

RESPONSE BY ENRIQUE DUSSEL: WORLD  
SYSTEM, POLITICS, AND THE ECONOMICS OF  
LIBERATION PHILOSOPHY

The "fact" that they have reacted to my questions in a critical manner—Karl-Otto Apel orally, in March of 1991, in Mexico, and later in writing,<sup>1</sup> and Paul Ricoeur,<sup>2</sup> at the program of North-South dialogues in Naples—is a novelty. Both are estimable colleagues, and to have accepted a dialogue places them as pioneers in this type of philosophical exchange. Ricoeur's answer was an improvised and extemporaneous reaction to one of my essays (written in Spanish and read in French), where I presented some points on which dialogue might be possible.<sup>3</sup> Apel's answer, on the other hand, was the fruit of a dialogue that began in November 1989<sup>4</sup> continued in Mexico in 1991,<sup>5</sup> and was followed up in August of 1993 in Moscow (at the XIX World Congress of Philosophy), and in September of the same year in Sao Leopoldo (Brazil). That is to say, Apel's text, the first part of a much longer work, is the fruit of a specific type of reflection, on the taking charge of a new problematic by the philosopher from Frankfurt, which in turn puts in evidence his "openness" and creative capacity. The North has not paid any attention to the philosophies of the South when the former departs from its own problematics, from its own reality, and in this Apel is ahead of his own time. Those "excluded" from the hegemonic philosophical communication community are sensible to this "gesture" of acknowledgment, essential for the consecration of the "new philosophical age."

Both texts, Apel's and Ricoeur's, find themselves within the environment of a certain euphoria of the North before the sudden defeat of real socialism in the East. Both pretend to "teach" us people from the South not to *repeat* the political-economic errors already superseded by European history. It would thus appear that I situate myself outside the prevailing "good philosophical tone," when I *return* to superseded, anachronistic, questions. Both authors, however, ought to grow accustomed to the fact that our "reasons" do not form part of the events that lead to the failure of the East, but instead that these reasons, which have existed for five centuries, have their origin in the South. But European

and North American philosophers are not used to "listening" to these reasons beyond, or outside, their own horizon of problems. These reasons suggests the benefit of a "provocation," as Apel recognizes.

Ricoeur makes an initial declaration: "I will underscore above all the reasons that demand that I declare that I have no shame of Europe."<sup>6</sup> Apel, on the other hand) with greater experience in the North-South dialogue, writes:

In my case, these preparations were indispensable because I was forced to disclose gradually the different levels that Dussel's intervention formulated against my own European understanding, specifically West German, and, in the last instance, against my transcendental pragmatic conceptual understanding.<sup>7</sup>

Apel is much more aware of "eurocentrism" than the majority of Euro-North American philosophers, and this awareness is noticeable in his text.

I ought to explain that with both philosophers I have used the strategy of the respectful dialogue "with... and beyond":<sup>8</sup> "with Apel... beyond Apel,"<sup>9</sup> "with Ricoeur... beyond Ricoeur."

### *10.1 The World System<sup>10</sup> As A Philosophical Problem*

Ricoeur states clearly that

the Latin American philosophies of liberation depart from a precise situation of economic and political pressure which puts them in direct confrontation with the United States. *However, in Europe* our experience of totalitarianism, in its double aspects, nazism and Stalinism [is our point of departure] It is therefore necessary to consider different thematics, and different original situations. We can talk, with this intention, of a *plurality of histories of liberation*. The question now resides in knowing what it is that each can teach the other, and what one can learn from the other.... If I insist on *the heterogeneity of the histories of liberation*, it is in order to prepare our spirits to admit not only that these experiences are diverse, but perhaps even incommunicable. Furthermore, the self-understanding that is attributed to the one, *creates obstacles to the full comprehension of the other*, and a certain controversy with respect to this intention is perhaps insurmountable for us as well.<sup>11</sup>

That is, for Ricoeur the "precise Latin American situation of economic and political pressure" is an "original situation" different from European totalitarianism; they are "incommunicable," or do not "communicate." The contradiction North-South does not touch Europe, and its "totalitarianisms" (Nazi or Stalinist), and, therefore, the Latin American philosophies of liberation have a certain incommensurability with the European ones, even with the recent East European experiences of emancipation. This hermeneutics of incommunicable histories leaves the dominator from the metropolitan center in total innocence with respect to all the cruelties committed in the periphery during the whole

of modernity.<sup>12</sup> A French person will recognize that French colonists in Algeria have something to do with France; but just as well the Boers of South Africa with Holland, the *conquistadors* of Mexico and Peru with Spain, those of Brazil with Portugal, the Dutch merchants in Indonesia with the Low Countries, those of Haiti or Martinique (of Franz Fanon) with France, and the Company of the East Indies with England. Not to acknowledge that modernity begins with the expansion and “centrality” of Europe in the history that is thus inaugurated as “worldly”—before civilizations were regional, provincial—is to forget the violence of the European colonization. The colonial period is followed by the neocolonial (for Latin America approximately since 1810). Later on, the modernizing and industrializing processes initiated by the peripheral “populisms” (Vargas in Brazil since 1930, Perón in Argentina, Nasser in Egypt, Sukarno in Indonesia, the Congress Party in India) pretended, thanks to a protectionist nationalist capitalism, to emancipate themselves from the empire. German nazism and Italian fascism in the “center” and the populisms of the periphery are similar economic-political phenomena of the world system inaugurated centuries before by the so-called discovery of America by Europe (for the Amerindians it was the invasion of the continent<sup>13</sup>). Nazism, fascism, and populism attempted “national” liberation within a capitalist regime (for instance, Germany or Italy within the center; Brazil and Egypt within the periphery).

In turn, although in the 16th century Russia was not yet properly a periphery of Europe,<sup>14</sup> the processes of modernization introduced by Peter the First (taking capitalism as his model) and later by Lenin (taking socialism as the model) ought to be interpreted as projects of nations “external” to central Europe (industrialized since the 18th century), and which needed to overcome their backwardness through industrialization and development.

It would be long, but not difficult, to show, within the modern world system (that is, since the 15th century), that the populisms (from 1930 to 1955 as a pretension to emancipation by a peripheral capitalism exploited by post-colonial or colonial Europe)<sup>15</sup> have a lot to do with nazism and fascism (capitalist nationalism without “sufficient” colonies in Africa or Asia, in competition with other capitalist nations of the North, which had preceded them in the process of industrialization, such as England and France). Stalinism plays a very well-defined role, if Russia's historical semi-peripheral position is taken into account (it having arrived relatively late to the process of industrialization). Since 1945 (Yalta), the United States has exercised hegemony over world capitalism (including Western Europe and Japan), and therefore the so-called dictatorial regimes of National Security in Latin America (since 1964) have a lot to do with North American domination, not without European complicity, over the world periphery in the era of the transnationalization of capitalism's productivity. If the world hermeneutical “key” of these phenomena is not discovered,

and thus is declared incommunicable, then the relation between Nazi or Fascist nationalism (capitalist nationalism in the center), populisms (competing capitalist nationalisms in the South) —which Ricoeur does not treat—Stalinism (a model of development of a European semi-periphery), and the Latin American regimes of national security (military totalitarianism which makes viable a dependent capitalism<sup>17</sup>) cannot be seen or surveyed. All of these are different actors, in different scenarios, of a great common horizon: the world system, within the space of the global market, geopolitically dominated by certain states<sup>18</sup> (today, the United States, Western Europe, and Japan), and under the complete military hegemony of the United States.<sup>19</sup>

*Schema 1. Some Political Regimes*

Forms of Democracy	Capitalism		Socialism	
	Center	Periphery A	Center	Periphery B
Modernizing development without formal democracy	1933 Nazism and European fascism	1930 + Populisms	1917 USSR	1959 Cuba
With formal democracy, B	1945 + Postwar European democracies	1955 + Developmentalism		
Dictatorships		1964 + Dictatorships of national security	1989	
----- Neoliberal formal democracies, B	1983 + Alfonso (Ar.) Sarny (Br.)			

Clarifications of Schema 1: A, only Latin America; B, electoral democracies with competitive plurality of various political parties; + approximate dates, or only noting the beginning of processes<sup>20</sup>

The world system is a philosophical problem because Europe confused the evolution of subjectivity within the limits of Europe not only with universality (as much in the morality of Kantian autonomy, as in the supposed post-conventional stage<sup>21</sup>), but also with globality. That is, what Europe came to realize as a center of a world-system (using not only economic wealth, but cultural information) was attributed to its autonomous creativity as a self-enclosed, self-referential, autopoietic system. It not only elevated as universality its European particularity (speaking like Hegel), but it also pretended that the work of humanity "in it" (Europe) was the product of its autonomy and exclusive creativity. Modernity, and modern philosophy with it, never abandoned its eurocentric

dream. It never defined itself as a hegemonic center where information is controlled, where the learning of humanity is processed, and where political institutions (political, economic, ideological, etc.) which permit greater global accumulation of wealth in the center (economic, cultural, and all other types of wealth), thus "systematically" exploiting the periphery, are created. Is there a relationship between the wealth of the few and the poverty of the majority? Are these worlds that cannot communicate? Is there no commensurability that may be applied with the goal of establishing poverty as a *factum*, or point of departure, for an ethics, for a practical philosophy? This is exactly the origin of Liberation Philosophy, since it is necessary to co-relate "worlds" apparently uncommunicable in order to obtain a world vision, universal, in relationship to humanity.

The *ego cogito* (of Descartes from 1636) was not the original philosophical expression of modernity. Before, the *ego conquiro* ("I conquer," in first place with Hernán Cortés in 1519 in Mexico) had to undergo the practical experience of Europe's "centrality," of its superiority, which was also expressed in the philosophical debate of Valladolid in 1550. Ginés de Sepúlveda, the modern philosopher par excellence, justified the superiority and violence of modern subjectivity over other cultures. Bartolomé de las Casas, on the other hand, begins the counter-discourse of modernity, not from Europe, but instead from the world periphery. The path had been opened and it would have to be traversed.<sup>22</sup> A complete philosophical historical reconstruction of modernity is necessary,<sup>23</sup> from a world and non-eurocentric perspective. It is for this reason that we indicated that the world system is a philosophical problem, because in it, on the threshold of the 21st century, is deployed the minimal concrete and historical horizon of contemporary philosophical reflection.

### *10.2 The Pretension to Globality and the Fundamental Insight into the Question of Dependence*

Liberation philosophy, in my case, has undergone six moments, which I would like to indicate in order to proceed with this critical reflection. In the first moment (1) the Latin American philosophy student of the 1950s was eurocentric without knowing it. He travelled to Europe in order to be filled with the "wisdom" that he had already studied in books in Argentina. When he arrived in Europe (2), to first Spain (later France and Germany, going through Israel; ten years without returning to Latin America, from 1957 to 1967), he understood immediately place that he was "not European." He discovered himself as Latin American when he left the boat that had brought him from Buenos Aires. This promptly inaugurated the third moment (3) under the perennial question, What does it mean to be a Latin American? And later, how can this *being* Latin American be clarified positively and narratively (historically-philosophically)?

He tried for more than ten years to answer this question (1957-70). The fourth moment (4) constituted the discovery that *being* is intrinsically dominated, and therefore that it was an ethical responsibility to engage in its liberation and to develop theoretically this theme from its negated positivity. This was the first stage of Liberation Philosophy (from 1970 to 1989, approximately). The fifth moment (5) consisted in discovering Europe and the United States (named originally as North Atlantic and later as center) as eurocentric. Although this was suspected since the beginning (1957),<sup>24</sup> now, for the first time, it assumed the clarity of a philosophical theme (ontological, inasmuch as it is a "closure" of the modern world; ethical, insofar as it is always negated with "innocent conscience"). The first work where this theme began to be developed is *The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of "the Other" and the Myth of Modernity* (university lectures presented in Frankfurt, 1992).<sup>25</sup> It is thus that the sixth moment opens up (6): If Europe is eurocentric without consciousness of being such, this means it has become a provincial, regional culture with a "false consciousness" of its universality. We, from the "periphery," conscious of being thus, and therefore in a situation in which we situate the United States and Western Europe as center, open ourselves for the first time to a globality [*mundialidad*] where Europe and the United States and the peripheral cultures develop a unique *world* history on our small planet. World, global, planetary are the new horizons, which stand beyond eurocentrism and the regionalism of the liberation philosophy of one periphery (only of the periphery or of Latin America<sup>26</sup>). This sixth moment, then, is a "de-centering" of Liberation Philosophy's reflection from the world periphery (from the oppressed woman, the repressed son or daughter, the discriminated races) in order to place itself now in a world "perspective" (a "point of view," a lens, like a microscope or telescope). The "liberation" of which Liberation Philosophy will speak, from this sixth moment on, is no longer solely *Latin American* because of its pretension, but worldly, global; and as philosophy, it is now *philosophy as such, without anything else*, albeit always from the oppressed, the excluded, the discriminated; that is, from the *dis-tinción* (which others have called *differance*), the "exteriority," the "alterity" of the Other .

It is for this reason that Karl-Otto Apel, at the beginning of his critical article already cited,<sup>27</sup> fundamentally believes that he is developing a critique of the so-called Theory of dependence,<sup>28</sup> in whose scientific pretensions (as a "great theory of the left") Apel decipheres as liberation philosophy's point of departure. I have in an *explicit* way denied the theory of dependence's status as a theory, since I demonstrated that it was never formulated as a theory (it does not even use coherent Marxist categories), and, therefore, could not be falsified:

We can now affirm that in the debate concerning the question of dependence, Marx was frequently notorious in his absence.<sup>29</sup>

No Latin American “dependency” authors explained this phenomenon as a “transfer of value” according to the “law of value”—in Marx's sense—and therefore there never was such a theory. I speak of a concept of dependency, but not of a theory, and of Marx himself.

This means Liberation Philosophy departs from a fact whose “explanation” can be discussed. It concerns a massive fact: the misery of the periphery, which is what Franz Hinkelammert recently called the “goal of knowledge” (*Erkenntnisziel*)<sup>30</sup> of the question of dependency. The contemporary name of the question is the world system, with center and periphery (a *differentiated* periphery, for instance, in the petroleum-producing Arab countries, the “Asian Tigers,” Brazil, and Mexico, but, in the last instance, diverse types of periphery). What is relevant is that Apel writes now:

*The number one problem of world politics and of its corresponding macroethics of the co-responsibility of all human being is and will be the question of the relationship between the First and the Third Worlds due to the insoluble connection between the ecological crisis and the socio-economic crisis.*<sup>31</sup>

This was the point of departure for Liberation Philosophy since the seventies, given that for it, it was an empirical *factum*. It was always sufficient for us that it was an *empirical* fact, and that nothing more than this was needed, since this was an essential moment of non-philosophical *reality*, from out of which, as peripheral humanity, we ought to philosophize.<sup>32</sup>

With the world system as reality, the planetary claim of Liberation Philosophy departs from an irrefutable fact: the misery of the majority of humanity, 500 years after the “birth” of modernity. Ricoeur himself ends his intervention noting:

I accept in good will that these figures of alterity, and of the other, may come to be summarized and to culminate in the moment of alterity in which the other *is the poor*.<sup>33</sup>

These agreements, between and with Apel and Ricoeur, serve as an introduction to my approach to the background question.

### *10.3 Why Marx? Toward a Philosophical Economics*

We have had recourse to Marx in our critical texts in the dialogues with Apel and Ricoeur,<sup>34</sup> not because of some fashion—because Marx is no longer in fashion—nor because of some superficial rebelliousness, nor because of a simple anachronism or stubborn dogmatism. On the contrary, up until 1975 we numbered ourselves among the thinkers with strong objections against marxism. The matter concerns the philosophical exigency of coherence with the “reality” of the periphery of world capitalism, such as that of Latin America, which sinks further and further into misery, as both Apel and Ricoeur recognize. A

"transcendental pragmatics" is pertinent in a world where science is a relevant phenomenon.<sup>35</sup> A "hermeneutics of the text" is essential to a culture of "cults," of literates, of "readers."<sup>36</sup> I do not deny this. I approve of it. I study it and take advantage of it. Apel and Ricoeur recognize that in the peripheral world of capitalism, 80 percent of humanity, according to the United Nations report on development of 1992, consume 18 percent of the income of the planet. In these immense majorities (I do not speak of minorities) poverty, misery, and the simple reproduction of *life* are perennial problems to be resolved each morning, each day. This brutal, real, irrefutable empirical fact demands not only a transcendental pragmatics, not only a hermeneutics, but *also* an economics (not an "economy": *économie* or *Wirtschaftswissenschaft*, but *économique* or *Oekonomik*), as a fundamental moment (transcendental for Apel, universal for Habermas, ontological for Ricoeur, "metaphysique" for Levinas). It is thus that the objections of Apel and Ricoeur, both of whom depart from the *a priori* that Liberation Philosophy studies Marx because he is Marxist, are erroneous presuppositions and occlude why today we must again have recourse to Marx. The "poor" (lacking institutional and historical means for the reproduction of life<sup>37</sup>) of the planet *demand* (theoretical and ethical demand) a philosophical "economics." That is all!

It is for this reason that we cannot accept the critiques of leninism and *standard* marxism, which Ricoeur as well as Apel impute to me without sufficiently knowing my work. Now I would like to examine Apel's critiques<sup>38</sup> and, in passing, those of Ricoeur .

When Apel and Ricoeur speak of Marxism, they refer to a *standard* marxism I have criticized since the beginning.<sup>39</sup> I thus reject conclusively the expression *Marxist* liberation philosophy. Analogously, when I write that "*Capital* is an ethics," I am not referring to the pedestrian notion of ethics. In my case ethics is a critique of bourgeois morality (and of the bourgeois political economy since Smith) from the exteriority of the Other (from the living labor as person, as poor, as creative source of value).<sup>40</sup>

The question could be formulated thus: Is an analogous reconstruction of Marx's *economics*, such as is being carried out in *pragmatics* (Apel, Habermas, Searle, et al.), possible?

For Liberation Philosophy, Marx is a classic of "economic philosophy" (in addition to being an economist for the economists), a philosophy which was developed as a critique of a capitalist life world whose fundamental structure (and not only as a system) are obstacles to the reproduction of human life. Therefore, Marx departs in his critique from an ideal *community* of producers, out of which a real alienated *society* of producers (capital) is deconstructed. For Marx the essential is not the relation subject of labor/object-nature, but the relation subject/subject as a practical, ethical relationship. His *economics* is a critique from the perspective of an "ideal community" of a capitalist "real society." I have already cited in other works this text:



Production by an isolated individual *outside society*.... is as much of an absurdity as is the *development of language without individuals living together and talking to each other*.<sup>41</sup>

Just as the speech act presupposes a community, so does production. This is the meaning of the “three stages” in the *Grundrisse*.<sup>42</sup> In an analogous manner, paragraph 4 of Chap. 1 of vol. 1 of *Capital* (1873), the last text to be published during Marx's life time, concerns four examples located in two levels (an ideal or transcendental, and another empirical or historical):


As the foregoing analysis has already demonstrated, this fetishism of the world of commodities arises from the *peculiar social [gesellschaftlichen]* character of the labour which produces them.<sup>43</sup>

The “social” character is not communitarian. Marx departs in his analysis from the critique of solipsism in the Robinson Crusoe mythologies (Schema 2, level A1);<sup>44</sup> that is, it is a question of a critique to an “ideal model,” just as presupposed by Smith, which in some way anticipates the “original position” of Rawls (but in the economy). In the second place, Marx goes deeply into “medieval Europe, shrouded in darkness”<sup>45</sup> (Schema 2, level B1). The Robinsonian utopias are ideal models. The Middle Ages are an empirical reality. In the third place, Marx writes:

Let us finally imagine, for a change, an association of free men, working with the means of production held in common, and expending their many different forms of labour-power in full self-awareness as one single social labour force.<sup>46</sup>

We find ourselves at the level of abstraction of a model, and not of a “future historical moment” (level A2, and not level B3). This is the “third stage” of the *Grundrisse*.

### Schema 1. Five Levels in Marx's Critique of Economy



In the same manner, in the classical text on the “realm of freedom,” from *Manuscript I*, of Vol. III, from 1865, we ought to locate ourselves at level A2:

The realm of freedom in fact begins there where work is not determined by necessity or special considerations of efficacy; with respect to the nature of the matter, therefore, it is beyond the sphere of actual material production.<sup>47</sup>

This "realm of freedom," this ideal model (level A2), is transcendental (beyond *all possible modes of production* = empirically or factually impossible). But, in addition, Marx represents it as a community which is presupposed in every act of effective and rational work:

Freedom in this territory can only consist in that socialized men, *associated producers*, rationally regulate their material exchange with nature, and bring it under their communitarian [*gemeinschaftliche*] control.... But this always remains the realm of necessity. Beyond [*Jenseits*] this begins the development of human capacities... the true realm of freedom... The reduction of the work day is its basic condition.<sup>48</sup>

That is to say, the "perfect community of producers," with zero labor time, is a model, a regulative idea, a type of ideal (level A2), from which real or empirical societies are criticized: capitalism (level B2). In a similar manner, that expression from the *Critique of the Gotha Program*, "From each according to their capacities, to each according to their needs!"<sup>49</sup> is precisely a "model of impossibility."<sup>50</sup> In other words, it is impossible to accomplish this perfectly at an empirical level even with the mediation of institutions (level B3); and if there were such institutions, it would be just as impossible to attempt a numerical approximation between "capacity" for and obligation to work and "necessity" and right to consumption, because we would need an infinite intelligence with infinite speed (Popper) in order to apply this ratio. We would need Kant's *intellectus archetypus*. This also means that a *perfect* capacity for planning would be presupposed, which is impossible, and this is precisely "the transcendental illusion" (to use Hinkelammert's expression). To attempt as factually "possible" (level B3) an "impossible" model (level A2) is precisely to fall into this illusion, into which the great majority of *standard* marxisms fell, and into which stalinism also plunged dogmatically (this, incidently, has nothing to do with Liberation Philosophy, which nevertheless can sustain the opinion that in peripheral capitalism there is no possibility for self-centered and sustainable-from-within and without anything else- development). Marx himself denied resolutely that he had proposed a philosophy of history which demanded the necessary fulfillment of determined stages that could be anticipated. Only one example will suffice. Mikhailovskii in 1877 criticized Marx because of his historical-philosophical vision, to which Marx replied:

He absolutely insists on transforming my historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into an *historic-philosophical theory* of the general course *fatally imposed on all peoples, whatever the historical circumstances in which they find themselves placed*, in order to arrive ultimately at this eco-

conomic formation which assures the greatest expansion of productive forces of social labour, as well as the most complete development of man. But I beg his pardon. That is to do me both too much honour and too much discredit.... By studying each of these developments separately, and then comparing them, one may easily discover the key to this phenomenon. But success will never come with the master-key of a general historico-philosophical theory, whose supreme virtue consists in being supra-historical.<sup>51</sup>

This vision of Marx is unknown by the *standard* marxism of Apel and Ricoeur, but it is precisely the one I have been able to obtain from re-reading Marx as a classic critic of capitalism, so necessary for a liberation philosophy of the poor and excluded yet nevertheless affected.

We now may consider a second level of Apel's critique, namely, the question of value.<sup>52</sup> Apel cites a few lines which are the beginning (*Anfang*, in the Hegelian sense) of the critique of the entire system of categories of bourgeois political economy:<sup>53</sup>

In order to extract value out of the consumption of a commodity, our friend the money-owner must be lucky enough to find within the sphere of circulation, on the market, a commodity whose use-value possesses the peculiar property of being a *source* of value, whose actual consumption is therefore itself an objectification of labour, hence a *creation* of value.<sup>54</sup>

The possessor of money confronts the possessor of labor, establishing thus a practical relation (level B2 from Schema 2) between two persons who are not members of a prior "community" (level B1) but instead are isolated, free, and equal.<sup>55</sup> This confrontation, this face-to-face (think of Levinas and Liberation Philosophy), between him who has money and the "poor," refers us back to the original situation from which Marx departs (and not in John Rawls's sense), which is and real historical and stands in opposition to Adam Smith, when he writes:

[1] In that early and rude state of society which precedes both the accumulation of stock and the appropriation of land.... In this state of things, the whole produce of labour belongs to the labourer.... [2] As soon as stock has accumulated in the hands of particular persons, some of them will naturally employ it in setting industrious people to work.<sup>56</sup> Every man is rich or *poor* according to the degree in which he can afford to enjoy the necessaries, conveniences, and amusements of human life. But after the division of labour has once thoroughly taken place, it is but a very small part of these with which a man's labour can supply him. The greater part of them he must derive from the labour of other people, and he must be rich or *poor* according to the quantity of that labour which he can command, or which he can afford to purchase.<sup>57</sup>

This theme is treated by Marx, systematically, on at least six other occasions.<sup>58</sup> He deals with the conditions of possibility of "contract,"<sup>59</sup> and describes the

confrontation between two owners as unequal, non-equivalent. the product of a previous violent history.<sup>60</sup> This is a matter of the practical question of interpersonal relationships,<sup>61</sup> from which Marx describes the alienated situation of labor. It is for this reason that he placed so much importance on the presuppositions of contract:

The separation between the property [of money] and [the property of] labor appears as the necessary law of exchange between capital and labor. As *non-capital, non-objectified labor*, the capacity for labor appears: 1) Negatively, as non-raw material, non-instrument of work.... This complete denudation is the possibility of private labor of all objectivity.<sup>62</sup> The capacity for labor as *absolute poverty [als die absolute Armuth]*.... 2) Positively.... Work not as an object, but as activity, as living source of value [*als lebendige Quelle des Werths*].... Work, which on the one hand is absolute poverty as object, on the other is the universal possibility of wealth as subject and activity.<sup>63</sup>

The poor (for Smith and Marx), before being wage-earners and subsumed by Capitalism, are the condition of the possibility of the existence of capitalism itself. Capital is, in the last instance, a "social (*gesellschaftliche*) relation (level B2), non-communitarian (level A2), justified by the legitimating model of capitalist political economy (level A1, which includes Rawls and, in part, Ricoeur and Apel, inasmuch as both are not critical of this model).

The practical "relation" between the owner of capital ("rich" for Smith) versus the owner of labor ("poor") is a quasi-natural relation for the philosophy articulated by capitalism; it is a *factum* of practical reason which is not questioned (and to which the "maximin" is applied). For Marx, instead, this relation is a fruit of the historical structures which determine it. The point of departure is not something natural. It is a *historical* point of arrival. For Latin America, a continent of "poor",<sup>64</sup> just as with Africa and Asia, this question is Central, essential. The "poverty" of our continents is not a point of departure (due to some uncongnizable self-incurred immaturity<sup>65</sup>), but the point of arrival of five centuries of European colonialism (within the world system, in which the United States is today hegemonic), of which Ricoeur, I think, should be ashamed (the holocaust of 15 million Amerindians, 1,3 million African slaves; Asians, objects of colonial wars, the Opium War, Algeria, South Africa). At the individual level the poor are "alienated" (subsumed) in capital as an instruments, as a mediation of the "valorization of value." At the world level, the poor are the exploited periphery. There are diverse ways of accumulating value (as surplus value or as transference of value from the periphery to the center). This "social relationship" (level B2; non-communitarian, level A2) in the interpersonal is the relation that informs the relations between isolated individuals in daily life (*Lebenswelt*) prior to any Habermasian system. Marx locates himself at the constitutive level of the life world (*Lebenswelt*) itself, which explains his relevance as a philosopher of daily life in capitalism. To conclude

this point, I would like to repeat that for Marx is the person-to-person relationship is essential:

The possession of nature is always already mediated through his existence as a member of a *community*... a relationship to other human beings, which conditions his relation to nature.<sup>66</sup>

Now we can touch on the objection of Apel, who departs from Marx's following text:

As use-values, commodities differ above all in quality, while as exchange-values they can only differ in quantity, and therefore do not contain an atom of use-value."<sup>67</sup>


The page which contains this text of 1872-73, included in the second edition of *Capital*, Vol. 1, indicates a new distinction which had not been made clear in the first edition of 1867. In the first edition Marx had written, in note 9:

In the following, when we use the word *value* without any other additional determination, we refer always to *exchange-value*.<sup>68</sup>

In the second edition, note 9 is eliminated, and in its place the distinction between "value" and "exchange-value" is made for the first time in the theoretical life of Marx:

The progress of the investigation will lead us back to exchange-value as the necessary mode of expression, or form of appearance, of value. For the present, however, we must consider the nature of value independently of its form of appearance [*Erscheinungsform*].<sup>69</sup>

This means that in 1873 Marx distinguishes the following levels:  
*Schema 3. Labor as the "Substance"<sup>70</sup> of Value*



In this schema, concrete labor (or nature) produces (a) *materialiter (stofflich)*, material use value (1), as the concrete quality of a thing. Abstract human labor (already in the *social* relationship of capital, without a presupposed community) produces (b), as a *formaliter* objectification, value as such (2). The *potentialiter* value appears (c) as exchange value (3) in exchange, in the actual relation with another person (person-to-person relationship, intersubjectivity) in the market, as a moment of the commodity in the interpersonal relationship. In this case, the exchange value is a "mode of expression" or "form of appearance" (*Erscheinung*= phenomenon for Kant or Hegel) of value in the "world"<sup>71</sup> of commodities."

The commodity, as a thing (*Sache*), has a quality (the relation between the material constitution of a thing and human necessity, namely, utility, (*Nützlichkeit*). Otherwise, this quality is a *material* determination (*determinatio* for Spinoza) of a thing as an object of need.

Value (2), as objectification (*vergegenständlichung*) of labor (*potentia*), can appear or present itself in the actual *social* relationship between persons (*formaliter*), in the world of commodities, as an exchange value (3). However, in a *strict sense*, these levels cannot be confused. Therefore it is necessary to distinguish the aspects: the exchange value (economic) does not have an atom (formally) of useful use value (materially).

But it is evident that value, as the formal objectification of abstract labor, has a material bearer (*materiellen oder stofflichen Träger*): in first place the thing, in second place the use value.<sup>72</sup> Without use value there is no commodity. But the material level of use value (as a thing) is not the formal level of exchange value (social, economic level). Hence the metaphor which has been used: exchange value does not have *formally* any atom of use value. Both levels are formally different.


In addition, Apel confuses the semantic content of "utility" (*Nützlichkeit*) in Marx with that of later commentators such as William Jevons, Karl Menger, Leon Waldras, or Eugen Bohm-Bawerk. For Marx utility is primarily (*materialiter*) established in the following sequence:

*Schema 4. Sequence from Labour to Consumption*



The later commentators reversed the sequence (pure *formaliter*):

*Schema 5. Sequence from Labour to Consumption*



W. Stanley Jevons, in *The Theory of Political Economy* (1871, four years after the first volume of *Capital*), writes:

The science of Political Economy rests upon a few notions of an apparently simple character. Utility, wealth, value, commodity, labour, land, capital, are the elements of the subject.... Repeated reflection has led me to the somewhat novel opinion, that value depends *entirely upon utility*: Prevailing opinions make labour rather than utility the origin of value; and there are those who distinctly assert that labour is the *cause* of value."<sup>74</sup>

The formation of value depends entirely on the "pleasure or pain,"<sup>75</sup> the "feel-

ing" of the buyer:<sup>76</sup> the greater the pleasure, the greater the utility, the greater the value, the greater the price (it is an increase in "demand"). It is thus that there is a "degree of utility" (*Nützlichkeitsgrad*)<sup>77</sup> which determines value. As can be seen, the categories depart from already given capital, from the market and the buyer. It is a tautology from the pre-existence of capital. The worker, the producer, has disappeared and only leaves a trace of itself as "human capital," as "wage" (a number among many: the person of the worker, the principally "affected" has been "excluded" from the community of economic decisions).

For Marx, on the contrary, utility is the use value of the product (a thing as such, before it becomes a commodity) of work for the *needs of the worker* (this is Adam Smith's first situation of a state of nature [AI], Schema 2). In this case utility is determined by the *anthropological* need of the worker, prior to capital. For Apel, as for Bohm-Bawerk, utility is that of the buyer,<sup>78</sup> and this is measured by the intensity of preference or desirability (*Wünschbarkeit*) of the buyer in the market. In this case utility is determined as a moment of capital: "from out of the market."

It is evident that for the Amerindian of the *encomienda* and the Black slave of the Ingenios, for the colonies in the Third World, for over-exploited workers (as shown by Mauro Marini in Latin America<sup>79</sup>), Marx has categories and perspectives which are far more relevant and pertinent to the development of an "economics" (ethical-philosophical economics) than do the commentators or the neo-liberals, who affirm as an empirical fact "the market's tendency to equilibrium" (Hayek). On the contrary, the market shows profound instabilities and lack of equilibrium, which become even more abysmal between the center and the periphery, and which the capitalist system can make only more acute and deeper.<sup>80</sup> Utility constituted from the desirability of the buyer is always in equilibrium or tends to it (in neo-liberal ideology), apparently. The ethical question begins when we formulate the massive fact of the "basic needs" of the miserable majorities of the planet who are not solvent, who cannot be part of any market.

#### *10.4 There is No Economics without Politics nor Politics without Economics*

With reason does Ricoeur insist that an economics is not possible without a politics. I have always held this to be a given.<sup>81</sup> But if in front of Apel, Habermas, Ricoeur, and other philosophers of the center I expound the importance of economics, it is because the hegemonic philosophies (phenomenology, analytical philosophy, hermeneutics, pragmatism, etc.) do not deal with economics.<sup>82</sup> What is the cause for this forgetfulness? In the center, Habermas expresses it explicitly:

In advanced capitalist countries the standard of living has, in any cases, risen to such an extent, at least among broad strata of the population, that the interest in the emancipation of society can no longer be articulated directly in *economic* terms. *Alienation* has been deprived of its palpable economic form as *misery*.... thus today Marx would have to abandon his hope that theory can become a material force, once it has taken hold of the masses.<sup>83</sup>

This is Apel's position as well. Ricoeur, in contrast, has other reasons. In our conversation at Chicago, prior to our dialogue in Naples, I asked him why he had not undertaken, as in hermeneutics, the "circuitous way" (*voie longue*) of an economics? To which he responded that economics is a difficult science, with its own presuppositions, and one to which he had not been able to dedicate a lot of time. I believe there is something else. Ricoeur has carried out a titanic work of interpretation of the "text." But to the reproduction of life, at its economic and productive levels, he has never dedicated an important work. In *Du text à l'action* it would appear that he is going to deal with the theme in a final reflection. He even makes a schema on ethics, politics and economics.<sup>84</sup> There he deals with the question in approximately the same terms as those of the critique, or warning, which he made to us in Naples:

This reduction of the political to the economical is responsible for the lack of interest, so accentuated in marxist thinkers, for the specific problems which are formulated with the exercise of power: a problem eminently political.<sup>85</sup>

That is, Ricoeur struggles against the economicism of *standard* marxism, and defends the importance of the political. I agree with Ricoeur's position. However, he does not answer my critique, namely, why Ricoeur has not developed an economics.

For Ricoeur, what pertains to economics is abstract, is a sub-system of the political (has he perhaps not fallen into a politicism?):

In a certain sense, the economic-social plan is an abstraction in the measure to which the economic life of a nation is incorporated in the political by the decisions taken by the state.<sup>86</sup>

Is there not a partial consideration of the economic in Ricoeur? Is there no need for a more precise reflection on the logic of human "life," the person-to-person relations at the level of the reproduction of history as life, of labor, the concrete economic structures as such, etc.?<sup>87</sup>

The same takes place in Habermas. At the beginning of *The Theory of Communicative Action*, he indicates why sociology<sup>88</sup> is of greater interest to his philosophical reflection than economics:

As political economy, economics still held fast at the start to the relation to society as a whole that is characteristic of crisis theories. It was concerned with questions of how the dynamic of the economic system affected the



orders through which society was normatively integrated. Economics as a specialized science has broken off that relation. Now it concerns itself with the economy as a subsystem of society and absolves itself from questions of legitimacy. From this perspective it can tailor problems of rationality to considerations of economic equilibrium and questions of rational choice.<sup>89</sup>

Exactly; political economy is what Marx called economics (*Oekonomik*); this was later transformed into the science of economics (*Wirtschaftswissenschaft*). What I am speaking of, since the beginning of the dialogue with Apel and Ricoeur, is that economics which has a relation to global society (*Lebenswelt* and system), but not just inasmuch as it is a theory of crisis, but also as the foundation for "everything pertaining to the economic": from an anthropology, and an ethics, to an ideal community of producers, level A2, which can criticize the factual society of the capitalist system (and equally, Stalinist real socialism).

In an Apelian manner, I have expressed it in the following manner, in the work "Toward a North-South Dialogue":

Who *works* can be led to recognize or be convinced through self-reflection that, as a producer, he or she necessarily has recognized an ethical norm. This ethical norm can be made explicit in the following manner: who *works* has already attested *in actu*, and with that has recognized that practical reason is responsible for human action; that is, that the claims to *justice* can be and ought to be satisfied through *acts-of-work*, which are not only technically adequate, but also practically *just*.

For Liberation philosophy, which begins with massive *misery* (a point of departure very different from of Habermas's, which is the late capitalism of a "minority" of humanity), it is essential to develop an economics which integrates ethics as a founding moment of its development—and not, as is the case with the "science of economics" (for example in Friedrich Hayek), for which the death of entire peoples who cannot compete in the world market is of no moral concern, and which leaves it entirely immune from any responsibility because marginality does not fall within the sphere of the "science of economics."

I accept Ricoeur's suggestions and warnings. In fact, I presupposed them, and I think that an economics without politics is irrational, a totalitarian economicism, unjustifiable for a liberation philosophy. But, at the same time, I am "warned" of a certain "politicism" in Habermas, Ricoeur, et al. This politicism is also frequent in Latin America, but for other reasons. It is thus that my insistence on the economic has two fronts: the European and the Latin American. In fact, during the phase of national security dictatorships (see Schema 1), a certain theory<sup>90</sup> for and consensus in favor of "democracy" gestated (sustained as much by the left, in crisis, as by the bourgeois, discarded by the military, since the neo-liberal and transnational project did not need an

alliance with the peripheral national bourgeois). Thus there emerges a strong current of theoretical reflection on democracy in Latin America,<sup>91</sup> but, in general, without links to an innovative economic project, since it continues to support the neo-liberal military project, which continues to increase the growing impoverishment of the majority. With the election of Alfonsín in Argentina in 1983 there begins a period of democracy in the eighties. But governments elected popularly have not modified the economic project of the dictatorships. On the contrary, they have propelled a certain neo-liberalism (as with Salinas de Gortari, Menem, Fujimori, de Mello, Carlos Perez), and have dismantled the institutions of the populist and developmentalist welfare states, plunging deeper into poverty greater masses of people than during the dictatorships. This reason why, after ten years of *formal* democracies, the claim and call for a concern with the economic level is philosophically, ethically, and objectively relevant. On the other hand, the unpayable external debt incurred by the military dictatorships and deeply corrupt civil governments, and the painful mechanisms of the transnational banks in the central countries, require a certain "legitimacy" of the paying governments. The people were made responsible for electing democratical governments in order to pay a debt which they did not contract and from which they derived no benefit. *Formal* democracy, of which we must applaud many positive aspects, covers up also a great injustice.

It is for this reason that Latin American political philosophy ("politics"), when this is responsible and ethical, ought to be articulated (studying its *mutual conditionality*) through an economic philosophy ("economics").

Today in Latin America, to speak of democracy or politics is not enough. What is necessary is a social or material-economic democracy, and a political philosophy articulated adequately through an economic philosophy.

Now we can understand what it can mean to a philosopher of the periphery when the "warning" or "suggestion" is enunciated in the following manner:

Our complex and confused history only allows us to warn our partners in discussion against the temptation to any foreshortening of history.<sup>92</sup>

We can only make some remarks. In first place, if the history of Europe is complex and confused, ours, for being colonial (that is, has its own history, but is nevertheless determined by foreign metropoleis) is even more complex and confused. In the second place, it is a question of not repeating the five centuries of modernity (so as to arrive in the year 2500 at the European present).<sup>93</sup> Instead, it is necessary to be able to undertake *ones own path of development*, different from the European (because up to the present we have been the other face of the same system, but the exploited, dominated, dependent face); and therefore, structural and in-depth changes cannot be ruled out *a priori*.<sup>94</sup>

## Notes

1. See "Die Diskursethik vor der Herausforderung der *Philosophie der Befreiung*. Versuch einer Antwort an Enrique Dussel" in Raúl Fonet-Betancourt, ed., *Diskursethik oder Befreiungsethik?* (Aachen: Augustinus Buchhanollung 1992), pp. 16-54. Chapter 8, above, is a revised and expanded version of this essay. The program of dialogues was organized and coordinated by Raúl Fonet-Betancourt.
2. See Paul Ricoeur, "Filosofia e Liberazione" in *Filosofia e Liberazione. La sfida del pensiero del Terzo-Mondo* (Lecce: Capone Editors, 1992), pp. 108-15. In this book, chapter 9.
3. See chapter 5, above.
4. See Fonet-Betancourt, ed., *Ethik und Befreiung* (Aachen: Augustinos Buchhandlong, 1990).
5. Fonet-Betancourt, ed., *Diskursethik oder Befreiungsethik?*
6. See "Filosofia e Liberazione," p. 109.
7. Apel, "Die Diskursethik vor der Herausforderung der 'Philosophie der Befreiung,'" in Fonet-Betancourt, *Diskursethik oder Befreiungsethik* pp. 17-18.
8. Apel speaks of "with Popper against Popper," "with Habermas, against Habermas."
9. Apel attempts to do this when he locates me at the level of "the complementarity principle C," but we will see how the dialogue proceeds.
10. This is I. Wallerstein's phrase *The Modern World-System* (New York: Academic Press, 1917, Passim). "World system" (*Weltsystem* or *Système-monde*) indicates a category similar to that of the "universal concrete" in Hegel, as when it is spoken of as *Weltgeschichte*; *Welt* is not *Allgemeinheit* (abstract universality) but the "planetary," a "concrete" that is the sum of all nations but also supranational and international.
11. See Ricoeur in this book, chapter 9, pp. 205-6. Emphasis added, Ricoeur will give us philosophers from the South some "advice," although it is not clear what he has learned from the South. Not to be "shamed" by Europe would appear to have led him not to have learned anything outside Europe. And in this sense he will add later on: "As I said at the beginning, there exist many histories of liberation that do not communicate. If Latin America is confronted by a specific problem which inscribes itself within the framework of North-South relations. Europe is the inheritor of the struggles which have culminated with the liquidation of totalitarianism as illustrated by the words Gulag and Auschwitz. Does this history constitute an obstacle for understanding the Latin American projects of liberation? What is needed is that Europeans admit that the totalitarianism that Latin Americans confront is of a different nature from that which has been known in Europe. These questions ought to remain open. But the reserve and silence that impose themselves should not impede warning our friends [here a certain eurocentric paternalism is made evident] that they ought to extract all the lessons from the failure of bureaucratic economy in Eastern Europe, and that they ought not to set aside political freedom in favor of any increase in technological and economic

- productivity, which ought to be seen instead as components of economic and social liberation" (p. 114).
12. This is the background *philosophical* thesis in my work *The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of "the Other" and the Myth of Modernity* (New York: Continuum, 1995). A translation of the first chapter has appeared in English in John Beverly and José Oviedo, eds., *The Postmodernism Debate in Latin America: A Special Issue of boundary 2*, 20, 3, Fall 1993 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993).
  13. See Dussel, *The Invention of the Americas*, fifth lecture.
  14. I. Wallerstein documents this very well in his work in *The Modern World-System* title Vol. 1, Chap. 6.
  15. See my "Estatuto ideológico del discurso populista" in *Praxis latinoamericana y Filosofía de la Liberación* (Bogota: Nueva America, 1983). pp. 261-305.
  16. This model failed, but it attempted by less developed nations, such as Russia, which tried to industrialize themselves within an instrumental rationality very similar to that of capitalism, with the disadvantage that once the market was eliminated, and thus competition, they did not have at their disposal a mechanism for technological innovation. Furthermore, they imprisoned themselves within the vicious circle of an excessive anti-democratic bureaucratization.
  17. Whereas "populism" is an attempt at an *autonomous* capitalism (where its principal enemy was England before World War II, as it was later for nazism), the military dictatorships, since 1964, organized, an anti-nationalist capitalism or one "dependent" upon North American hegemony.
  18. This global "politics" is invisible to the "political" analyses of European-North American philosophers, from John Rawls to Jürgen Habermas. These States are, on the one hand, the inheritors of colonialism initiated in the 15th century under the diachronic hegemony of Portugal, Spain, Holland, France, England, and lastly the United States (shared with the former USSR from 1945 through 1989). A "political philosophy" cannot forget this concrete-historical horizon with "global" reach, lest it turn unconsciously eurocentric.
  19. This aspect is ignored in all European-North American political philosophies. My *Philosophy of Liberation* begins by talking of war as "the father of everything" since Heraclitus and up through von Clausewitz and Kissinger (Dussel, *Philosophy of Liberation* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1985) p. 1.
  20. See some of my works on political philosophy: my doctoral thesis in political philosophy, which I defended at the University of Madrid, *La problemática del bien común, de los presocráticos a Kelsen*, v. I-III (Madrid, 1959); Vol. IV of *Filosofía ética latinoamericana*; and the following articles: "Pobreza y civilización" (Paris, 1962), in *América latina, dependencia y liberación*, pp. 144-51; "La propiedad en crisis" (París, 1963), in: *América Latina, dependencia y liberación*, pp. 178-89; "Democracia latinoamericana, socialismo y judeocristianismo" (Paris, 1964), in *América Latina, dependencia y liberación*, pp. 152-60; "Hipótesis para el estudio de Latinoamérica en la historia universal" (1966) (Universidad del Nordeste [Resistencia], reprinted in *Método para una filosofía de la liberación*, pp. 2131f; "Cultura, cultura popular latinoamericana y cultura nacional" in *Cuyo* (Mendoza) 4, 1968, pp. 7-40; "De la secularisation au sécularisme de la science, de la Renaissance au XVIIIe siècle" in *Concilium* (París), 47, 1968, pp. 81-101; "Elementos para una filosofía de la política latinoamericana" in *Revista de Filosofía latinoamericana* (Buenos Aires), 1, 1975 pp. 60-80; "La divinización del imperio o de la filosofía de la religión de Hegel" in *Nuevo Mundo* (Buenos Aires), 9-10, 1975, pp. 81-101; "Church-State Relations in Peripheral Latin American Formations" in *The Ecumenical Review*

- (Geneva), 29, 1977, pp. 24-34; "Hipótesis para elaborar el marco teórico de la historia del pensamiento latinoamericano. Estatuto del discurso político populista," Conclusiones del Seminario sobre categorías políticas tenido en el Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos (Mexico: UNAM, 1976), in *Ideas y Valores* (Bogotá, Universidad Nacional), 1977, 50, pp. 35-69; "Filosofía de la liberación y revolución en América Latina" in A. Cuevas, E. Dussel et al., *La filosofía y las revoluciones sociales* (México: Grijalbo, 1978), pp. 25-53; "La chrétienté moderne devant celui que est autre. De l'Indien 'rudo' au 'bon sauvage' " in *Concilium* (Paris) 1978, pp. 65-76; "Basic Rights, Capitalism and Liberation" in *Human Rights. Abstracts of Papers from the Tenth Interamerican Congress of Philosophy*, Tenth Interamerican Congress of Philosophy 18-23 Octubre 1981 (Tallahassee: Florida State University, (1982), p. 33; "Un rapport sur la situation du racisme en Amérique Latine" in *Concilium* (Paris), vol. no. 1982, pp. 89-97; "Christians and Marxists in Latin America," síntesis publicada por *Newsletter from CAREE*, Bulletin 24, 1984; "Cultura latinoamericana y filosofía de la liberación. Cultura popular revolucionaria más allá del populismo y del dogmatismo" in *Ponencias, III Congreso Internacional de Filosofía Latinoamericana* (Bogotá: USTA, 1985), pp. 63-108; "El nacionalismo: Hacia una teoría general" (1992), published in the minutes of the philosophy weekly, *Pontevedra* (España), 1992; "Europa, Modernidad y Eurocentrismo" (1993), forthcoming in *Filosofar Latinoamericano* (Montevideo), y Istituto Filosofico (Napoli), 20, p.
21. A certain European-North American "conventionality" and "contractualism" (with all the naivete that these presupposed, what Marx referred to as the utopias of Robinson Crusoe) are thus sustained, which make themselves evident at all moments, especially when it is attempted to "descend" to the level of the "application" (*Anwendung*) of basic norms, and the necessary conditions for it are not given.
  22. In the second conference of, *Toward the Origin of the Myth of Modernity*, I develop this argument philosophically and historically.
  23. See chapter 7 above.
  24. Between 1959 and 1961 I spent two years in the Middle East (especially in Israel where I studied Hebrew). In 1961 I wrote *El humanismo semita* (Buenos Aires: EDUEBA, 1969), in contraposition to my other work from the same period, *El humanismo helénico* (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1976). As a Latin American, it was necessary to supersede hellenocentrism in order to liberate the possibility of a Latin American philosophy. When I now read the work of Martin Bernal, *Black Athena. The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization*, Vol. One (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1987), I discover something that I had intuited since my first stay in Europe: the German romantics (since Winckelmann, Goethe, Humboldt, Schlegel, and certainly Hegel) needed to "invent" an Aryan, autopoietic Greece. They displaced the African Egypt, and constructed the Indoeuropean myth which grounds the ideology which culminated in nazism (where the University of Berlin and the Gymnasium acted as mediators). This is an entire "construction" that does not precede the 18th century, and of which philosophy, just as it is taught presently, is the fundamental ideological axis.
  25. Enrique Dussel, *The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of "the Other" and the Myth of Modernity* trans. Michael D. Barber (New York: Continuum, 1995)
  26. My ethics, published in 1973, carried the title of "Toward an Ethics of Latin American Liberation." This indicated the maximum horizon of claim or validity. It was an ethics that emerged from Latin American regional culture and did not yet have (although it suspected it and put it in evidence) a "world claim."
  27. See chapter 8, above, p. 163-204.

28. On the "Theory of dependence" see Chap. 15, "Los Manuscritos del 61-63 y el concepto de dependencia" in my *Hacia un Marx desconocido*, pp. 312-62; translated as: "Marx's Economic Manuscripts of 1861-63 and the 'Concept' of Dependence" in *Latin American Perspectives* (Los Angeles), 17,2, 1990, pp. 61-101.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 312.
30. From Franz Hinkelammert see "Die Marxsche Wetzlehre und die Philosophie der Befreiung: einige Probleme der Diskursethik und der Marxismuskritik Apels," unpublished (San José, 1993), p. 21, under the question: "Was aber ist das Erkenntnisziel der Dependenz-theorie? Apel fragt nicht einmal danach. Er unterstellt ihr seine eigenen Erkenntnisziele und fragt dann, ob sie darauf antwortet. Tut sie es nicht, so gilt sie nicht."
31. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
32. With respect to The refutation of Apel's most important objections against the theory of dependence, I cede the word to the philosopher and economist Franz Hinkelammert, in the work cited, and to Hans Schelkshorn, in his contribution presented at the seminar which we organized in Frankfurt, December, 1992. This is still not published.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 115.
34. See some of my already cited works: "La introducción de la *Transformación de la Filosofía* de K.-O. Apel," paragraph 4.3, in Karl-Otto Apel and Enrique Dussel, eds., *Fundamentación de la ética y Filosofía de la Liberación* (México: Siglo XXI, 1992), pp. 71ff. The expression "life community" disconcerted Apel. For this reason, I returned to the topic again and again: see chapter one, section four; chapter two, section four; chapter three, section four; and chapter five, section four; and Chap. 8 of *Las metáforas teológicas de Marx*, entitled "De la económica a la pragmática." Here we only intend to answer some fundamental aspects of Apel's objections, and some of Ricoeur's.
35. See, for instance, by Apel, "Notwendigkeit, Schwierigkeit und Möglichkeit einer philosophischen begründung der Ethik im Zeitalter der Wissenschaft" in P. Kanellopoulos, ed., *Festschrift für K. Tsatsos* (Athens: Nomikai Ekdoseis Ant. 1980), pp. 215-75. In this essay he wrote: "With respect to the ecological crisis, which today represents the greatest problem for humanity..." (p. 215). Today we see that the number one problem is poverty linked to the ecological question.
36. In addition, the great universal religions (Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism) are religions of the "text," and Ricoeur knows this very well.
37. The concept of pauper, frequently written in Latin by Marx, is not a metaphorical, religious, or folkloric category; it is an analectical-economic concept for Marx. It is the person, the "living labor" inasmuch as it is excluded in its relation to capital, once his traditional possibilities for the reproduction of life have been destroyed: *ante festum* when he has yet not obtained work; *post festum* when he is unemployed. It is an "ethical" category par excellence, which is here related to Schelling and Feuerbach, and is later elaborated by Levinas and Liberation Philosophy.
38. In "Die Diskursethik vor der Herausforderung der Philosophie der Befreiung" pp. 38-54.
39. Consider this critique in the four volumes which we have written between 1985 and 1993 on Marx; *La producción teórica de Marx*; *Hacia un Marx desconocido*, *El último Marx (1863-1882)* and *Las metáforas teológicas de Marx*.
40. This question is extensively treated in *El último Marx (1863-1882)*, Chaps. 9 and 10 (pp. 334-450), and also in *Hacia un Marx desconocido*, Chap. 14, paragraph 14.2, "Critique from the Exteriority of Living labor" (pp. 290-97).

41. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 84. Emphasis added.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 75, The first stage is feudal “community.” The second is the social (*gesellschaftliche*) relation of isolated individuals without community in capitalism. The third stage, as we will see, is a “model of impossibility” or simply “ideal.” This last is not a historical moment. We have studied some texts pertaining to this interpretation in “Toward a North-South Philosophical Dialogue,” Chap. 3.
43. Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, Vol. 1, p. 165; *MEGA*, II, 6, p. 103.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 169.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 170.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 171.
47. *MEW*, 25, p. 828. This is from Chap. 28 “The Trinitarian Formula,” Section VII, “Revenues and Their Source.” Translated from the German.
48. *Ibid.*
49. *MEW*, 19, p. 21. “Jeder nach seinen Fähigkeiten, jedem nach seinen Bedürfnissen!”
50. Franz Hinkelammert, *Critica de la razón utópica* (San José: Costa Rica: DEL, 1990), has studied the theme of the “models of impossibility,” such as the *perpetuum mobile* of physics. Einstein shows that perpetual motion is impossible (just as is, in Marx, “the higher stage of communist society, when subordination would have disappeared ...”), but it is a regulative idea, from it are deduced the laws of modern thermodynamics. Just the same, the “realm of freedom” is empirically impossible, but this allows the critique of empirical society.
51. See my detailed discussion of this citation and the entire debate with Mikhailovski in *El último Marx (1863-1882)*, pp. 252-55. Marx's citation can be found in Rubem César Fernandes, *Dilemas do socialismo. A contravérsias entre Marx, Engels e os populistas russos* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1982), pp. 167-68, or in K. Marx-F. Engels, *Escritos sobre Rusia. II* (México: Cuadernos de Pasado y Presente, Number 90, 1990), pp. 64-65. emphasis added. For an English translation see Teodor Shanin, ed. *Late Marx and the Russian Road: Marx and "the peripheries of capitalism"* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1984) p. 136.
52. See Apel, chapter 8, above, pp. 189ff.
53. Marx uses different expressions, all of great richness: “the general critique of the whole system [*Gesamtsystem*] of economic categories” (*Manuscripts of 61-63, MEGA* II, 3, p. 1385); Or, in 1858, “present the system of bourgeois economy critically” (*MEW* 29, p. 550); or “to conceptualize the process of the configuration in its different forms” (*Manuscripts of 61-63*, p. 1499); or “develop genetically the different forms” in order to be able to realize the “genetic presentation” of the concept of capital (*ibid.*). See my *Hacia un Marx desconocido*, pp. 300ff.
54. *Capital*, Vol. I. p. 270.
55. The themes of freedom, equality, property, etc. are dealt with by Marx in the *Grundrisse*, I, pp. 151-62 (see my commentary in *La Producción de Marx*, pp. 109ff), as well as in his later writings, such as *Capital*, Vol. I (1873), at the end of Chap. 6: “The sphere of circulation or commodity exchange, within whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labour-power goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. It is the exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham.” *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 280. (Today we could say: John Rawls.)
56. Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Vol. I, p. 65, chap. VI, paragraphs 1-5.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 47; Chap. 5. For F. Hayek, M. Friedman, and John Rawls himself, the fact that there are rich or poor is a quasi-natural fact, a matter of fortune. This

matter is not the object of philosophical analysis or critique. Evidently, this is not Marx's position.

58. In the *Grundrisse*, November 1857 (*MEGA* II, 2, p. 216); in the *Urtext*, 1859 (*Grundrisse* [Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1974], V. II, p. 215); in the *Manuscripts 61-63*, August 1861 (*MEGA* II, 3, 1, p. 148); in the lost text of Vol. 1 of *Capital* of 1863; in the lecture on *Wage, Price, Profit*, 1865 (*MEW* 16, pp. 129-32); and in the text cited from *Capital*, 1, Chap. 2 (1867), Chap. 4 (1873).
59. In this case we would have to carry out an entire analysis of every form of "contractualism" (to which Ricoeur refers, who accepts as John Rawls's analysis or at least, is not as critical as the case calls for). In fact, Rawls's second principle, which is the economic principle, admits "inequality" as a quasi-natural fact: "Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged..." (*A Theory of Justice* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972], Chap. 2, paragraph II, p. 60). To distinguish the political-liberal equality of "basic liberties" from these inequalities, he later adds: "While the distribution of wealth and income *need not be equal*, it must be to everyone's advantage..." p. 61. Why is political equality demanded and economic inequality admitted? This is what Marx puts in question with his critical theory of contract (dealt with in Chap. 4 of *Capital*, Vol. 1, 1873).
60. In the same way that in argumentation the "non-freedom" of the one who argues questions all relations as irrational, in the economic contract the fact that one of the contract partners is violently coerced makes the contract unjust (and also irrational): "It is forgotten, on one side, that the *presupposition* [*Voraussetzung*, a word much liked by Apel] of exchange value, as the objective basis of the whole of the system of production, already in itself implies compulsion over the individual, since his immediate product is not a product for him, but only *becomes* such in the social process, and since it must take on this general but nevertheless external form; and that the individual has an existence only as a producer of exchange value, hence that the whole negation of his natural existence is already implied; that he is therefore entirely determined by society....It is forgotten....What is overlooked..." (*Grundrisse*, p. 247-48).
61. Apel, like Habermas with respect to his critique of "productivism" in *Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, thinks that Marx gives a fundamental importance to the relation person-work-nature: "The theory of 'alienation' or 'objectification,' inasmuch as it is essentially referred, in Marx, to the positive basic concept of 'living labor' [*lebendige Arbeit*], and not primarily to the relation of reciprocity with the interaction, which in the life world is complementary to labor" (Apel, "Die Diskursethik vor der Herausforderung," p. 39. But it is not like this. For Marx the essential was the practical relationship person-to-person.
62. See the philosophical Hegelian reflection on these categories which we presented in "Hermeneutics and Liberation," chapter 5, section 5, above.
63. Karl Marx, *Manuscripts of 61-63*, in *MEGA* II, 3,1, pp. 147-48. See my *Hacia un Marx desconocido*, pp. 62ff.
64. And now as an "analectical" category of economics, and not as a socio-folkloric metaphor or allegory.
65. This is Kant's definition of *Aufklärung*, in his *Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?* (A 481): "Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbst verschuldeten Unmündigkeit."
66. Karl Marx, *Manuscripts of 61-63*, 4, 5, in *MEGA* II, 3,5, p. 1818.
67. *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 128.
68. *MEGA*, II,4, 5. p. 19.



69. *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 128.
70. "Substance" in the sense of Hegel's *Logik*: a real thing that produces an effect.
71. For Marx "world" means the same as, in Hegel's *Logik*, that which refers to the "totality of phenomena" in economics: the "world of commodities," where the commodity is a being (thing) (*Dasein*) in which the essence of capital manifests (*erscheint*) itself, i.e., value.
72. "Use-values are only realized [*verwirklicht*] in use or in consumption. They constitute the *material content* of wealth, whatever its social form may be [level B 1, B2. etc.]. In the form of society to be considered here [level B2] they are also the material bearers [trager] of ...exchange value." *Capital*, Vol. I, Chap. I, p. 126, *MEGA II*, 6, p. 70.
73. This with respect to the first moment of its description in Vol. I of *Capital*. Later Marx deals with the question of the transition of value to price, thanks to competition in the abstract, that is, the transition of value to the price of production. In Vol. 3 of *Capital*, Marx only arrives at the price of production. Only in a separate treatise after *Capital*, *Competition*, would he have dealt with the final problem of supply and demand, the ultimate price, and therein the buying and consumption of commodities. That he did not reach this problematic does not mean that we should not attempt to develop this discourse from within Marx. P. Sraffa attempts in his work *Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), to avoid this transition of value to price. On the polemic of this "transfer" of value, see J. Steedman, *Marx after Sraffa* (London: New Left Books, 1981), and J. Steedman, P. Sweezy, A. Sheikh, eds., *The Value Controversy* (London: New Left Books, 1981). In Raúl Rojas, *Das unvollendete Projekt. Zur Entstehungsgeschichte von Marx. "Kapital"* (Hamburg: Argument, 1989), the German version of this debate can be observed.
74. W. Stanley Jevons, *The Theory of Political Economy* (London: MacMillan and Co., limit, 1924), p. 1.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
77. On this depends the "final degree of utility" (*Ibid.*, p. 52), the point of departure for future marginalism, i.e., marginal use.
78. We ought to remember that the "poor" are people who have "needs" but no money (because they have no wage, or because the objective conditions for the reproduction of life in their traditional modes of production have been destroyed or displaced). This means the "poor" are not solvent: they are not part of the market. The poor are miserable, and with them the cynical calculus of market techniques and science can dispense. In Bangladesh or Sub-Saharan Africa they become the "excluded" of the world market.
79. Mauro Marini, *Dialéctica de la dependencia* (México: ERA, 1973).
80. I leave to Franz Hinkelammert, "Die marxsche Wertlehre und die Philosophie der Befreiung," the refutation of a critical political economy.
81. See note 21 for some of my work on political philosophy. Note especially Vol. 4 of *Filosofía ética latinoamericana*, which deals with Latin American politics, written in 1974, before my intensive Marx studies. In the "Latin American Seminar" in Paris, 1964 (published in 1965 with works by Ricoeur and myself in *Esprit*), the debate was strictly "political."
82. In Latin America there are other reasons why the hegemonic political philosophies do not deal with "economics." The defense of the neo-liberal formal democracies (such as those of Alfonsín, Sarney, Salinas de Gortari) need to de-couple the political

- problem (democracy) from economics (the misery of the majority, which increases day to day). We will deal with this question later.
83. Jürgen Habermas, *Theorie and Practice*, trans. John Viertel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973). pp. 195-97. (*Theorie und Praxis* [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1982], pp. 228-29. Emphasis added.
  84. Paul Ricoeur. *Du text à l'action* (Paris: Seuil. 1986), p. 393ff.
  85. *Ibid.*, p. 396.
  86. *Ibid.*, p. 395.
  87. Perhaps for the same reason Ricoeur does not understand my objection. I do not say that the "text" is in reality the "product" of labor. This would be an unjustifiable hermeneutical economism. What I indicated in my critique was that, just as a product is achieved through work, and a worker can be dominated by another (c.g., *conquistador*)—and injustice here means the robbery of the value of the work of the dominated—in an analogous manner, the dominator (the conqueror of the Mexican Yucatan) who has written a "text" (for example, the Christian New Testament), does not live by the rules of hermeneutic justice, first, when they impose on the Mayas of Yucatan a "foreign text" under threat of violence, and second, when they ignore the "dominated text"—for example, the Popol Vuh of the Mayas. That is, and this is the question not answered by Ricoeur; Is not hermeneutics implicated with concrete historical cases such as those of the conquest of America by the Spaniards or of Canada by the French? To what an extent can the dominated read the "text" of the dominator, or the dominator the "text" of the dominated? Which are the hermeneutical difficulties, the categories that would have to be developed in order to be able to analyze these cases which are our interest in Latin America? It concerns, then, developing hermeneutical themes not developed in the center, but of great interest for the periphery. Not more, not less. Feuerbach, in *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. George Eliot (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957) Chap. 27, at the end, writes; "Bread and wine are, as to their materials, products of Nature; as to their form, product of man... Eating and drinking is the mystery of the Lord's supper; eating and drinking is, in fact, in itself a religious act; at least, ought to be so." p. 276-277. It would appear that Ricoeur reads the "text", but he has no "Bread and Wine" to eat and to drink. His text has "sense", but it is without carnal ("flesh") content. *Hermeneutics without economics is empty; economics without hermeneutics is blind!*
  88. And therefore his dialogue partners are Weber, Mead, Durkheim, Parsons, et al. If he were to have a dialogue with the economists Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, Marx, Jevons, Marshall, Keynes, or Hayek, he would have to make more complex his concept of rationality when incorporating the *material-technical* mediation of the product of the practical-economic relationship, which is very different from that of language in the practical-pragmatic relation.
  89. Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), pp. 3-4.
  90. See for instance the works of Guillermo O'Donnell, "Apuntes para una teoría del Estado" in *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, 40, 4, 1978, pp. 1157 -99; *El Estado autoritario-burocrático* (Buenos Aires; Ed. Belgrano, 1982). Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, *La democracia en México* (Mexico: ERA, 1965); Norbert Lechner, *El proyecto neoconservador y la democracia* (Santiago, Chile: FLACSO, 1981), and *Estado y política en América Latina* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1981); Daniel Camacho, ed., *Autoritarismo y alternativas populares en América Latina* (San José; FLACSO, 1982); Daniel Camacho, ed., *Autoritarismo y alternativas populares en América Latina* (San

- José: FLASCO, 1982); Tomás Moulian, *Democracia y socialismo en Chile* (Santiago, Chile: FLACSO, 1983).
91. With respect to this debate see the essay by Marcos Roitman Rosenmann, "la Política y las opciones de la Democracia en América latina," unpublished presentation at Pontevedra, 10 April 1991; Franz Hinkelammert, *Democracia y Totalitarismo* (San José: DEI, 1987). By various authors, *El control político en el Cono Sur* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1978); also Norbert Lechner, *Los patios interiores de la democracia: subjetividad y política* (Santiago, Chile: FCE, 1990); Guillermo O'Donnell, *Transiciones desde un gobierno autoritario* Vol. I-IV (Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1986), and *Notas para el estudio de procesos de democratización política* (Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad, 1979). By various authors, "Movimientos políticos, sociales y populares en América latina" in *América Latina: entre los mitos y la utopía* (Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1990), pp. 247-360; José Coraggio and Diana Dere, eds, *La transición difícil* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1986); Agustín Cuevas, *Las democracias restringidas en América Latina* (Ecuador: Ed. Planteta, 1988); Torcuato Di Tella, "Reform and the Politics of Social Democracy" in *Latin American Politics* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), pp. 142-76; Pablo González Casanova, "La democracia en América Latina. Actualidad y perspectiva," presentation at the Seminario Internacional, Madrid, 15-20 April 1991, and *El poder al pueblo* (Mexico: Océano, 1985). Also Peter Hengstenberg, *Profundización de la democracia, Estrategias en América Latina y Europa* (Caracas: Nueva Sociedad, 1989); Julio Labastida, ed., *Los nuevos procesos sociales y la teoría política contemporánea* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1986); David Lebmann, *Democracy and Development in Latin America* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990); Carlos Matus, "la gobernabilidad de un sistema social" in *Diseños para el cambio* (Caracas: Nueva Imagen, 1989); Ronaldo Munck, *Latin America: The Transition to Democracy* (Arlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1989); Orlando Nuñez and Roger Burbach, *Democracia y revolución en las América* (Managua: Ed. Vanguardia, 1986); Carlos Pereyra, *Sobre la Democracia* (Mexico: Cal y Arena, 1990); Juan Carlos Portantiero, *La producción de un orden: ensayos sobre democracia entre el estado y la sociedad* (Buenos Aires: Nueva Visión, 1988); Marcos Roitman and Carlos Castro Gil, eds., *América Latina entre los mitos y la utopía* (Madrid: Ed. Complutense, 1990); and with others (eds.), *Quel avenir pour la démocratie en Amérique Latine?* (Paris: CNRS, 1989).
92. Paul Ricoeur, in this book, page 431.
93. The "developmentalist fallacy" consists precisely in suggesting to other cultures or peoples to follow the European path of development. The expression "shortening of history" is ambiguous. Does it mean to follow the same slow European path or the impossibility of a rapid revolutionary path or one's own path? It is rational to attempt to save time, within a realist project, in order to evade the "vicious circle" which necessarily leads to failure (as can be the case with a neo-liberal project of development, whose fruits will never reach "development" due to the international structure of exploitation which prevents sufficient national accumulation in order to attain a real "take off").
94. This is what I, in my first dialogue with Apel, called the "historically possible communication community" (in Apel-Dussel, eds., *Fundamentación de la ética y Filosofía de la Liberación*, pp. 78ff). It is a "project of liberation" that demands knowing how to "govern" the permanent crisis of peripheral countries, but which does not declare *a priori* as impossible that there could be a revolutionary change (although the actual circumstances are far from permitting it, but only situated political prudence can evaluate it).