inheritor of modern, ethically irrational colonialism), for woman (always within a machist system of violation), for the oppressed races (such as the Jews in Hitler's Germany and African slaves in the United States, or apartheid in South Africa), for the minorities, such as the Palestinians in Israel, or the great majorities, such as the wage-earners in capitalism, for all of them the "exceptional case" prevents the "application" of transcendental moral norms in their concrete cases. Of what good is such a morality?¹¹⁸

7.3 Conclusions

We may conclude that in a certain manner the ontological critique of Hegel (Taylor) against Kantian formalism (Habermas, Apel) is repeated once again, an issue which is at the very origin of the Philosophy of Liberation itself.¹¹⁹ It is obvious that between the real Hegel and us there mediates a century and a half of history; there we find the old Schelling, Marx, Levinas, and many others. The debate, thus, is located between 1) a "formal morality," 2) a "concrete ethical life," and 3) a *tertium quid* not considered in the Euro-North American debate, and much less if it is placed in the perspective of an impoverished, exploited, and excluded world periphery (the absent affected), that is to say, from a "world ethical alterity" that attempts to supersede formal "morality" (Kantian or profoundly "transformed" by Apel and Habermas) as the substantive "ethical life" (Hegelian, Heideggerian, or the communitarian of a Taylor or MacIntyre). "Alterity" allows the superseding of the formal universality of

morality, on the one hand, and, on the other, the concrete substantivity of an ethical life, from a horizon of a new problematic. The position of the Philosophy of Liberation would appear to be in agreement with Taylor's call for a reclaiming of the positivity of a life world oriented toward the good¹²⁰ (against Habermas and Apel); but, at the same time, discovers "formal" criteria that allow the critique of every ontological, systematic totality or *Sittlichkeit* (against Taylor), from the ethical principle of the alterity of the Other (beyond Habermas and Apel).

The project of liberation of *the oppressed* and the *excluded* opens up from the exteriority of the Other, beyond (*jenseits*) every given situation. The construction of alternatives, even if it were also necessary (which cannot be discarded *a priori*), the construction of an historical utopia or a new society, is not only a product of the "application" of a model, or ideal, or transcendental situation. Not is it the authentic accomplishment of a given life world (be this the modern world or another), much less when thought of as the defectless movement of a necessary logic (such as Hegel's teleology or historical reason or *standard* Marxism or Stalinism), but a responsible "dis-covering" as an answer to the "interpellation" of the Other, in a prudent and slow movement (where the theory of a real communication community, which arrives rationally and procedurally at consensus with intersubjective validity, helps us better understand the elective development of a *frónesis* of liberation), where the philosopher (as the "organic intellectual" of Gramsci) ought to take seriously (with Taylor) the ethical motivations of the liberation of the oppressed and excluded.

Notes

1. With this I intend to indicate that Taylor enters into a "positive" description of the "substantive" moments of the modern self and does not remain at a purely formal level. I have, for a period of ten years, attempted to describe in a "positive" manner the Latin American experience, having for a method the hermeneutic of Ricoeurian inspiration; I abandoned the project for methodological reasons (concerning the critique of this position, see my work "Más allá del "culturalismo" in *Historia de la Iglesia en América Latina*, I/1 (Salamanca: Sígueme, 1983), pp. 34ff; consult also Hans Schelkshorn, *Ethik der Befreiung* (Freiburg: Herder, 1992) the chapter titled "Fakzitar versus Universalismus der Moderne" (pp. 48ff) and the following sections.
2. In Schelkshorn's work, "Neudefinition des weltgeschichtlichen Ortes Lateinamerikas" in *Ethik der Befreiung*, pp. 58ff, and the following paragraphs.
3. Charles Taylor *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989) 103. Taylor tells us in the preface: "In part, it was because of the very ambitious nature of the enterprise, which is an attempt to articulate and write a history of modern identity" (ix).
4. Although Taylor also counts with the help of writers, theologians and other thinkers of the human sciences.

5. Alphonse de Waehlens use to say to us that “philosophy thinks the non-philosophical” (*La Philosophie et les expériences naturelles* [La Haya: Nijhoff, 1961]).
6. In my work, originally written in 1961, but published much later, *El Humanismo Helénico*, I attempted an interpretation of the Semitic *ethos* in opposition to the Greek (also presented in another work, *El Humanismo Semita*, where we studied the thesis formulated above).
7. Modern Western culture has attempted and achieved a “kidnapping” of classical Greek culture as an exclusive European moment. There is no clear consciousness of the fact that classical Greece, and even the Byzantium, is as much Arab-Muslim as it is Latin-Christian. In *Eurocentrism*, the Egyptian thinker Samir Amin shows this correctly. Aristotle was studied in Baghdad (the very same bombarded Baghdad of the 20th century!) during the 10th century, A.C., when he was still unknown in the Latin-Christian world.
8. For Taylor the “self” is as much the *ego* as it is the *person* (see the entire first section, “Agency and the Self”, in *Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 13-114 and *Sources of the Self*, 25-51).
9. *Book of the Dead* in Papyrus Nu (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1960), p. 372. The translation has been slightly altered: “mariner” is not consonant with the boats that were common for the Nile. This text, present in the Christian New Testament (but absent in the Old Testament), speaks to us of the presence of Egyptian culture in the consciousness of the founder of Christianity, who suffered political exile in this country during his infancy.
10. This mythological belief is of Bantu origin, from Black Africa, the south of the first cataract of the Nile.
11. The *próton kakón* of Plotinus's *Enneads*. See my work on “Plotino, genio reflexivo indoeuropeo” in *El dualismo de la antropología de la cristiandad*, (Buenos Aires: Guadalupe, 1974) Chap. IV, pp. 137ff.
12. The soul is one for the whole universe; un-created, immortal, divine. It has nothing to do with the personal “self.” Instead, the “dead” or the “flesh” of the Egyptian is personal-individual and pretends perpetuation as such. It is the proto-anthropology of modernity. With respect to this, see my *El dualismo en la antropología de la Cristiandad*, Chap. II “Antropología cristiana y humanismo helénico,” § 4, “La resurrección como doctrina del hombre.”
13. Hammurabi, King of Babylon, *The Hammurabi Code and The Sinaitic Legislation* trans. Chilperic Edwards (Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1971), pp. 73-74.
14. See my *El dualismo en la antropología de la cristiandad*, el § sign 85, “Hacia el descubrimiento de la persona come exterioridad” (pp. 279ff).
15. Paul Ricoeur, *The Symbolism of Evil* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967).
16. Taylor's works about Hegel, in my opinion, influenced him to give central importance to the concept of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*), a “substantive” and not merely “formal” position with respect to ethical questions. But, at the same time, he absorbed from Hegel's eurocentrism. See my recent work *The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of the Other and the Myth of Modernity* (New York: Continuum, 1995) with respect to the theme of “eurocentrism”. Hegel wrote, “Europe is absolutely the center and end [*das Zentrum und das Ende*] of universal history” (*Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, Zweiter Entwurf* (1830), in *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. J. Hoffmeister, (Hamburg: 1955), p. 235). In my Frankfurt conferences, we could all “laugh” (more than two hundred participants in all) at the quasi-comical

- ingenuities of Hegel's racist and superficial eurocentrism (with respect to the interpretation of Europe in universal history, and the denial of historicity to Latin America and Africa, and the localization of Asia in an "infantile" stage, merely preparatory to European history). The commentators (Taylor himself, *Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, 3ff) never refer to Hegelian eurocentric contempt for Latin America, Africa, and Asia, not to his way of justifying European colonialist violence: "Against the absolute right that it [the dominating people of the world: *Weltbeherrschende*] has because of its function as the bearer of the development of the world spirit, the spirit of *other peoples does not have any right [rechtlos]" (Enzyklopädie, § 347).*
17. This is the central thesis of my *Towards the Origin of the Myth of Modernity*.
 18. That is to say, the extremely elaborate characterization by Taylor, as well as that of Weber (which inspired Habermas), or Lyotard's critique—all of them ignore an essential determination, a "source of the self": European "centrality," since the late-18th century, in the planetary human experience that we denominate world history (*wordly, mondiale, and not universal, universelle*).
 19. See the third part of my work on 1492 *The Invention of the Americas*, "From the Invention to the Discovery of the Other."
 20. We have to distinguish between "concrete universality" (imposed by modern European domination in the world system, in the periphery) and the "worldliness" or totality of concretely existing cultures. A "trans-modern" project proposes a new "worldliness" as a full realization of future humanity, where all cultures (not only the modern European one) can affirm their alterity, and not merely a process of modernization where the Euro-North American culture is imposed upon them or its abstraction (an "abstract" modernity that is no more than very same Euro-North American modernity from which some disturbing characteristics are taken away).
 21. See "Toward a phenomenology of the Ego Conquiro," Chap. 1 of *The Invention of the Americas*.
 22. See Tzvetan Todorov's work, *Nous et les autres* (Paris: Seuil, 1989).
 23. Jürgen Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action. Volume One: Reason and the Rationalization of Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983) p. 157.
 24. *Ibid.*, p. 157.
 25. Here Weber opens the door to our suspicion of it being an ungrounded, partial, provincial, and eurocentric representation.
 26. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Son, 1958), p. 13; German: "Vorbemerkung" in *Die protestantische Ethik, I* (Hamburg: Siebenstern Taschenbuch Verlag, 1973), p. 9 (emphasis added). The question is not, as Habermas thinks, whether that universality has universal validity "for us" (Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action. Volume One*, p. 179).
 27. This is the not yet invalidated thesis of Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System* (New York: Academic Press, 1974). See my work *The Invention of the Americas*, the third lecture.
 28. The conquest of Africa was organized during the Berlin Congress of 1884-85, a century ago.
 29. Taylor, *Source of the Self* 207. That "for a time" is the last 500 years, and not only until the middle of the 20th century, but until the Gulf War and its consequences in 1993. Perhaps Taylor thinks that the United States replaces Europe in world hegemony, but philosophically and culturally they are the "same."

30. Taylor's text indicates that colonialism or the domination of the periphery has only a posterior and quantitative effect: "This has obviously had tremendous importance for the *spread of these practices...*": but not as preceding moments to its constitution. Taylor does not understand the eurocentric sense of his following phrases; in any event, he recognizes this "won't figure in my analysis, except at the boundaries." Like Ginés de Sepúlveda, Taylor believes that the domination of Europe over its periphery "has had a crucial effect on the development of both [!] European and non-European societies, and the prestige [!] of the self-understandings associated with them has a fateful importance for the development of cultures." In such a manner all of this process has to be interpreted culturally. And what if the development of modern violence and barbarism, such as slavery and colonialism, were the structural underdevelopment of all the cultures of the South? This type of conclusion is fruit of a method that only takes into account philosophical "ideas." Would this be that which some call *idealism*?
31. Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987), p. 301.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 302, 309. Taylor extends modernity a bit longer: "The whole modern era from the seventeenth century is frequently seen as the time frame of decline" *The Ethics of Authenticity* (p. 1).
33. Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, p. 367.
34. The *entwicklungsideologische Fehlschluss*.
35. The universities, the publication of books, etc. presuppose economic development and the accumulation of wealth acquired in the peripheral colonial world, which are the material conditions of what Gramsci will call the "material apparatus" of culture (and philosophy, of course).
36. Born in Veracruz (México); died in Bologna (Italy); he was exiled from Mexico in 1767, by Borbonian expulsion. He knew in addition to Castilian, Greek, Latin, Nahuatl (Aztec), and Mexteco, which he practiced during his youth. He was professor in the college of San Gregorio de México, in Puebla, Valladolid (later Morelia), and Guadalajara. He carried out a systematic critique of Buffon and De Pauw, defending the dignity of the American indian: "We were born of Spanish parents and we have no consanguinous affinity with the Indians, not can we from their misery expect any reward. And thus with no other motive than love for truth and jealousy for humanity, we are made to abandon our own cause in order to defend *another's* [the Other] with less danger of erring" (*Disertaciones*, V, "Constitución física y moral de los mexicanos," in the work by Clavigero, *Historia antigua de México*, which he had to translate from Castilian to Italian in order to be able to edit it in 1780 in Italy, Porrúa, [ed. Mexico 1976, pp. 503-24]). In addition Clavigero wrote a *Historia de la Antigua y Baja California*, edited in Venice, 1789. See also from Clavigero, *Antología*, introduction by Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán (Mexico: Sep-Setentas, 1976). Another work that should be considered is Miguel León Portilla's *Recordación de Francisco Xavier Clavigero. Su Vida y su Obra* (Mexico: Porrúa, 1974). Clavigero chooses, then, a historical, hermeneutical-political line in order to reconstruct regional Mexican particularity against Spain, and because of that he writes a pamphlet on the Virgin of Gaudalupe (flag of Mexican political emancipation from Spain), and indicates a path of the construction of that which is Mexican against the abstract universality of the European *Enlightenment*, a true "positive philosophy," just as that of Schelling's *History of Mythology*. See my work *Método para una filosofía de la*

liberación. Superación analéctica de la dialéctica hegeliana (Salamanca: Síguemen, 1974): "Del Hegel definitivo al viejo Schelling," pp. 116ff. In fact, Clavigero wrote about these themes at least fifteen years before Schelling wrote *The Positivity of the Christian Religion* (1795-96).

37. This is the sense of Augusto Salazar Bondy's hypothesis in his work *Existe una filosofía en nuestra América?* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1967).
38. See Tzvetan Todorov's work, *Nous et les autres* (Paris: Seuil, 1989).
39. Let us consider only a quantitative factor, which really does not indicate much; but gives us an idea of the proportions. Today, in 1993, Western Europe, the United States, and Canada (that is the *exclusive* cultural and philosophical horizon of Taylor's work) constitute only 15 percent of humanity (750 million among the 5,000 million). Can the remaining 85 percent feel itself expressed in this type of historical analysis? Has not Euro-North American philosophy itself become provincial and regional?
40. It is for that reason that the entire work of Clavigero in the 18th century, like the Philosophy of Liberation in the 20th century, departs from the affirmation of an "identity" (of the negated Aztec world by the conquest of modern man: Hernán Cortés) that is the negation of the modern "identity" as "modernization"; modernization which presupposes the negation of the peripheral culture as Other, distinct, as an in-itself. The peripheral "self" departs from the negativity of the "hegemonic modern self." The entire analysis by Taylor is only the first chapter of the "making of the Modern Identity." It is evident that there the entire irrational violence of the modern self, with respect to the periphery, violence that is justified in the name of civilization, does not make its appearance; and this is what I call the "myth of modernity". This "myth" has neither been discovered nor analyzed. See *The Invention of the Americas*, fifth lecture, "Critique to the Myth of Modernity," which is as much a critique of Lyotard as it is of Habermas, or Taylor, from the debate of Valladolid in 1550, where Ginés de Sepúlveda (a modern argumentative rationalist), who opposed Bartolomé de las Casas (the founder of an explicit philosophical "counter-discourse" in the *world-modernity* as a project of a "trans-modernity" from its "other face," from the Other, Latin America, Africa, and Asia, women oppressed by machismo, the destroyed Land as a capitalist "means of production").
41. In the way that the "other face" of the moon although never seen is always a constitutive part of the terrestrial satellite.
42. In the work by Schelkshorn already cited (pp. 69ff), especially "Die Ethizität der menschlichen Existenz," pp. 97ff.
43. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy*, p. 142. *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (Kp V), A 54; see also *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (GMS), BA 52; in my *Para una de-structión de la historia de la ética* (Mendoza: Sei y Tiempo, 1972) pp. 100ff.
44. *KpV*; A 197.
45. This "application" (the application of the "moral conscience" of the ancients) is a function of the "practical faculty of judgment," *praktische Urteilskraft* (see *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, B xxvi, A xxiv). See the excellent work by Albrecht Wellmer, "Derecho natural y razón practica" in Karl-Otto Apel, Adela Cortina, et. al. eds., *Ética comunicativa y Democracia* (Barcelona: Editorial Critica, 1991), pp. 154-169, although Wellmer is partial in his critique of Marx.
46. Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 96; GMS, BA 66-67.
47. *KpV*, A 155-56.

48. *Ibid.*, A 155.
49. *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 96. *GMS*, BA 66.
50. About the "community" in Kant as "kingdom of God," as *corpus mysticum*, as "kingdom of ends," see my work *Para una de-structión de la historia de la ética*, pp. 108ff.
51. Jürgen Habermas "Was Heißt Universalpragmatik?" in *Vorstudien und Ergänzungen* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1984), p. 407; English version "What Is Universal Pragmatics?" in *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, pp. 1-68.
52. Apel, "Notwendigkeit, Schwierigkeit und Möglichkeit einer philosophischen Begründung der Ethik im Zeitalter der Wissenschaft" in P. Kanellou-poulos, ed., *Festschrift für K. Tsatos* (Athens: Nomikai Ekdoseis Ant., 1980) p. 264. Emphasis added.
53. Not inasmuch as it is empirical or a life world, but as the "ethical" (the practical as person-to-person relationship), the moral is made universal and the life world is *ethical*.
54. For instance, in Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) 369ff.
55. See the exposition of this theme in my *Método para una filosofía de la liberación*, pp. 64ff.
56. G. W. F. Hegel, in *Frühe Schriften, Theorie Werkausgabe*, Vol. I (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971), p. 326. This is from the fragment titled *The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate*.
57. *Ibid.*
58. Aristotle's *deutera physis*, of virtue as *héxis* (*Nicomedeian Ethics* II. 1: 1103 to 18ff; specially II, 6, 1106 b 36ff). The Hegelian *Sittlichkeit* is precisely this "second nature" (*als eine zweite Natur*) (*Rechtsphilosophie*, § 151; in *Theorie Werkausgabe*, vol. 7, p. 301).
59. Hegel *The Spirit of Christianity*, p. 327.
60. In *Grundkonzept zum Geist des Christentums*, in *Frühe Schriften*, Vol. 1, p. 312. This formula of *lebendige Gemeinschaft* is used by Karl Marx in his *religion exam*; "lebendige Gemeinschaft" (*WEB*, EB 1, p. 600), and is found in the radical foundation of his communitarian paradigm. See my essay presented in the seminar on Marx in the context of the debate with K-O. Apel, 1992. at the Goethe University in Frankfurt: "Relektüre Marx aus Lateinamerika," Chap. 3 "Toward a North-South Dialogue."
61. Everything else is known, just as much as the descriptions of *Sittlichkeit* in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (VI), in the *Encyclopedia* (§§ 513ff), in the *Philosophy of Right* (§§ 142ff); etc.
62. I wrote in 1969: "Kant himself. when writing his *Critique of Practical Reason*, had no full self-consciousness that his thinking, in the end, was the thinking of the Prussian bourgeois ethos of the XVIII century. Could he have written, if he had had such a critical consciousness, that neither in the world, nor outside the world in general, is it possible to think anything that may be considered as good without restriction, but perhaps only as much as a good will [*ein guter Wille*] [*Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, I, BA 1]? Does this position betray the tragic ethic of a chained Prometheus or a blinded Oedipus? Would these principles accept the Tlacaélel ethic, the foundation of the Aztec empire? Is not this principle only understandable within the Western Christian tradition, and especially of Spencer's pietism?" (*Para una de-structión de la historia de la ética*, p. 9.

63. Kant himself recognizes that “the question how the law in itself and immediately be the foundation for the determination of the will (which is, however, the essence of every morality) constitutes an irresolvable problem [*unauf lösliches*] for human reason, and identical to the knowing of how a free will is possible” (*KpV*, A 128). For the problem of *Anwendung* see *KpV*, A 119ff.
64. Hegel considers this theme when commenting on and criticizing Fichte in his *Difference of the Philosophical Systems of Fichte and Schelling* (1801): “Reason and freedom as being reasonable are no more reason or freedom if not being oneself.... If the community of reasonable entities were essentially limitation of true freedom, this would be in itself and for itself tyranny.... In the living relation there is no freedom if only in the measure in which this implies the possibility to be subsumed and to enter in relationship with others...” (*Frühe Schriften in Theorie Werkausgabe*, Vol. 2 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970), pp. 82-83). On the contrary, in “the community under the domination of understanding [*unter der Herrschaft des Verstandes*] (83-84), the “rational” or living moment is the superation of that limiting determination as domination.
65. My *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, § 1, Vol. 1, pp. 33, deals with “La fundamentación subjetiva de la moral moderna,” which is superseded by “La comprensión existencial” (Vol. 2, pp. 38ff).
66. This “com-prehension” is a “possibility-for-Being” (*Seinkönnen*), a *telos* in the Aristotelian sense. See my work *Para una de-structión de la historia de la ética*, § 3, “El ser como eudaimonia” (pp. 32ff).
67. *Nicomachen Ethics*, II, 6; 11-6, b 36. My citation is an explicitly Heideggerian translation-interpretation.
68. One would have to note there how I carried out this Heideggerian reconstructive labor; and it was there, also, that I discovered the limits of the early and late Heidegger.
69. See my critique of axiology in *Para una de-structión de la historia de la ética*, IV, pp. 126ff. I think that Heidegger, in *Breif über Humanismus* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1947), proleptically made a critique of that “style,” I have in Louvain studied the Husserl archives, thanks to van Breda, and I have read the axiological manuscripts of Husserl (see *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, Vol. 1, “Manuscritos éticos de E. Husserl que se encuentran en el Husserl-Archiv de Lovaina,” pp. 193ff), from the F 120 (1890ff) until de B 116 (1931-34). Kant was the ethicist most studied by Husserl, and in particular *The Critique of Practical Reason*. The critiques to Scheler's formalism (*Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Werkethik*, Bern: Francke, 1954) and of Nicolai Hartmann (*Ethik*, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1962) have been studied in the above cited work. Because of its “style,” Taylor's philosophical position owes tremendously to the axiologists, but just the same to the ontological philosophers like Aristotle, Sartre, or Heidegger, from Anglo-Saxon philosophy attentive to the linguistic turn. It is something like “axiological-existential-linguistic.”
70. Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 521.
71. Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity*, 1ff.
72. *Ibid.*, 25.
73. *Ibid.*, 29ff. In a Philosophy of Liberation this “being true with oneself” (solipsistic, atomistic moment) becomes the “being true with an oppressed and excluded people” (communitarian, historical moment) of the hegemonic identity (as with Clavigero, for instance).
74. Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity*, 33.

75. See George H. Mead, *Mind, self and Society* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 67ff.
76. Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity*, 45.
77. *Ibid.*, 50. We will see that the oppressed within systems and the excluded ones in communication communities are already politically, economically, sexually, and pedagogically oppressed, and, therefore, by definition, not recognized. It is not that their non-recognition is cause of their oppression; on the contrary, the non-recognition is a condition of the "reproduction" of the system of their oppression and exclusion.
78. Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity*, 66. In the Philosophy of Liberation all of these themes are not affirmed from the standpoint of atomistic "authenticity" but from the right to the dignity of the persons excluded from the community of humanity, of the oppressed classes, of women oppressed by machismo, of the child without rights before adult society, and so on. It is something deeper, greater in number, more ethically relevant, without taking importance from that "authenticity" described by Taylor in the central and hegemonic countries.
79. Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity*, I 17 .
80. *Ibid.*, 50.
81. Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition" in Amy Gutmann, et. al., eds. *Multiculturalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
82. "It is held that since 1492, Europe has projected an image of such people as somehow inferior, uncivilized, and through the force of conquest have often been able to impose this image on the conquered" (*Ibid.*, 26). This is new! But from this hypothesis all of his work *Sources of the Self* is in question.
83. Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition" 37. This is precisely the theme formulated by the Philosophy of Liberation more than twenty years ago: the significant other is the Indian (15 million killed in the first holocaust of modernity), the African slaves (thirteen million enslaved from the 16th to the 19th century, the second holocaust), the exploited peripheral nations of colonialism and neocolonialism (more than 80 percent of humanity), the working classes dominated under a salary-and-production-of-surplus regime (even in the countries of central capitalism), etc. The Philosophy of Liberation, since 1970, expressly formulates the "encounter," the "dialogue" with the *significant other* (see *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, Chap. 6, "El Método de la ética": "El rostro del pobre indio dominado, del mestizo oprimido, del pueblo latinoamericano es el tema de la filosofía latinoamericana. Este pensar analectico [to be read: dialogico], porque parte de la revelación del Otro y piensa su palabra, es la filosofía latinoamericana, única y nueva, la primera realmente posmoderna [I would write in 1970 much earlier than Derrida y Lyotard. Today I would have to write: transmodern and superseder of modernity]" (Vol. 11, p. 162).
84. Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition" 72-73. It is interesting that almost five centuries after Bartolomé de las Casas, a philosopher from the Anglo-Saxon world repeats his words, which *in a unique manner*, written in Guatemala in 1536, showed that the American Indians had dignity and deserved to be treated in the *only manner* humanly possible, with rational arguments and not with the violence of the war (from the conquest of Mexico in 1519, until the Gulf War in 1992, that still continues in 1993). See my work *The Invention of the Americas*, lecture 5.3.
85. Charles Taylor, "Language and Society", in Axel Honneth and Hans Jonas, eds., *Communicative Action: Essays on Jürgen Habermas's The Theory of Communicative*

- Action* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1988), pp. 23-35, and "Le juste et le bien" in *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*. 93, 1 (1988), 33-56.
86. See especially Jürgen Habermas, *Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993), pp. 124 ff, and 69-76; and *Faktizität und Geltung* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1992), pp. 640ff.
87. In Habermas, *Faktizität und Geltung*, see concerning Taylor pages 226, 313, 325, and 607, but on themes that do not strictly touch on what we are debating.
88. Habermas, *Justification and Application*, pp. 69-76. The critique of A. MacIntyre, especially his work *Whose Justice? Which Rationality* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1988), also applies to Taylor (pp. 96-r05). Although in the case of MacIntyre, I think that Habermas does not adequately formulate the question when he negates the necessity, in all dialogue of cultures, to attain a *sufficient* knowledge of the other tradition, or of the culture of the Other in order to be able to "argue rationally." In other words, to be able to belong to both in some way. For Habermas this is not possible, except as a dialogue as an application of one's own point of view through the process of convergence of perspectives. I ask: To what extent does Habermas (as every philosopher of the periphery, who experiences Europe as something his/her own because of a long learning processes of the "other culture," as is the case with Latin Americans) have experience of "other" worlds? Can one think philosophically the problem of intercultural dialogue without having for years lived in *other cultures*? Eurocentrism is here a bad adviser.
89. This was, precisely, the moment of birth of the Philosophy of Liberation. See the move from Chap. 2 to 3 in my work *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana* (Vol. I, pp. 97ff); or *Método para una filosofía de la liberación*, Chap. 4, pp. 115ff, "Superación europea de la dialectica hegeliana." See especially "La no-eticidad de la autenticidad gnostica del heroe tragico y moderno" (*Para una ética de la* Vol. 2, pp. 22ff).
90. Niklas Luhmann, in his consideration of the subject as functional part of the system, correctly describes that it is not "persons" but "functions," autopoietic and self-referential moments (see Niklas Luhmann, *Soziale Systeme* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988), pp. 30ff, "System und Funktion"). A. Gehlen had seen this clearly with his definition of "institution": "Man kann anthropologisch den Begriff der *Persönlichkeit* nur im engsten Zusammenhang mit dem der Institutionen denken"; *Anthropologische Forschung* (Hamburg: Rowohlts, 1961), p. 72.
91. See in *Philosophy of Liberation*, "Alienation," 2.5.
92. Here Totality can be as much the Heideggerian world, as the modern world (Taylor), or even still the "real communication community" (that of the effective *arguers*).
93. *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, Vol. 2, pp. 14-15. It is impossible here to repeat what has been written, given that it would require going through the concept of evil in Kant (a question which has not being brought up by any of his modern readers, and I am referring to the "root of Evil" [*die Wurzel des Bösen*]), in *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, I,III, B 32-39, a 29-36, until note 1), Schelling, Hegel (i.e., *Rechtsphilosophie*, § 139; *Enzyklopädie*, § 570), Nietzsche, etc.
94. But modern European culture is the only one that has been ethnocentric and *center of world history*, in such a way that it has constituted all other cultures as a *dominated* periphery an *a-symmetrical* situation unique in history.
95. "In the primitive and rough state of society, which precedes the accumulation of capital... the integral product of work belongs to the worker.... Though as

- soon as capital is accumulated in the power of determined persons, some of them attempt to regularly hire them in given work to laborious peoples, providing them with raw materials, food, in order to extract a benefit" (Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, I, Chap. V). In a similar manner Rawls, in his second principle, defines "the *social and economic inequalities* will have to be arranged in such a way..." (*A Theory of Justice*, II, 11). The question is: How can there be "social and economic inequalities" in a "state of nature" or in an "original situation"? How do such inequalities exist from the very point of departure?
96. "By necessity" until consciousness of the negated other is finally acquired, and this may take centuries or millennia, centuries: How many millennia did humanity practice slavery until it finally acquired consciousness of its immorality in the 19th century? How many millennia did machismo oppress woman until the 20th century? *Before the historical* discovery of the negated Other, "by historical necessity," factually, the *telos*, the good, virtue, and values of the prevailing system justify, implicitly or explicitly, the oppression of the other.
 97. "System" in a broad sense, and not exactly in the sense of Luhmann.
 98. Liberation is the action, the practical process through which the non-free becomes a factual subject of freedom.
 99. It is evident that it becomes operative when "it has discovered" a new type of oppressed Other, for example, when certain religious communities struggle against slavery, or capitalism discovers that a free wage earner is more efficient than a slave. From the moment of "discovery" of the Other as *oppressed*, the dominator becomes factually culpable.
 100. That is to say, the "slave" is a "concrete manner" of negating human dignity discovered by certain Protestant communities or by capitalism; the "wage-earner" is another "concrete manner" of the negation of human dignity discovered by Karl Marx, etc.
 101. "Missionarien der Zivilisation in der ganze Welt" (Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, IV, 3, 3, in *Theorie Werkausgabe*, Vol. 12 [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970], p. 538). The term missionaries gives a sacred character, and "civilization" evidently refers to modern Europe—but with that he leaves clear his ingenious and provincial eurocentrism.
 102. See Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition", 1992 b, p. 65. "One of the key authors in this transition is undoubtedly the late Franz Fanon, whose influential *Le Damnés de la Terre* argued that the major weapon of the colonizers was the imposition of their image of the colonized on the subjugated people." Fanon is a Latin American, from Martinica, from whose work the Philosophy of Liberation makes its departure in the decade of the sixties.
 103. Which I have termed "dis-tinction" in order not to be confused with Derrida's "di-fference" (see my *Philosophy of Liberation*, 2.4.3; "Dis-tinction" is not "Difference" [2.2.5]). For all of these themes see Hans Schelkshorn's *Ethik der Befreiung*.
 104. See *Philosophy of Liberation*, 2.4, "Exteriority."
 105. "Nothingness," as much in Levinas as in Marx (see on this question my work *El último Marx* (1863-1882), Chap. 10).
 106. It is not the *a priori* "transcendentality" but the "transcendentality" of the one who goes "beyond" the horizon of the world, of the system, of the "good" of our culture.
 107. In our works we have given to ethics (for example, in *Toward an Ethics of Latin American Liberation*) the sense of the formal critical, while to "morality" (for example, in bourgeois morality, as in Marx) the sense of Hegelian *Sittlichkeit*. Simple clarification is in order to prevent confusions.

108. Jürgen Habermas, *Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991), p. 12; for the English version see “Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel's Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics?” in Jürgen Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, p. 197. Translation slightly altered.
109. Habermas, *Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik*, p. 12.
110. “Limites de la ética discursiva?” in A. Cortina, *Razón comunicativa y responsabilidad solidaria* (Salamanca: Ediciones Sígueme, 1985), p. 261. On the theme of “application” (*Anwendung*), see Matthias Ketmer, “Drei Dilemmata angewandter Ethik” in Katl-Otto Apel and Matthias Ketmer, eds. *Zur Anwendung der Diskursethik in Politik, Recht und Wissenschaft* (Frankfurt: Suhrkampverlag, 1992), pp. 9-27; K-O Apel, “Diskursethik vor der Problematik von Recht und Politik” in *ibid.*, pp. 29-60.
111. We can not problematize here the entire theme of how, “procedurally,” one assumes consciousness of the oppressed and excluded. The description of the *logic* of the “oppression” and “exclusion” of systems is the first theme of the Philosophy of Liberation, in order to allow for the “assuming-of-conscience” (*conscientization*). To this assuming-of-conscience there follows the “organization” of the oppressed and excluded. Only when, because of a *process of liberation*, which has to describe and justify ethically the affected-oppressed and excluded of the real communication community at the hands of the *hegemonic* participants, have “negotiating power” or “effective participation” (that is reached at the end of a process of liberation), then, and only then, can the exercise of ethical-argumentative reason be began on an equal footing. The affected-dominated and excluded are not minorities: they are the great majority of humanity. The richer 20 percent of humanity consumes 82 percent of said goods; see *Human Development Report 1992*, United Nations Program (UNDP) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). The excluded and affected are the 50 percent of humanity (women); the 40 percent (children); the 20 percent of the poor in rich countries; the discriminated races; etc. That is to say, if we were to make a mathematical calculation, not even 5 percent of actual humanity would belong to the real hegemonic communication community (which is the real “participant”): men, white, adults, western culture, “central” capitalism, the power groups (economic, political, intellectual), etc. But is this not also the case with Taylor's modern *Self* (male, white, adult)?
112. See my lecture “La razón del Otro. La *interpelación* como acto de habla” in Raúl Fornet-Betancourt, ed., *Diskusrethik oder Befreiungsethik?*, pp. 106ff, “La Exterioridad y la comunidad ideal de comunicación.”
113. To recognize in the slave a person, hidden in slavery as a non-person and, therefore, *excluded-not-affected* (for in order to be affected it is necessary to be-a-person; and it would be good to problematize this from an ecological philosophy) is the *radical* point of departure of every possible argumentation with the *ancient* slave and the *new* Other, now recognized as a “participant”.
114. “Derecho natural y razón practica” in Apel, et. al. eds; *Etica Comunicativa y Democracia* p. 29. Apel himself acknowledges that “under finite conditions, the principle of development of morality never [*niemals*] can reach-inasmuch as it is a principle of historically responsible application of ethics-moral reality, because a new rational beginning of *all man* cannot be obtained on the grounds of the ideal validity of the discursive principle” (*Diskurs und Verantwortung*, p. 465).
115. The Philosophy of Liberation departs from the situation of the negated dignity of the person within a system or a Totality (for instance, when Freud says that “the masculine comprehends the subject, the activity and the possession of the

phallus; the feminine integrates the object and passivity" (*Die infantile Genitalorganisation*, in *Studiensausgabe* Vol. 1 [Frankfurt: Fischer, 1970], p. 241); or when Marx says "the real subsumption of living labor under capital is developed in all of those forms that produced surplus value..." a definition of alienation of the person in the Totality capital (*Manuscripts of 61-63, MEGA II*, 3, p. 2190 [Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1982]). Methodologically, the Philosophy of Liberation moves upwards from the "functional part" (the women-object in the machist system, wage labor in capitalism, etc.) toward the foundation, the ground, the being, the *telos* of the system (see *Philosophy of Liberation*, 5.2), and from that horizon the causes of "oppression" are explained. To negate this negation of the oppressed person is the "just," "good" praxis. This is the theme of Vol. II of *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, already cited. In volumes III (erotics), IV (politics), and V (anti-fetishism), the analytical path of the ethics of liberation is traversed at different levels.

116. If to situations of impossible "direct" application we add the restriction that every application is "partial" and "approximate," and that it cannot be realized in situations of revolution, war, or lack of rights, it can be discovered that it can never be applied in concrete and really. This is what we call the "inapplicability" (*Nichtanwendbarkeit*) of this transcendental ethic. Furthermore, the ideal situations (Habermas) are "models of impossibility" (as has been shown by Franz Hinkelammert in *Critica de la razón utópica*) that cannot appropriately "ground" but only "delimit" the horizon of the "possible" (by the "absolute empirical principle of impossibility," as when Einstein proposed an impossible model [the *perpetuum mobile*] that does not "ground" but opens the field of "possible" or "empirical" mechanics. This is treated at greater length in a work under preparation.
117. Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, p. 21; French: *Totalité et Infini. Essai sur l'extériorité* (La Haye: Nijhoff, 1968), p. x.
118. With reason H. Schelkshorn objects that the Philosophy of Liberation, which is so "strong," is for "exceptional" situations (that are "normal" in today's world), but is less operative in normal situations. It would not be hard to show that the normal situations are constructed on the foundations of institutions of permanent oppression (for example, in capitalism the wage earners who produce surplus value) or of exclusion (for example, the *pauper*, the unemployed or marginal).
119. See *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, Vol. 1, Chap. I, pp. 35ff.
120. In our case these may be trans-systematic "projects of liberation" (see my *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, Vol. II, "El bien ético como justicia," pp. 34ff). The practical relation with the- Other we call "love-of-justice" (thus bringing together the rectitude of justice and the "love" of the good).