FOR MANY YEARS, Enrique Dussel has been meeting with Karl-Otto Apel in a "North-South Dialogue" in which they and several other philosophers and theologians exchange papers. Here I will briefly summarize Apel's philosophical position and address what I see as the two central issues between Apel and Dussel: namely, whether the philosophy of liberation can be accommodated within Apel's transcendental pragmatics and whether Dussel's appropriation of Marx is anachronistic and mistaken, as Apel claims.

KARL-OTTO APEL 'S TRANSCENDENTAL PRAGMATICS

Although Apel's philosophical vocation derived from his witnessing the destruction of moral consciousness that occurred during the Nazi era, developing a philosophy restorative of such consciousness required criticism of several philosophical alternatives. In the first place, Apel opposes logical positivism, which, in his view, illegitimately reduces the notion of meaning to verification, universally applies natural scientific method without first reflecting on its appropriateness for the problems considered, ignores how its emphasis on protocol statements depends upon an option for one language game and life form among many, and conceals its own metaphysics in trying to do away with the metaphysics of others. Apel's critique of positivism relies on a richer appreciation of the variety of language uses beyond the positivist focus solely on semantics and syntactics. This recognition of diverse language uses was ushered in by Charles Morris's recovery of the pragmatic dimensions of language, the supercession of the earlier Witt-
genstein by the later, and the increasing linguistic awareness in phenomenology as it developed from Husserl to Heidegger. Once one is plunged into this richer pragmatic dimension of hermeneutics and communal language games, one no longer need philosophize on the basis of the relationship of isolated subject to a material object, that is, on the basis of the methodological solipsism that pervades the philosophical tradition. One must, instead, conceive of nonobjectifiable co-subjects in relationship. In a sense, positivism's metaphysical presuppositions never permit it even to envision this dimension, which can be described only through a reconstructive, nonempiricist methodology. Even within Apel's critique of positivism, one detects the outlines of his own transcendental pragmatics—"pragmatics" because it reincorporates the intersubjective and use dimensions of language neglected by a positivism focused solely on semantics and syntax, and "transcendental" because it constantly and self-reflexively brings to light unacknowledged positivist suppositions. In so doing, Apel expands the idea of rationality, since the rationality by which positivism absolutizes scientific rationality does not fall under science itself.

Following Peirce, who, unlike other pragmatists, did not sacrifice the regulative ideal of truth to his concern for cognition's function in real life, Apel does not find the turn to the hermeneutic-pragmatic dimension sufficient for a philosophy intent on reinstating moral consciousness. Apel sees Wittgenstein as evading the question of the bindingness of his own claims by stating that he does not present a general doctrine, but only therapeutically dissolves the webs that a linguistically naive philosophy has woven for itself. By refusing to engage in any reflexive self-justification of his own philosophy, which includes an entirely new insight into the essence of speech, Wittgenstein falls prey to what Apel calls Logosvergessenheit ("forgetfulness of reason"). Similarly, Gadamer and Heidegger raise universal validity claims—for instance, that all truth-claims are a function of temporal being and history—on the basis of which they claim to undermine all claims to universal validity. This ignoring of the self-undermining of their own claims, another form of Logosvergessenheit, constitutes a central strategy of the philosophy of postmodernism and neopragmatism following the lead of Gadamer and Heidegger. For
example, Gadamer, in Apel's view, leaves unanswered the question about the conditions of the possibility of the general validity of his own propositions, abandoning the ancient and modern idea of a universal science in favor of concrete immersion in what is "valid for us now." Without a critical mediation between a transcendental ethic and an historical hermeneutic, there is a danger of the relativistic reduction of the normative to the authority of a given tradition. Arnold Gehlen's authoritarian social theory—that the contemporary lack of meaning-orientation and stabilization of behavior can be remedied by compliance with what benefits positive functioning institutions (what Apel calls elsewhere "Eichmann ethics") reflects precisely this relinquishing of the central mission of philosophy as defender of the meta-institution of speech and the rational conversation of all humanity, in which what is taken for granted and unquestioned can always be problematized. Once again, by requiring them to recognize the status of their own philosophical position, which claims a validity not to be undermined simply because it has an historical genesis, Apel wields a transcendental method against the historicist/relativist tendencies in postmodernism. Although the pragmatic dimensions of Apel's theory surfaces in his critique of positivism, it is the transcendental aspects that gain importance in the criticism of hermeneutical philosophy.

The inescapable character of these transcendental aspects becomes evident in Apel's discussion of Popper's belief that the choice between his own "critical rationalism," which is similar to Apel's view, and irrationalism depends on an "act of faith," an "irrational moral decision." While conceding that anyone can will what they want, Apel argues that, whatever one's choice, a choice for rationality is capable of being rationally grounded, and the opposing choice can be shown to be irrational (in Apel's terms, "performatively self-contradictory"). In Apel's view, the skeptic who argues against rationality already partakes in certain transcendental presuppositions in favor of rationality.

In truth the presupposed problem situation does not exist, that is, the situation that we would stand in front of the question whether we should be rational, logical, or moral and at the same time that we could already offer arguments—or at least pose the question of why [be rational, logical, or moral].
Affirmatively expressed: Whoever seriously poses this why-question has already thereby entered upon the field of argumentative discourse. That is to say, *through reflection upon the meaning of his own action* he can realize that he has already necessarily recognized the rules, or norms, of rational, cooperative argumentation and therewith also the ethical norms of a communication community.  

Apel asserts further that the skeptic who refuses even to argue is doomed to become irrelevant for the discussion, and that even if the skeptic merely *acts* in a meaningful manner, he or she presupposes such transcendental rules of cooperative argumentation, for, as Wittgenstein has shown, no language game is possible on the basis of permanent lying and therefore no meaningful action would be either.  

But what precisely are these transcendental presuppositions of argumentation itself? Apel agrees with Habermas that every thinkable empirical examination of hypotheses presupposes the presence of the four validity claims of human communication acts (claims to factual truth, moral rightness, veracity, and comprehensibility), the hope for the consensual resolution of disputed claims, and the primacy of communicative rationality over merely instrumental/strategic rationality. Furthermore, on the ethical plane, in every authentic argument participants implicitly, reciprocally, and respectfully recognize each other as an autonomous subject of logical argumentation, as one not to be coerced by force, and entitled to assent freely only to arguments found convincing. Where this does not occur, where force other than the force of the better argument is employed, the communicative situation is experienced as falling short of the anticipation of an ideal communication community, which one might not have previously recognized as having been contrafactually anticipated in that very discourse and which one realizes is also anticipated in preferable noncoercive communicative settings. Since anyone who seriously argues presupposes these necessary conditions of argumentation, the conditions constitute a philosophically ultimate grounding point that one cannot evade (*nicht hintergehbar*) or contest without committing a performative self-contradiction. Thus, one arguing that there are not four validity claims could not avoid implicitly raising such claims in the argument, or one would act self-contradictorily in seeking consensual agreement.
that consensual resolution is not involved in argumentation, or one who argues for strategic rationality in discourse acts communicatively and not strategically in that very discourse (or if strategically, then parasitically within a communicative framework), or one arguing in favor of violence contradicts the nonviolent framework of the very argument he employs. These suppositions of argument are such that even the effort to falsify them must make use of them, and, as such, they form the transcendental meaning-conditions of the principle of falsification itself. Furthermore, while any particular validity claim is revisable, those conditions which make particular validity claims and their abrogation possible are not empirically examinable, falsifiable, or fallible.\(^5\)

Important philosophical implications follow from this transcendental pragmatics. Not only does Apel battle methodological solipsism by making the structure of communication itself and the ideal communication community transcendental, but even private processes of thinking, doubting, questioning, self-criticism, and self-understanding presuppose the norms of straightforward communication under the conditions of a reciprocal recognition between communication partners. Furthermore, Apel's discovery of the transcendental communitarian conditions of all speech, including speech among scientists, indicates that science itself unfolds within the already ethical framework of discourse itself. Apel thereby reverses the centuries-old presumption, shared by Max Weber and Anglo-American ethics, that science has driven ethics from the field of rationality and left it to merely private, arbitrary choice. In further dialogue with Weber, Apel distinguishes between a first level of discourse ethics (A), in which the formal procedural principle of argumentative consensus formation is philosophically established, and a second level (B) of fallible application in which the interests of all affected and the knowledge of experts must be brought to bear. At the second level, one realizes that application conditions for discourse are not in place, and one may resort to a Weberian ethics of responsibility (as opposed to a Kantian conviction ethics) and may be forced to employ strategic action, even violence, to bring about one's *telos*, the realization of unconstrained discourse in which each participant's deontological rights are upheld.\(^6\)

Transcendental pragmatics mandates that discourse be charac-
terized by universal openness to considering and acknowledging, when justified, all possible claims of all possible discourse-members regarding all possible human needs. This openness, based on Apel's postconventional, universal-principle ethics, contrasts with the conventional ethics of someone like Aristotle, who prohibited killing, lying, cheating, and the violation of rights only with reference to fellow members of the polis, but not in regard to barbarians. In Apel's view, the restlessness of communicative rationality that cannot refrain from entertaining questions calls for what Peirce described as the self-surrender of egoistic self-interest in favor of the "transsubjectivity" of the argumentative representation of interests. To reach valid solutions, one cannot exclude from discourse potential members whose rights are equal to those of actual participants, whether those potential members are geographically distant or belong to future generations. The ethics of the ideal communication community, constantly challenging restrictive real communication communities, requires the institutionalization of repression-free consultation. For Apel, the quality of argumentation must correspond to this inclusiveness, in the sense that participants should not seek victory in argumentation as if it were a competitive sport, but, rather, allow the "arguments to struggle for victory and see which prove themselves stronger." Apel agrees with Rawls that discourse entails altruistic "role taking" in order that the other be adequately heard. A final consequence of Apel's view that transcendental pragmatic conditions govern every discourse is that there cannot be a wholly other kind of reason that would relativize these conditions of rationality, since one would have to argue for the validity of that other type of rationality and in that argument one would presuppose and make use of the very conditions one is trying to relativize. Though such an appeal to an "other reason" may express a legitimate demand for philosophical caution or modesty, this reason could never be used to falsify the necessary presuppositions of argumentation without a performative self-contradiction. 

CAN TRANSCENDENTAL PRAGMATICS REPLACE THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIBERATION?

In recent meetings of the North-South Dialogue, Apel has recognized a rapprochement between his transcendental pragmatics
and Dussel's philosophy of liberation. He agrees with Dussel's emphasis on the importance of the "interpellation" of the poor "Third World" "Other," but he believes that this interpellation in no way threatens his transcendental-pragmatic standpoint. Rather, in Apel's view, this Other's protest actually pertains to part B of discourse ethics, which must determine what ought to be done when the application-conditions of the ethics of an ideal communication community, grounded in part A, are not in place. Part A, in fact, demands that members of the privileged communication community must represent the interests of all affected by their decision, even if they are not at present participants, and part B further requires that relations be so established that no adult, mentally sound human being be excluded from discourse because of structural forces. In Apel's opinion, Dussel basically agrees that the situation of the exclusion of the Other could be handled (behandelt) as a theme of part B of discourse ethics. If Apel is correct, then transcendental pragmatics would be able to replace the philosophy of liberation effectively, since its nonnaturalistic concept of self-critical rationality could achieve the very solidarity and openness to the Other the philosophy of liberation calls for.\footnote{8}

It is interesting to notice that Apel does not identify Dussel as an anarchistic postmodernist in favor of irrationality. Apel is correct in so doing since Dussel himself, as I have pointed out, describes himself as a transmodernist who cannot rest content with the skepticism and relativism that often characterize forms of postmodernism. Similarly, my entire first chapter attempted to present Levinas as a prorational phenomenologist, exploring neglected horizons in the tradition of Husserl and articulating the preconditions of rationality itself—the face of the Other—inventing discourse, and placing in question all discourses on the verge of congealing into totalities. This Levinas, although usually associated with contemporary French postmodernists, cannot be construed as antirational or opposed to the rationalist leanings of transcendental pragmatics. Secondly, Apel, although clearly in the Kantian philosophical tradition, never complains about Dussel's heteronomy to the Other, as Schutte and Cerutti do. Apel's silence here is again accurate since, as I have shown in chapter 5, this understanding of Dussel and Levinas is not warranted.\footnote{9}
But it is doubtful whether the philosophy of liberation can be so easily accommodated within Apel's system. Apel's incorporation of Dussel in Part B overlooks their basic differences. First of all, Apel, in reaction to the traditional subject-object paradigm of philosophy and related functionalist-behaviorist objectifications of communication partners, conceives human relations as taking place between nonobjectifiable co-subjects reciprocally and respectfully recognizing each other as equal partners in a discourse. For Levinas and Dussel, such a view, though legitimate at the level of the Third, portrays relationships as reversible in terms of formal logic, in the mode of an "alongside of," from an extrinsic third-person perspective. Although Apel's reconstructive transcendental methodology makes an important advance over previous theories in bringing to light the co-subject one faces in discourse, Levinas and Dussel penetrate more deeply into the way that Other appears to an autonomous, phenomenologically self-reflective I prior to the question of reciprocation. Their phenomenological descriptions from the perspective of the I facing the Other disclose an Other commanding one ethically "from a height," not as one's equal, not as identical or interchangeable with one. 10

The theories of both Apel and the philosophy of liberation target the skeptic, with Apel contending that the skeptic who argues need only become aware of the presuppositions she is already making use of, and the nonarguing skeptic, though consigned to irrelevance, would uncover transcendental presuppositions if he would simply attend to his own meaningful acting. Rather than adopting a maieutic, Socratic method of alerting a subject to his or her own (albeit communal) presuppositions, as Apel does, Levinas locates the challenge to the skeptic outside the skeptic, in exteriority, in the irrecusable face that opens the primordial discourse not even a proto-Nietzschean like Thrasymachus could avoid. In contrast to Descartes's idea of the Infinite, which we cannot account for out of our own resources, Socrates's method represents the primacy of the same determined "to receive nothing of the Other but what is in me, as though from all eternity I was in possession of what comes to me from the outside." Similarly, for Dussel, the Other, beyond every totality and before the
commencement of argumentation, stands in a relationship that haunts even the cynic who bases his own morality of "national security" on the irrational impulse of power, governs with strategic reason alone, and refuses the rational discourse he regards as totally ineffective against his power. Here the philosophy of liberation, through illuminating the Other's inescapable ethical demand from the exteriority in spite of even the cynic's interior resolve not to pay heed, seems to afford a more comprehensive and primordial context within which discourse ethics might take its place.¹¹

These diverse treatments of the skeptic/cynic demonstrate that, although both Apel and the philosophy of liberation assert the dynamism of rationality, they localize the source of that dynamism differently. Apel finds it within the demands for self-consistency essential to self-critical rationality, and Levinas and Dussel detect it in the Other preceding, evoking, and questioning rationality. These diverse understandings of the source of rationality's dynamism reflect fundamental differences in methodology. Dussel and Levinas opt for an intuitive-descriptive method that depicts the way the Other comes to appearance, and although one might posit the Other as an essential constituent of the ideal unlimited speech community, as Dussel has suggested, this intuitive-descriptive methodology will always be needed to revivify the height of the Other's demand and to prevent the face-to-face from collapsing into an "alongside of." Apel, in contrast, employs a transcendental method, continually searching for the presupposed but unreflected-upon presuppositions of argumentation itself. From this perspective, he can lay claim to the terrain on which the philosophy of liberation labors, since pretensions to validity are expressed in every face-to-face relationship and in Dussel's and Levinas's second-level, reflective account of such face-to-face relationships. Whenever one raises claims to validity, even if these must be adjudicated through compared intuitions as in the case of Dussel's and Levinas's phenomenologies, one is already implicitly partaking of the presuppositions that transcendental pragmatics articulates. These respective methodologies carry with them limitations, since transcendental pragmatics will inevitably level the "curvature of space" upward to the Other that a descriptive phenomenological method can disclose. Similarly, if
Lyotard's reconstruction of Levinas's prescriptive (as opposed to denotative) intent is correct, then an intuitive-descriptive methodology lacks the resources to justify ethical norms or to provide them with any transcendental foundation, as Apel's transcendental pragmatics has done. A phenomenological description of the conditions within which rationality arises cannot fulfill the task of providing a rational grounding of ethics, and there is no evidence that Levinas has ever conceived his philosophy in this role.¹²

Despite all these differences, there is a possible bridge between the philosophy of liberation and transcendental pragmatics in Levinas's discussion of the Third. The proximity of the third party modifies the asymmetrical demands of the face-to-face, and a series of questions arises regarding comparison, coexistence, contemporaneity, assembling, order, thematization, and the intelligibility of a system. The metaphysical relationship of the I with the Other moves into a form of the We, aspires to a State, institutions, and laws, which are the source of universality. Philosophy, too, undergoes transformation, searching for principles of unification and limiting the infinite demands experienced in the anarchic face-to-face. The self, Other-centered in the dyadic moment, is now called upon to concern itself with itself, to limit itself in trying to live up to its unlimited responsibility for the Other, although this self-restriction still ought to be motivated "in the name of this unlimited responsibility." In effect, at the level of the Third, a transition has taken place from the attitude of one facing another to the attitude of one extrinsically regarding the parties to a relationship as equal and interchangeable—to what Levinas might call a third-person point of view in the mode of "alongside of." At this level of the Third, one adopts a philosophical posture that, as Lyotard puts it, deploys a denotative metalanguage at one remove from the immediate prescription of the Other. At this level, though, it would seem that Apel's (and Kant's) norm that human relations ought to involve "nonobjectifiable co-subjects reciprocally and respectfully recognizing each other as equal partners to a discourse" converges with the experience of the prescriptive in the face-to-face better than other theoretical accounts.¹³

But for Levinas and Dussel, these norms of equality and reci-
proximity depend on the preoriginary moment of the face-to-face. "Equality is produced where the other commands the same and reveals himself to the same in responsibility; otherwise it is but an abstract idea and word. It cannot be detached from the welcoming of the face, of which it is a moment."\textsuperscript{14} In a manner reminiscent of Husserlian constitution, Levinas attempts to dig beneath the abstract idea and word "equality" to uncover the motivations and interpersonal dynamics that lead from the face-to-face to the egalitarian society and that have eventuated in the build-up of the concept "equality." In a highly condensed passage of \textit{Totality and Infinity}, Levinas observes how the poor one or the stranger, who had been above me in the dyadic relation, becomes my equal when the Third enters. At that point, I become conscious that the Other whom I serve also serves as Other, the Third, and that we are both equally servants. Even the Other's mastery of me is seen to be at the service of an Other (the Third). I realize that, as equal to the Other, I also possess mastery, but my mastery, like the Other's, is also mastery for the sake of Others. Equality need not originate from frustrated aspirations to dominate the Other, as Glaucon suggests in Book II of the \textit{Republic}; rather, it bears the traces of an original reverence for the Other beyond solipsistic egoism, an original inequality of service demanded by the Other, from which, paradoxically, equality, as a toning down of exigencies, derives. One does not begin jealously guarding one's equality with the Other and occasionally undertake altruistic forays toward the Other, as traditional philosophical wisdom might have it; one experiences the Other's infinite demand first, before the idea of equality ever intervenes to restrain it. Once again, Levinas situates the theoretical activity of norm derivation with reference to the ethical relationship, just as throughout \textit{Totality and Infinity} that relationship had formed the matrix within which the search for truth (epistemology), theology, and language emerges.\textsuperscript{15}

What purpose can Levinas have for separating out these strata of experience, that of the face-to-face and that of the Third, with their accompanying notions of reciprocity and equality, such that equality becomes a "moment" of the face? After all, these strata are so inextricably interwoven in everyday experience that non-phenomenological common sense might balk at the idea that the Other's unlimited imperative takes precedence over duties to the
self. By distinguishing the stratum of the face-to-face prior to the Third, Levinas obtains a fulcrum for the critique of institutions such as the state, the economy, philosophy, or even Apel's reciprocal discourse—all of which develop in tandem with the appearance of the Third. Such institutions, in Levinas's view, are "at every moment on the point of having their center of gravitation in themselves and weighing on their own account." One can come to think of them as impersonal totalities governed by anonymous human forces. In such a situation, reciprocity may degenerate into a mere compromise between conflicting strategic interests, and any sense of responsibility for those who are too powerless to affect those interests may vanish. Levinas, however, would protest in the name of the face of the Other, never eliminated by the appearance of the Third.

But the contemporaneousness of the multiple is tied about the diachrony of the two: justice remains justice only in a society where there is no distinction between those close and those far off, but in which there also remains the impossibility of passing by the closest. The equality of all is borne by my inequality, the surplus of my duties over my rights. The forgetting of self moves justice. It is then unimportant to know if the egalitarian and just state in which man is fulfilled (and which is to be set up, and especially maintained) proceeds from a war of all against all, or from the irreducible responsibility of the one for all, and if it can do without friendships and faces.¹⁶

Not only does this command of the Other in the face-to-face stand as an inexhaustible challenge to institutions generated at the level of the Third to respond to those beyond their totalities, but it also calls for a significant transformation of human motivation in at least two respects. Apel himself repeatedly and correctly notes that even though one begins with discourse-ethical principles, one cannot presume that others are so directed; hence, one even has a duty to mistrust others. Nevertheless, for Apel one must tentatively and cautiously work to replace strategic interaction with discursive-consensual conflict resolution. Insofar as Levinasian-Dusselian ethics employs the norms of equality and reciprocity established at the level of the Third, and insofar as it recognizes that capitulation to another need not be for that Oth-
er's good, it might share Apel's hesitancy. However, the face of the Other inspires one to take appropriate risks, to place oneself in danger for the Other, and thus to hasten this replacement of strategic relations with discursive ones. Dussel has masterfully described how liberation begins when the oppressor trusts in the world of the Other, at first inadequately comprehensible. A philosophy such as Dussel's or Levinas's, which is interested in the liberation of the poor, will tend to emphasize the risks that need to be taken on behalf of the Other, more than the healthy corrective that a Weberian ethics of responsibility affords an ethics of conviction.17

Furthermore, the truly heroic figures in human emancipation display a striking willingness to surpass reciprocity and to allow themselves to be held hostage in order that others' rights be upheld. Martin Luther King, Jr., for instance, endured firehosing, pelting with rocks and spittle, the constant threat of character assassination, and even death itself so that the rights of other African Americans would be respected. Unlike Western existentialists preoccupied with their own deaths, Mahatma Gandhi and Oscar Romero were so obsessed with the murder of Others that they did not protect themselves against their own deaths. To attend truly to the call of the Other motivates toward this extreme opposite of strategic rationality such that, in Levinas's terms, one comes to fear murder more than death.18

In summary, Levinas's level of the Third corresponds to the level at which Apel's transcendental pragmatics unfolds, with Levinas's phenomenological descriptions of the face-to-face constituting the Third's originary matrix and presupposition. Further, if my earlier interpretation was accurate—namely, that Levinas's philosophy of the face-to-face parallels the later Husserl's exploration of the horizons of theory itself, illuminating the ethical relationship as the context within which all theory arises, including Apel's transcendental theory—then could it not be said that Levinas's work must be understood as occurring at a "pretranscendental level," exploring essential ethical dimensions on a plane analogous to that of the Husserlian life-world? Apel, on the other hand, in his reaction to positivistic-scientistic portrayals of language and intersubjectivity, recovers the pragmatic dimensions of speech, the historical-linguistic-hermeneutic context for theory
itself, forgotten by an abstract science no longer mindful of its own pretheoretical (life-world?) origins, which Heidegger and Wittgenstein have thoroughly explored. However, since Apel finds within these pretheoretical relationships only relative, socio-historically conditioned moral belief systems instead of the essential ethical features that Levinas's descriptive phenomenology turns up, he has recourse to a transcendental level to investigate the transcendental presuppositions implicit in all speech, whether in everyday life or science. Indeed, the development of Apel's entire system, as I have depicted it, revolves around the projects of countering positivism by restoring to philosophy a linguistic, hermeneutic life-world, and yet overcoming relativist-historicist tendencies through a species of transcendental reflection on the conditions of the possibility of speech itself.  

My suggestion would be that the philosophy of liberation and transcendental pragmatics can be located at different levels within a common architectonic. Just as the Husserlian phenomenological system extended from the life-world to the transcendental ego, so it is reasonable to posit a similar structure in the domain of ethics. At the pretranscendental level, the philosophy of liberation marks out rationality's beginning in the ethical demand of the Other, which extends even to the cynic who refuses discourse and ceaselessly renews all theory and thus rationality itself. At the transcendental level, Apel, who has made the linguistic turn and so cannot be satisfied with Husserl's solitary transcendental ego, reflects on reflection itself and its own intersubjective presuppositions, particularly the presuppositions of speech and argumentation. Whether reflecting on forgotten horizons prior to the origin of theory itself or on the operative but not admitted presuppositions within every ongoing theory, both levels belong on a common continuum, because they are the work of a single reason, authentically owning up to what it usually bypasses or ignores and thereby rendering itself all the more rational. Indeed, the statements of this paragraph itself are of a unavoidable transcendental quality, reflecting on reason's own unexplored horizons in the philosophy of liberation and reflecting on reflection's own often unacknowledged presuppositions in transcendental pragmatics and demarcating their distinctive positions on a common architectonic continuum.
These two points of view belong on a common scale for many other reasons. Both levels focus on intersubjectivity in contrast to the solipsism characteristic of the previous philosophies of consciousness. Whether we speak of the conviction of the philosophy of liberation that Levinas's ethical metaphysics precedes ontology and all other theory, or whether we recall that, for Apel, far from its driving ethics off the field of rationality, science itself unfolds within the already ethical framework of discourse itself, it is clear that both viewpoints espouse a first philosophy that is ethical in character. Whether we consider the authenticity of transcendental pragmatic rationality that would forbid the exclusion from discourse of any possible claims from any possible discourse partners regarding any possible human needs, or we look to Levinas's Other jeopardizing every closed totality, both viewpoints demand the demolition of barriers of exclusion. Whether we pay heed to the way transcendental pragmatics's conditions of argumentation render fallibilism possible and necessary, or take note of the Other in whose presence every claim becomes contestable and every discourse unpredictable, it is clear that in both perspectives reason shows itself as vulnerable and self-critical. In addition, it would seem that Apel's transcendentally developed notion of ethical rationality, equally supportive of human solidarity and equally resistant to the strategization of rationality, lives from the forgotten experience of the face-to-face that Levinas discloses. Finally, when transcendental pragmatics and the philosophy of liberation alike compete to include the other as a useful subsidiary of itself, one is reminded of the way in which Husserl's phenomenology could be legitimately undertaken from the starting point of either the life-world as the origin of theory or the transcendental ego as implicit in the life-world and in every reflective endeavor. Instead of competitively trying to subsume each other, would it not be better if the philosophy of liberation and transcendental pragmatics could conceive of themselves as two irreducible but complementary pursuits within a common ethical enterprise, in which each is particularly suited to the other for the many reasons mentioned above? Within such a philosophical division of labor, would not the hostile polarity between modernity and postmodernity be overcome as well? 20

But, despite this continuity and complementarity, dissonances
that are never completely reconcilable and yet stimulate creativity persist at both levels, such as those between the methods of description and transcendental reflection. Similarly, a philosophy whose purpose involves continual reacquaintance with the Other's easily overlooked height and resistance to totalization will not easily be at peace with a philosophy intent on tirelessly reminding interlocutors of the necessary conditions they implicitly presuppose every time they speak. Tensions will always flare between a more critically oriented philosophy that conceives its role as vigilantly struggling to reduce the betrayal of the saying in the said and a more constructively oriented philosophy whose role is to uphold the meta-institution of speech and the rational conversation of all humanity. While transcendental pragmatics strives for that solidarity and openness to the Other characteristic of the philosophy of liberation (and so itself deserves to be called a philosophy of liberation), the Dusselian-Levinasian philosophy of liberation, functioning at a different level of the architectonic and utilizing a different methodology, in the end cannot be replaced without losses. Without the philosophy of liberation, one would lose sight of an account of origins and of the constant and rigorous challenge that the Other, precisely by being exterior to every totality, poses for every hermeneutical interpretation: namely, that in the end it be ethical; for every claim to rationality, that in the end it be all the more rational; and for every reciprocal accord, that in the end it not be merely strategic. Finally, the philosophy of liberation fosters the motivation upon which selfless, daring, and heroic emancipation relies.

IS DUSSEL'S REAPPROPRIATION OF MARX ANACHRONISTIC?

Apel's criticism of Dussel's reappropriation of Marx occurs in his essay "Die Diskursethik vor der Herausforderung der Dritten Welt," in Diskursethik oder Befreiungsethik. In that essay, Apel distinguishes between Dussel's claim that the poverty-stricken 75 percent of the world is excluded from the real communication community of humanity—a claim with which Apel agrees—and the claim that Apel has not read Marx's Capital carefully enough and so cannot understand Marx's significance for the liberation
of the "Third World"—a claim to which Apel takes exception.
Apel admits, though, that there might be some significance to
Dussel's appeal to Marx, given Dussel's Latin American context
and background, in spite of the failure of the state-socialist alter-
native to capitalism in Eastern Europe.\(^{21}\)

Marx, in Apel's opinion, basing himself on the dialectical laws
of history and strengthened by his scientific transformation in
later life, considered the market economy irreformable and was
willing to substitute a social utopia for that economy and its ac-
companying system of liberal rights. Because of Dussel's rejection
of similar reformist possibilities in his *Philosophy of Liberation*
(1977), he appears anachronistic in the face of the European ex-
perience, in which the social democracies of Western Europe,
with their welfare provisions and democratic procedures, have de-
veloped a better alternative to "real existing socialism" itself.
Latin Americans have responded to such charges of anachronism
by dubbing this a *Eurocentric* approach and offering their own "de-
pendence theory," according to which wealthy nations control
the framework conditions of the world economy, establishing the
terms of trade and originating and defining the debt crisis in such
a way that an overcoming of the progressive impoverishment of
the Third World masses has become in principle impossible.\(^ {22}\)

Apel, though, believes that the interrelations among individual
lands of Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the North are consider-
ably more diverse than the "grand theories of the left" recognize,
with their talk of the Third World depending on the First World.
The great differences in adaptation to the capitalist system
throughout the Third World (the economic success of former
Japanese colonies such as Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore, for
example) suggest that poverty results in part from avoidable fail-
ures of development politics, social experiments, civil wars, and
sufficient or insufficient inherited sociocultural dispositions. If
the historical-geographical presuppositions of dependence the-
ory are oversimplified, so are its economic premises. Citing the
Marxist-inspired Thomas Hurtienne, Apel argues that many of
the structural features attributed to peripheral capitalism these
days (for example, high luxury consumption among the wealthy,
exports driven by the needs of foreign markets instead of the
inner one, great heterogeneity in income distribution, and mas-
sivization of poverty) also characterized England and Germany at the beginning of their development, such that it took workers and farmers in those lands a hundred years to be able to share in the fruit of their productivity.\(^{23}\)

Before raising three major and final objections to Dussel's espousal of Marx, Apel points out the socioeconomic facts that would justify Dussel's ethical demand upon the North if that were all that his philosophy of liberation were issuing. Apel cites the destruction and enslavement of cultures at the time of colonialization, the subsequent economic domination of formerly colonized countries, the problem of overpopulation, the debt crisis, and disastrous ecological exploitation. But in order to solve these problems, Apel, concurring with earlier criticisms raised in particular by Cerutti, insists that what is called for is not "metaphysical-rhetorical oversimplifications, but rather the critical collaboration of philosophy with the empirical sciences in an ethically relevant form." But Apel also turns his criticisms on the West when he asserts that any effort to reduce ethics to the preservation or strengthening of the customariness of the West's cultural tradition in the face of this world crisis is nothing but irresponsible escapism. A universalistic macroethics of humanity—along the lines of Apel's own transcendental pragmatics—alone can ground the ethical norms necessary for transforming this world.\(^{24}\)

Apel objects more specifically to Marx's theory of alienation, his labor theory of value, and his historical determinism. Marx's theory of alienation developed within the philosophical paradigm of the subject-object relationship prevalent in German idealism without giving sufficient attention to the reciprocity relationships of acting subjects and the linguistic communication. In the tradition of recent critical theory, Apel prefers to conceive economic systems as quasi-automatically functioning action-systems entailing a necessary alienation and yet susceptible to limited practical control and organizational interventions agreed to in argumentative discourse and directed toward reform (and not total revolution).\(^{25}\)

As regards Marx's theory of surplus value, Apel believes that Marx resorted to a "hyperabstraction" in order to show how the exchange values of objects could be equilibrated, in spite of their
diverse use values. In Marx's view, these exchange values were determined according to the common standard of human labor-time invested in them and without regard for natural endowments, use value, or the play of supply and demand. Apel believes that Marx engaged in this hyperabstraction because he focused on the subject acting on the object and investing it with value rather than on the reciprocal exchange relations between seller and buyer, dependent on the supply and demand and generated in part by the usefulness of the object to the buyer. Had Marx focused on these relations, he would have placed his emphasis on communicative relations in the life-world, whose obligation it is to restrain the systemic alienation that is never totally eliminable. As a consequence, Marxism would not have turned, as it did, to either a regressive-utopian elimination of culture or the bureaucratization and paralysis of a state system.26

Apel's final critique of Marx focuses on his scientific prognosis of history on the basis of a dialectical theory of history. This "metaposition" enables the Marxist to explain (erklären) away opposing positions as context-determined phases of bourgeois thinking—with the result that truth and goodness are finally determined, not through argumentative discourse, but through the Politburo's insight into the necessary course of history. In Apel's view, Dussel has distanced himself from this interpretation of Marx by reading him as an ethician guided by Kant's categorical imperative, and such an ethical interpretation is incompatible with historicism, whether of the Marxist or the postmodern brand.27

In order to grasp and assess a possible Dusselian response to these criticisms, it is important to recall that Dussel's immersion in the manuscripts underlying Capital has led him to understand the late Marx in a different way from the antiphilosophical "scientific" economist that Engels or Althusser portrays. For Dussel, Marx is constructing an ontology of economics, a blend of anthropological, ethical, and metaphysical elements that I have dubbed an "ethical hermeneutics" of the economy, which interprets the entire capitalist system from the viewpoint of that system's exterior, that is, living labor. As we have seen, Marx did conceive his work as "scientific," not in a naturalist, empiricist sense, but, rather, according to German idealism's notion of Wissenschaft,
which moves beyond phenomena to seek out at a different level
the underlying essence, that is, the mutual connections—and
thus thinks from the phenomena back to the essence. According
to Dussel, the "rationality" of Marx's discourse depends upon just
this "scientific" explanation, in a systematic and fundamental
way, of the development of the concept of capital, even if some of
Marx's affirmations at the phenomenal level may be falsified or
shown to be impossible. Marx's ethical ontology of capitalism pro-
vides a framework from which one can interpret facts without
contradicting them, generate concrete scientific investigations
open to empirical verification or refutation, and develop joint
political decisions.28

But a question arises: How can one reconcile this ethical-her-
meneutical view of economic science with prevailing notions of
empirical economic science which demand that hypotheses be
capable of withstanding tests of falsifiability, notions that implic-
itly underlie Apel's critique of both Marx and Dussel? Following
modern empirical economics, Apel chides Marx for neglecting
that the laws of supply and demand are constitutive for the value
of goods. But Apel does not seem to observe the distinctions that
Dussel and Marx make, in particular, that surplus value is created
in the sphere of production through labor's unpaid investment of
time, even though supply and demand in the sphere of circulation
affect the amount of profit a capitalist will realize from the surplus
value of the goods he or she brings to the market. Marx never
denies that supply and demand play a key role, but, according
to Marx's interpretive distinctions, their function is to distribute
surplus value, not create it.29

However, a central question remains: namely, whether Dussel's
and Marx's interpretation of economic facts is falsifiable. Factu-
ally, while both Dussel and the bourgeois economist can agree
that the capitalist's sales on the market net him or her a profit
after expenses are deducted and in relation to the current supply
and demand, Dussel, as ethical hermeneuticist dedicated to capi-
talism's Other in the tradition of Marx, seeks the "hidden funda-
ment" behind these empirical phenomena. In order to keep the
economic theorist vividly aware that exploited living labor and
nothing else (supply and demand, for example) lies at the origin
of value in capitalism, Dussel insists that the surplus value created
by unpaid labor in the originary relationship between capitalist and worker establishes the reserve on which supply and demand exercise their influence and from which profit eventually results. What conceivable empirical data could disprove this ethically oriented conception of surplus value and its origin? By reverting from the empirically observed phenomena to the underlying essence—here the surplus value created in the sphere of production through exploited labor—Dussel and Marx furnish an ethical framework for economic science in much the same way as Dussel's ethical hermeneutics in the field of history involved adopting a heuristic or interpretive preference for the forgotten Other. Dussel appropriates Marx's categorical framework, although more elaborate than the simple resolve in history to interpret events from the view of the Other, in order never to allow one to lose sight of the forgotten Other of the capitalist economy, living labor, which, even as it creates value for capitalism, suffers most acutely its unforeseen consequences (for example, crises). No empirical phenomenal facts about the economy can refute this hermeneutical framework, any more than individual historical facts can abolish the decision to interpret history by focusing on the suppressed Other. Ethical hermeneutics does not contradict empirical phenomena; it situates them within an interpretation that begins with these phenomena and immediately moves to a more abstract plane.

Similarly, regarding the dependence theory, there can certainly be empirical agreement that the merging of goods toward a common average price on the international market will benefit those who produce goods more cheaply (those of central capital) or of less value (in Marx's terms); that even those who produce goods more expensively (peripheral capitalism) or of greater value (again according to Marx) can still make some profit; and that peripheral capitalism, in spite of its gains, seems destined to lag relative to central capitalism. But Dussel, given his ethical-hermeneutical account of the origin of profit in the more encompassing surplus value, interprets these facts by arguing that less-developed capital thereby transfers some of its surplus value (from which it might have taken a greater profit) to developed capital (which extracts its greater profit from this transferred surplus value). While both Dussel and the bourgeois economist can admit that
peripheral capitalism in spite of its slow progress is handicapped relative to a stronger capitalism, Dussel's interpretation of these phenomena in terms of transferred surplus value connects them to an underlying ethical concern for the exploited (here the workers of developing nations) and to his project of studying capitalism from their viewpoint and in terms of its impact upon them. In conclusion, Apel's reading of Dussel as engaging in "metaphysical-rhetorical oversimplifications" instead of collaborating with the empirical sciences seems to me to ignore that Dussel does not compete with the empirical sciences, but rather engages in an ethical hermeneutics that begins with empirical economic phenomena and interprets them within an ethical categorical framework.31

In response to Apel's and Cerutti's objection that the dependence theory and he ignore the diversity of nations and the multi-causal nature of world poverty, Dussel admits that his analysis of the law of dependence proceeds at an abstract level (more concrete than that of capital in general, but more abstract than that of the concrete social formation) that should not be confused with the investigations of concrete, multiple, phenomenal, and historical appearances of dependence and the many concrete variables interacting at this level. Indeed, economics itself, in order to clarify the economic laws that would function if everyone were to be solely economically motivated, forms constructs of actors, similar to Weberian types, in abstraction from the multiple motivations characterizing agents in everyday life. Dussel admits that counteracting influences may interfere with the action of a law in general and seem to annul it, giving it the character of only a tendency whose effects are manifest in impressive form under determinate circumstances and in the course of prolonged periods. As an instance of phenomena seeming to contradict the law of dependence, Dussel cites a counterexample raised by Samir Amin: namely, that the exports of peripheral countries, such as coffee, are produced by companies with high organic composition (more similar to those of central capitalism). Dussel counter-argues that such goods really do not enter into competition with the goods of central capitalism—a key feature of the dependence theory—because they are not produced in central capitalist countries and central capitalism exercises a monopoly as a buyer in
such cases. Tendentially, the law of dependence is fulfilled in spite of the phenomenal factors that only appear to annul it. While Apel accuses Dussel of naïve neglect of the diverse, concrete, historical, geographical, social, and cultural factors affecting dependence, Dussel's bracketing of these factors seems part of a highly self-conscious methodology not all that different from the methods of Weberian-type construction or economic science. In addition, while allowing for a methodological abstraction from cultural factors, Dussel evidences his awareness of their importance in his mistrust of Marxist internationalism's tendency to overlook distinctive nationalist resources for liberation and his preference for social analysis based on the pueblo instead of class. Moreover, Dussel himself explicitly rejects the idea that one could explain all the concrete levels of different national histories through the theory of dependence, and hence one ought not to ask more from that theory than it can deliver. Furthermore, though Dussel is not opposed to Hurtienne's view that peripheral capitalism may attain in a hundred years the standard of living in present-day central capitalism, he believes that such development exacts its toll in large transfers of surplus value (and human life), and even then, a century from now, central capitalism ought to be relatively far ahead of its later-starting counterpart.32

Dussel seems to confirm Apel's suspicion that he rejects reformist approaches to the international market economy. After two treatments of the theory of dependence in La producción teórica de Marx and Hacia un Marx desconocido, Dussel concludes with discussions of "national" and "popular" liberation in which he makes the following point:

The process of national and popular liberation is the only response to destroy the mechanisms of the transference of surplus value, in constant and increasing manner, away from less-developed global national capital. But this presupposes that one transcend capitalism as such, since the extraction of surplus value (the relationship of capital to living labor) is articulated in terms of the transference of surplus value in competition between global national capitals at different stages of development. Because of the fact of the weakness of peripheral capitalism (due to the structural transference of surplus value), the entire population cannot be subsumed within the class of salaried labor: for this reason, the great popular [populares]
marginal masses play a protagonist function in the process of change. The popular movement and organization becomes a political priority. It does not clearly follow from the transference of surplus value that popular national revolutions are the only solution. One might recommend patience to developing nations, pointing out that, in spite of transferred surplus value, developing nations can still make a profit, that development is occurring, and that some developing nations such as China, Mexico, or those of southeast Asia seem on verge of surpassing their current status as developing nations. But Dussel would no doubt find this appeal for patience on the part of developing nations highly Eurocentric, particularly since it overlooks or downplays the deep misery "the great popular [populares] marginal masses" must undergo until that future moment arrives—a misery outweighing even the immense sufferings inflicted on those nations Dussel praises for seeking to leave the dialectic of the international competition of capitalism and facing internal economic problems and external pressures (for example, from the United States), such as Cuba and Nicaragua. Apel would probably object that all developing nations, even those who seek to escape the competition, must inevitably take account of the systemic imperatives of the market economy. Hence, while Apel might consider revolution utopian, he would place his hope in the communicative processes curbing the deleterious effects visited upon the life-world by the blind, merely technical functioning of the capitalist economic system and overly bureaucratized socialism as well, as has occurred in the Western social democracies. Given the grave inequities in the distribution of wealth and power in many developing nations, one wonders if some other level B tactics—along the lines that Dussel suggests—might not be necessary to realize this ideal of life-world communities checking systemic incursions.

Given the tendency of critical theory at this practical level (Part B, to be sure) to allow systemic forces some free play in dialectical relationship to the life-world, some critical theorists, such as James Marsh, have shown more sympathy for Dussel's position. Marsh has attempted to implant requirements for material conditions, such as adequate food, housing, and education, within the
norm of the ideal communication community itself (Part A) by arguing that these conditions constitute the conditions of the possibility of communication and therefore of communicative ethics. Some Apelians, though, intent on maintaining the priority of communicative ethics over any solutions derived from it, might protest that communicative ethics itself constitutes the condition of the possibility for establishing these conditions of its own possibility that Marsh spells out. They might charge Marsh with transferring issues of the B level, regarding the implementation of communication ethics through removal of obstacles to it, to the A level. Dussel and the philosophy of liberation would no doubt mistrust such a distinction on the level of justification since it would tend to privilege at a practical level democratic dialogic processes. Dussel undoubtedly would be reluctant to entrust the practical resolution of urgent questions regarding malnutrition, starvation, and massive unemployment in developing nations to slow-working, haphazard democratic procedures, which so often have shown themselves indifferent to the pain of those on their periphery. This debate, now returned to the practical level, raises the question of what comes first, dialogic, democratic decision procedures requisite for nontotalitarian conflict-resolution or the socialist provision of the basic needs requisite for participating in such procedures. As such, the debate encapsulates differences between democracy and socialism, between the West and the former Eastern bloc, between the developed nations, where capitalism's irrationalities do not produce as much misery, and those developing.

There might be grounds for rapprochement, however, at this Practical level when one considers Apel's condemnation of the recommendation (attributed to von Hayek) that humanity maintain the equilibrium of the world's biosphere by allowing those in the overpopulated Third World who cannot help themselves to starve. In the light of Apel's denunciation of sacrificing human life as a means to ecological ends, it would not seem consistent for him to tolerate at this practical level the immense suffering of peripheral capitalism, far more extreme than that of the Western social democracies, just because gradual and unpredictable democratic procedures ought to take their course or just because some real communication communities have not as yet come to
recognize the immorality of the current arrangements. To think otherwise would subordinate the Third World starving to the liberalist telos of an unobstructed exchange of ideas—an equivalent to sacrificing them for the world's biosphere. The extreme plight of Third World nations might constitute one of those situations in which an ethics of responsibility might, regrettably, require strategic, violent action or some coercive supervision of the economy by the state, in order to put in place and ensure the material conditions necessary for the communicative action called for by communicative ethics itself and necessary if one ever hopes to realize the higher-level ideal that the life-world restrain encroaching systems.36

If communicative ethics would espouse this practical position—which seems highly plausible—it would converge with the view defended in Franz Hinkelammert's *Crítica a la razón utópica*—a treatise in theoretical economics endorsed by Dussel. Hinkelammert, equally offended by Hayek's comments on sacrificing lives, nevertheless admits, on the one hand, that a market economy with autonomous businesses is necessary because mercantile relations supply for the limitations of knowledge befalling any economic planner. However, state planning of the economy is also indispensable, to ensure full employment and the satisfaction of basic needs, which are the center of institutionality. While Apel, if I might construe him as in accord in with Hinkelammert, would be conceding something here to the socialist position of Dussel, would not Dussel also have to allow something of a market economy with some of the systemic alienation that Apel and Hinkelammert claim is unavoidable? When it comes to the dire situations of the Third World, Apel's reformism would have to approach revolution, just as Dussel's revolution can never be total.37

In regard to Marx's theory of alienation, insofar as some form of market would be preserved even after a popular, national revolution, I do not see how Dussel can hope to achieve any utopian overcoming of all alienation, as Apel suggests. Yet Dussel's new reading of Marx would seem to offset the old interpretations that Marx's view is developed within the paradigm of the subject-object relationship prevalent in German idealism. In Dussel's view, Marx, motivated by his concern for the Other of capitalism—that is, living labor—begins his analysis of capital with the social rela-
tionship between living labor and the capitalist, whose profiting off of unrecompensed labor Marx characterizes as "robbery." Indeed, the relationship between capitalism and its Other is at least co-originary with the labor theory of value, and, as Dussel reads Marx, it seems preeminent in importance. For Dussel, Marx's focus on surplus value throughout *Capital* has little to do with Marx's, German idealism's, and particularly Hegel's admiration of the human power to bestow value triumphantly on inert matter through labor, and everything to do with tracing all of capitalism's categories back to that originary relationship in which the Other of capitalism was treated unfairly and subsequently forgotten. Even though Apel recognizes Dussel's basic intersubjective paradigm and cites his works on Marx, Apel still seems to read Marx through the eyes of Hegel, as if Marx were materializing Hegelian idealism. How different is Dussel's reading of Marx through the eyes of Levinas, as if Marx were doing an ethical hermeneutics of the economy, beginning with the excluded Other?138

Similarly, Apel argues that Marx, unwittingly under the influence of German idealism and its philosophy of the subject, sought the origin of surplus value in labor's investment in the object—"hyperabstracting" from other factors such as supply and demand, which reflect reciprocal-exchange human relationships. Here Apel seems to lack a clear understanding of the distinctions Marx makes between production and circulation and of the function of supply and demand in his thought. Moreover, Dussel never would allow such a neat separation of *poesis* (as action on nature) from *praxis* (political interrelationships). If Marx's economics constitute an ethical hermeneutics beginning from the system's excluded Other, living labor, then the theory of surplus value serves as a constant reminder of the originary exploitative human relationship that exists when the totally dispossessed faces a prospective employer. Apel seems to neglect how human relationships, albeit distorted ones, enter the capitalist picture at the level of production long before goods are placed in circulation on the market—perhaps because he is so under the sway of a German idealist reading of Marx instead of a Levinasian one. In fact, it was Marx's attention to the ethical demands of human communicative relationships, not his neglect of them, as Apel
suggests, that led him to hope for an total overcoming of alienation, however unachievable such a dream might be.\(^{59}\)

Finally, it is obvious that Dussel no longer partakes of the scientific prognosis of history, falsely attributed to Marx, who never believed that Russia would have to pass inevitably through capitalism on its way to socialism. Furthermore, it is significant that, after he has described the transfer of surplus value from less-developed to developed economies, Dussel resorts to a political solution that does not rigorously follow from its economic antecedents, instead of predicting economically that Third World nations will pass from capitalism directly and inevitably into socialism. Furthermore, in light of his focus on the exteriority that submits even socialist regimes to question, Dussel could never accept a mechanistic view of history or a Politburo defining all truth and goodness—these would be nothing more than new totalities closed against the Infinity beyond them.\(^{40}\)

**CONCLUSION**

In response to charges from Schutte and Cerutti that Dussel's philosophy is irrationalist, I have argued that they have not taken sufficient account of his Levinasian presuppositions, due in part to the fact that Dussel often does not present them fully. The charge that Dussel promotes blind worship of the Other fails to pay attention to Dussel's own texts and to such key Levinasian concepts as separation, apology, and discourse. My interpretation of Levinas as a phenomenologist, but in a new key, can help defend Dussel from the criticisms that he refuses to test validity claims, dogmatically affirms his own foundationalism instead of giving an account of his own philosophizing, and arrogantly claims to have overcome all European rationality. With this emphasis on his Levinasian roots, Dussel's "foundation" should lead not to pomposity but to self-undermining, opening the philosopher of liberation to questions and to cooperation with the empirical sciences. The early ambiguous relationship of the philosophy of liberation with Peronism does not destroy its rational credentials, precisely because the relationship was ambiguous and because the criticism itself seems to commit the genetic fallacy.
Finally, I have concurred with Schutte that Dussel's sexual ethics in particular do not adequately break with the natural law ethics with which he began. This does not weaken his present Levinasian position; it merely suggests that he needs to take it more seriously. In regard to Apel's attacks on Dussel, I have argued that Dussel's philosophy, self-denominated as "transmodern" is not in opposition to Apel's rational transcendental pragmatics. Though Dussel's Levinasian method cannot provide a rational grounding for ethics as Apel has, Dussel can locate Apel's enterprise and concur with it as taking place after the entrance of the Third in Levinasian terminology. Dussel's own work, like Levinas's, attempts to return to a preoriginary moment beneath the level of the Third, revivify the height of the Other that Apel's transcendental pragmatics inevitably levels, and thus explain how the beginning of discursive rationality unfolds in the presence of the Other, whose questions challenge and renew rationality, making it all the more rational. I have suggested that Dussel and Apel belong within a common philosophical architectonic, utilizing different but complementary methods. Both can be conceived as carrying on the work of a single reason, owning up to what it often ignores, exploring the horizons prior to the origin of theory in Dussel's case and uncovering the presuppositions of all ongoing theory and argumentation in Apel's.

I have also argued that Dussel's Marxism must be understood in terms of German idealism's *Wissenschaft*, seeking the underlying essence beyond phenomena and not competing with the empirical sciences, even though it is capable of generating testable claims at the phenomenal level. The "essence" Dussel finds, though, is the ethical framework, the relationship with capitalism's Other, through which he interprets empirical economic phenomena. Empirical phenomena can no more jeopardize this ethical hermeneutics than individual historical facts can dissolve a framework or heuristic for doing history that would focus itself on allowing the voice of the excluded Other to be heard. I have also made the case that Apel fails to understand the abstractive level of Dussel's "law of dependence." I have tried to show that in the face of the plight of developing nations, Apel would be moved toward a planned economy, as Hinkelammert describes it, while Dussel would be unable to deny the need for a market econ-
omy with some inescapable alienation. Finally, I have explained how Dussel's ethical hermeneutics of the economy in the pattern of Marx need not partake of the presuppositions of the philosophy of the subject in accounting for alienation and surplus value, or endorse any mechanistic theory of history that would relativize any claims to validity except those of the Politburo.

NOTES


4. Transformation der Philosophie, 2:411-14/267-70. This last point sounds very similar to a position of Jürgen Habermas's that while the arguing skeptic cannot be contradicted, the skeptic living in everyday life cannot deny the discourse principles implicit in communicative action except under pain of self-destruction. Apel rejects this argument as insufficient because it does not reach beyond Kohlberg's conventional level to a level of rational discourse. Apel prefers to point to the way the
meaningfulness of action depends on language games which in turn depend on transcendental presuppositions. It would seem to me that both Apel and Habermas are doing a similar thing, eliciting presuppositions from the meaningful activity of the skeptic apart from the skeptic's involvement in formal philosophical argument. Cf. Karl-Otto Apel, "Normative Begründung der 'Kritischen Theorie' durch Rekurs auf lebensweltliche Sittlichkeit? Ein transzendentalpragmatisch orientierte Versuch, mit Habermas gegen Habermas zu denken," in Zwischenbetrachtungen im Prozess der Aufklärung zum 60 Geburtstag J. Habermas, ed. Axel Honneth and Thomas McCarthy (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989), pp. 58-59; Razón comunicativa y responsabilidad solidaria, ed. Adela Cortina. (Salamanca: Ediciones Sigueme, 1988) , pp. 94-95.


10. Totality and Infinity, pp. 22-30, 35-36, 80-81, 289-90; "Die Entfal-

12. "La, introducción de la 'Transformatión de la Filosofía' de K.-O. Apel y la filosofía de la liberación," pp. 76-77; see above. chap. 1, pp. 11-12.


15. Ibid., pp. 213-14. Again, Levinas recommends no blind servility toward the Other here. As I have said, the demand of the Other for service in the face-to-face, made on the phenomenologically self-reflective and autonomous I, does not preclude apology or disagreement with the Other. Also, in the face-to-face, Levinas describes only the experience of normativity coming from the Other and does not set out to determine which specific norms are valid. In the situation of the Third, Levinas attempts to explain how the norm of reciprocity and equality is generated through interpersonal dynamics motivated by the claim of the Other on me (a claim not yet elaborated into a norm or not yet justified as a norm). And once that norm is in place, it can be used to assess whether specific claims of the Other are justifiable—of course, one must repeatedly return to the face-to-face to ensure that one's assessment is not totalizing. At every stage, then, there is always the sense that one is responsible for the Other, but not that one ought to do whatever the Other bids.


248-51; "La ética del discurso como ética de la responsabilidad," pp. 16-19, 29-30, 41; "Normative Begründung der 'Kritischen Theorie' durch Rekurs auf lebensweltliche Sittlichkeit," pp. 21-58. In this latter essay, Apel chides Habermas for not keeping these levels distinct and for seeking ultimate grounding in the life-world instead of at a transcendental level.

20. *Transformation der Philosophie*, 2:423-35/267-85; *Diskurs und Verantwortung*, pp. 202-203, 215, 235-36, 266. Dussel, as already mentioned (see above, p. 42), does not always observe the distinctiveness of these levels. His *Ética de la liberación* articulates philosophy of liberation principles. These principles could be fashioned out of exposure to the face of the Other at the pretranscendental level, but the experience of the face, the critical counterpole to all principles, always needs to be distinguished from the denotative issuing of principles. Because his philosophy of liberation encompasses these two poles while keeping them distinct, Dussel is entitled to situate the philosophy of liberation, as he does in his recently published *The Underside of Modernity*, as lying in-between Apel's universalism and Richard Rorty's skepticism and in-between Apel's formalism and Charles Taylor's *Sittlichkeit*. See *Underside of Modernity*, pp. 114,147-48.


22. Ibid., pp. 22-26.

23. Ibid., pp. 27-32.

24. Ibid., pp. 32-38, see above, chap. 5, pp. 115-116.


27. Ibid., pp. 50-53.

28. See above, chap. 4, pp. 90-105; *El último Marx*, pp. 119, 361, 405. To see Dussel's own response to Apel's critique of his Marxism—a response that became available only after this volume was in press—see *Underside of Modernity*, pp. 213-39.

29. See above, chap. 4, pp. 90-97.


33. *Hacia un Marx desconocido*, pp. 358, see also pp. 357-61; *La producción teórica de Marx*, pp. 400-13.
36. *Diskurs und Verantwortung*, pp. 62-63. Dussel admits that Marx's "realm of freedom" and the "perfect community of producers" is only a regulative ideal, which, like the ideal of perfect economic planning according to Hinkelammert, cannot be realized completely. Cf. *Under-side of Modernity*, p. 222.
40. See above, chap. 4, pp. 104-105.